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My ability to complete coursework and write this dissertation at the University of 
Michigan owes, in a fundamental material sense, to the decades of struggle by the Graduate 
Employees Organization (AFT/AFL-CIO 3550). GEO members secured tuition waivers and 
maintained wage levels that made it possible for my family and me to remain fed and sheltered 
during seven years of drastic cost of living increases near the University of Michigan, won and 
expanded health care for graduate workers and their dependents, and built a community that I 
will always treasure. Solidarity forever.  
The members of my dissertation committee have been generous with their time and 
support throughout the project. Arlene Saxonhouse raised a series of questions that transformed 
my general interests in persuasion, the formation of identities and political concerns, and social 
movements into a far more coherent project than I had ever envisioned on my own. Arlene’s 
encouragement to think strategically about new labor-intensive projects, advice on coping 
mechanisms for the academic publishing industry, empathy for graduate students with families, 
and deep wells of Ann Arbor lore each proved invaluable at various points in the project. Liz 
Wingrove’s feedback helped me frame every chapter in this dissertation, and I remain in awe of 
her ability and willingness to provide line-by-line editing feedback while also communicating a 
clear sense of the project’s big picture. Lisa Disch read and critiqued more drafts of Chapters 5 
and 7 than I can recall, commiserated on the challenges of local politics and labor activism, and 
pressed me to clarify the dissertation’s political implications. Chapters 5 and 7 would not exist in 
their present form, and Chapter 6 would not exist at all, without her insights. Eric Swanson 
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helped me think about the relationship between language, ideology, and social hierarchy, 
especially in the context of racist rhetorical appeals, and modeled collegial, respectful, and 
mutually productive inquiry across disciplinary boundaries. This dissertation’s merits owe much 
to each committee member’s efforts; its limitations are entirely my own responsibility.  
The community around the Political Theory Workshop at the University of Michigan has 
improved my scholarship in every way. Aside from extensive opportunities to read and discuss 
work from the rest of Michigan’s political theory subfield, its law, courts, and politics subfield, 
and guests from elsewhere in the university and in neighboring schools, the workshop discussed 
almost every substantive chapter in this dissertation, often more than once. I’m especially 
grateful to those who were the discussants for my papers – Bonnie Washick, Zev Berger, Lucy 
Peterson, Max Lykins, David Suell, Amir Fleischmann, Danny Blinderman, Mel Rieck, and 
Renee Heberle – and to faculty in the department who, although not on my committee, met 
repeatedly with me to offer advice on the project. David Temin and Mariah Zeisberg both 
offered extensive comments on drafts, directed me to additional literature, and helped me work 
out some of the thornier issues on several chapters, especially Chapters 5 and 6. Nev Koker and 
Ben Peterson went out of their way to welcome me to the department and point me to resources 
for graduate students in Michigan’s political theory community, and Janice Feng’s insights on 
Hobbes and social theory and commiserations on teaching assignments made a couple of very 
difficult semesters much better.  
Many people outside the University of Michigan’s political theory community also 
supported my research. I am grateful to chairs, discussants, fellow panel members, and attendees 
at the annual meetings of the Michigan Political Science Association, Southern Political Science 
Association, and Coalition of Graduate Employee Unions, all of whom helped me clarify and 
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sharpen elements of Chapters 4 and 7. Devin Stauffer took time to chat with me between panels 
at the SPSA conference, offering valuable advice on how to pitch the dissertation in various 
academic contexts. Three anonymous reviewers at The Review of Politics, as well as journal 
editor Ruth Abbey, provided a great deal of constructive feedback for an article-length version of 
Chapter 4, much of which also helped me improve the version in this dissertation. Andrew 
Hertzoff and Monicka Tutschka helped me in more ways than I could possibly list during my 
M.A. studies and while applying for graduate school. Their support made graduate studies 
possible for me in every dimension; I hope that this project justifies their efforts. Gayle Rubin, 
Anne Harper-Nobles, and Greg Nobles discussed their experiences as labor activists and directed 
me to additional archives for my work on Chapter 7; while not all of this information made it 
into later drafts of the chapter, it enriched my background understanding of the subject material.  
The COVID-19 pandemic severely disrupted this project in almost every way possible. It 
made the GEO archive at the Bentley Historical Library inaccessible for many months, delaying 
the development of Chapter 7, as well as reducing access to other library materials for some 
time. While the University of Michigan’s top administrators made a number of lamentable 
decisions during the pandemic, I would like to thank the graduate administrators in the political 
science department for their unwavering and energetic support throughout this difficult time. 
Rob Mickey, the director of graduate studies, and Megan Gosling, the department’s 
undergraduate coordinator, both did everything possible to ensure financial and institutional 
support through the two additional semesters required to complete the dissertation.  
During my graduate studies, the difference between studying politics and engaging in 
political struggle has not always, or even often, been entirely clear. Many of the most important 
lessons I have learned about persuasion and organizing came in the context of activism in and 
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near the academic labor movement; when thinking and working with others to build power 
among workers, the texts and ideas with which I grappled in the academy often informed our 
collective efforts. The community of activists, organizers, and comrades in the Graduate 
Employees Organization contributed not only friendships, shared struggles, and shared victories, 
but also experiences that are inextricably bound up with my scholarly interests and 
commitments. While I cannot possibly name everyone in this community from whom I learned, 
and for whom I’m grateful, I would like at least to thank Denise Bailey, Dominic Barbato, Liz 
Ratzloff, Jesse Holloway, Persephone Hernandez-Vogt, Vidhya Aravind, Joey Valle, Joseph 
Paki, John Ware, Nora Krinitsky, Cass Adair, Sam Shuman, Angie Perone, Yael Kenan, Duygu 
Ula, Umang Varma, Patricia Klein, Ansel Neunzert, Luis Flores, Katie Berringer, Austin 
McCoy, Nick Caverly, Kim Daley, Beth Walz, John Bell, Corey Bowen, Mike Mei, Sasha 
Bishop, Katie McLean, Amir Fleischmann, Emily Gauld, Danny Blinderman, Zach Kopin, 
Devlin Mallory, Jen Piemonte, Yehia Mekawi, Lucy Peterson, Garima Singh, Zoe Davis-Chanin, 
Simeon Newman, Robin Zheng, Kathleen Brown, James Meador, Sumeet Patwardhan, Erin 
Markiewitz, Mel Rieck, Youngkyun Choi, and Dan Walden. I’m also thankful for comrades in 
GEO’s sibling academic labor unions and in other Huron Valley unions, especially Ian 
Robinson, Alex Elkins, Angie Liao, Erin Lavin, Bob King, Moe Fitzsimmons, Daric Thorne, 
Tim Allen, Justin Villanueva, Tad Wysor, and Michelle Deatrick, and for undergraduate activists 
(many of whom have now graduated and do other amazing work): Hoai An Pham, Allie Brown, 
Sharif-Ahmed Krabti, Anna Nedoss, Solomon Medintz, and Trent Ingell.  
Finally, I’d like to thank my family, who allowed me to repurpose part of our home as an 
office during more than a year of social distancing and patiently tolerated the countless hours 
during which I was physically nearby but intellectually away at work. Heather Rainwater 
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Campbell has improved all of my ideas, both the ones that we’ve talked about and the ones that 
have been shaped by her unqualified commitment to human freedom and dignity. I hope to catch 
up soon on the books she’s recommended. Devyn Campbell awes me every day with their 
creativity and their courage; watching them grow up offers daily reminders not only that we must 
make our world better, but that we can. I am also deeply grateful that my parents’ love and 
understanding has always transcended our many differences.  
The people I’ve mentioned have offered kindness, insight, and support that extends far 
beyond any specific contributions that I could list here. Many others also contributed, directly or 
indirectly, to this dissertation. I regret the limitations of memory and space that led to these 
omissions and remain grateful for each contribution. Finally, while critique, feedback, and advice 
has enabled me to improve and expand this dissertation in countless ways, any remaining errors 
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This dissertation proposes an audience-centered political theory of rhetoric: speakers 
identify and appeal to the characteristics of their audiences in order to build unity behind 
achieving some collective project. When crafting rhetorical appeals, speakers must account for 
those processes that define audience members’ concerns, commitments, and conceptions of self-
interest. I call these processes “political production”: a central, but underexamined element in 
how audiences respond to rhetorical appeals. Under some circumstances, as in the small and 
narrowly-defined political communities discussed by ancient Greek theorists of rhetoric, political 
production is consistent across the politically relevant audience. In plural societies, however, 
difference, subordination, and exclusion often cut across the politically relevant audience, rather 
than defining its boundaries. As a result, rhetoric can build new solidarities which, reinforced 
through organizing and material infrastructure, create transformative political projects.  
This project utilizes a wide variety of theoretical and historical methods. In the first three 
substantive chapters, I rely on a combination of close readings of Attic Greek texts, conceptual 
analysis, and intellectual history to identify a conception of regime (politeia) as productive of the 
“available means of persuasion” in the thought of Aristotle and Plato, and to uncover Hobbes’ 
attempt, in his translation of Thucydides, to protect political order against his original and 
polemical conception of subversive “rhetoric”. In the next two chapters, I draw on social 
theoretic analysis, contemporary social science, and the history of American political thought to 
examine the role of rhetoric in political contexts defined by plurality and hegemony. In the 
dissertation’s final substantive chapter, I use archive research, interviews, and my own 
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participant observations to apply the dissertation’s treatment of rhetoric to contemporary labor 
organizing and movement building.  
Understanding rhetoric in terms of political production contributes both to the history of 
political thought and to theoretically-engaged political interventions. By placing worries about 
rhetoric’s manipulative potential in their proper early modern context, I open space for re-
reading the history of political thought for other approaches to rhetoric, such as the ones that I 
find in ancient Athenian philosophy. Normatively-engaged accounts of rhetoric, particularly 
those that examine appeals to racial resentment and similar reactionary attitudes, may also 
benefit from a broader focus on the institutions, movements, and material conditions that enable 
such appeals. These aspects of political production contribute far more to the success and 
consequent harm of such appeals than any specific candidate or official. Finally, the project 
contributes to the theory and practice of contemporary politics, especially as understood through 
radical democratic and broadly leftist perspectives. I develop a distinction between populist 
strategies and other possibilities for counter-hegemonic projects, and identify ways to fit an 




This dissertation proposes a political theory of rhetoric in which rhetoric is a practice 
directed at unifying a speaker with some audience. Rhetoric seeks to identify what Aristotle 
called “available means of persuasion” that allow the speaker to call on identities or interests that 
audience members come to recognize as their own. Successful rhetoric involves speakers 
advocating a unified set of demands or objectives that, if not necessarily or obviously coherent, 
nonetheless make sense from the perspective of audiences who see themselves included in the 
broader project. This advocacy takes place across a wide variety of circumstances and contexts, 
and can be aimed at practically any objective. Since I focus on theorizing rhetoric as a political 
practice, I am primarily interested in rhetorical appeals aimed at creating solidarity and building 
power in a way that enables some kind of collective action. Such projects require audience 
members who either already regard such collective action favorably, or at least have needs and 
concerns that are important enough to motivate collective action under the right circumstances. 
When practiced in support of a political project, then, rhetoric at any one moment is bound up 
with prior and present instances of political production: systemic and interpersonal work to 
define audience members’ interests, concerns, and values in accordance with broader political 
arrangements. Speakers can benefit from such political arrangements, when the speakers’ 
objectives align with dominant patterns of political production; otherwise, speakers must seek to 
build alternative solidarities as a basis for further action.  
Understanding rhetoric in this way raises the question of what it means to produce an 
audience. I turn to two concepts in the history of political thought to account for political 
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production: regime (in Attic Greek, politeia) at the center of classical conceptions of rhetoric, 
especially those of Aristotle and Plato, and hegemony, through the work of Antonio Gramsci, 
Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, for theorizing rhetoric in modern and contemporary 
contexts. A regime is a self-contained political order, in which the political conditions that 
produce citizens reliably give those citizens values and assumptions that protect and maintain the 
regime. Within the small and homogeneous citizenry typical of the poleis Aristotle and Plato 
considered, or with a highly stratified society with an unquestioned ideological apparatus, such a 
self-contained political order is possible; today, however, these parameters rarely occur. Instead, 
contemporary political order is always contestable, contested, and plural. As a result, political 
production now takes the form of rhetoric and organizing that shape contingent alliances of 
interests and identities, formed around a principle that gives those interests and identities a 
common focus. Where a regime, in the classical sense, leaves little room for rhetorical appeals 
that explicitly challenge or undermine it, hegemonic formations inevitably leave resources for 
counter-hegemonic appeals among the identities, interests, and values that any hegemonic 
formation leaves at the margins. In any political order that we find objectionable, then, the 
possibility of altering or abolishing that order depends on rhetorical practices that build an 
alternative solidarity on which to base collective action; in any political order that we think is 
worth preserving, we can only preserve it through persuading people that their needs and 
concerns are best met through our existing institutions and values.  
For many political theorists today and in the past, rhetoric plays a different, innately 
dangerous role in politics. Andrew Norris accurately summarizes this pattern: “With very few 
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exceptions, political theory is as hostile to rhetoric as politics itself is agreeable to it”.1 This 
hostility often flows from the intuition that rhetoric functions by manipulating subjects who 
would, if left alone, have acted otherwise, coupled with the judgment that this manipulation 
usually leaves its subjects acting less correctly – whether correct action involves rational self-
interest, the law of nature, or some other standard – than they otherwise would have done. The 
first of these points prompts a concern that rhetoric introduces unequal power dynamics, and 
therefore worries deliberative democrats; the second provokes specific fears of demagogy, 
especially for those who hope to achieve or maintain a secure political order. Simone Chambers 
has refined the concern with damaging power dynamics into a critique of modes of persuasion 
that are “monological rather than dialogical”, following her reading of Plato’s Gorgias, while, 
with Iris Marion Young, arguing that the standards of dispassionate reason and objective natural 
right often assumed by those who fear demagogy have little foundation and often reflect existing 
social inequities.2 For Chambers, the solution to concerns about rhetoric’s power lies in dividing 
rhetorical practices between those that encourage reflective deliberation among the audience and 
those that instead seek to mobilize the audience to follow the speaker; while mobilization is 
“endemic to democracy”, we ought to encourage deliberative rhetorical practices and build 
institutions that encourage them.3  




1 Norris, “Rhetoric and Political Theory”, in Michael J. MacDonald, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Rhetorical 
Studies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199731596.013.048.  
2 Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?”, 
Political Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2009), 324-326; Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 64.  
3 Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere”, 344.  
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deliberative concerns more compatible with the realities of mass publics, Bryan Garsten has 
argued for mobilizing partial and even factional publics as a positive good.4 Garsten reads 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a response to the problem of “sophistic demagogues [who] invited the 
people to view themselves and their particular judgments as the final authority in the city.”5 On 
Garsten’s reading, Aristotle hoped to theoretically intervene to push rhetoricians toward 
deliberative settings, where audience members’ interests were directly implicated in the decisions 
at hand, and away from forensic settings, where audience members lacked such active interest in 
the results of judgment and therefore were more vulnerable to manipulation. Garsten sees many 
modern and contemporary critics of rhetoric as attempting to exclude persuasion and practical 
judgment in favor of objective or authoritative standards of decision-making, and portrays active, 
engaged political contestation as a central element of public deliberation.  
Each of these attempts to rehabilitate rhetoric, however, begins by admitting to a long 
history of essentially accurate worries about rhetoric’s political effects. Persuasion, and more 
broadly rhetoric, needs to be saved from its own abuses, or have its better forms intentionally 
emphasized over the less healthy ones. Moreover, the extant efforts to rehabilitate rhetoric 
assume a fundamental consistency across the history of these worries. For Garsten, Aristotle’s 
reframing of rhetoric from a practice of swaying jury members to one’s preferred outcome to a 
practice of advancing deliberation in the assembly provides resources for responding to Hobbes 




4 Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006).  
5 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 117.  
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Hobbes’ time in important ways.6 Similarly, while Chambers criticizes attempts to frame 
critiques of rhetoric in terms of passionate rhetorical appeals and dispassionate deliberative 
reason, her rehabilitative approach nonetheless assimilates a wide variety of concerns about 
rhetoric into Plato’s alleged criticism of rhetoric as monologic.  
In contrast to approaches that emphasize saving rhetoric from its abuses, I develop a 
political theory of rhetoric without emphasizing or validating concerns of the dangers of rhetoric. 
I start with the idea that rhetoric, as a political practice, begins with understanding and 
responding to the audience. That is, speakers (or writers, or users of sign language; I use the term 
“speaker” to refer to a person involved in generic communication) who wish to persuade 
audience members to do something most accurately craft their persuasive appeals by learning 
what the members of their audience believe in, what counts as evidence to them, what concerns 
they bring to a conversation, and attempting to communicate with their audience on those terms. 
At the same time, people who want to observe and explain the success or failure of some 
persuasive appeal do best to think about the audience members’ characteristics, commitments, 
and concerns, and how the appeal connected to those. In either case – practicing rhetoric in the 
moment, or analyzing it from an outside perspective – the audience’s capacity to reject appeals 
and the historical and situational conditions that make persuasion possible weigh against the 
speaker’s ability to craft and deliver appeals that they hope will persuade, and it is a mistake to 
overemphasize the speaker’s capacity to influence the audience. This is especially true in 




6 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 117. 
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prioritize democratic member participation, the healthier and more collegial of academic 
workshops, and similar local organizations in which discussion or deliberation occur 
predominantly in a context of mutual respect and concern. Under these conditions, speakers must 
consider the possible negative consequences of being perceived as trying to control or 
overwhelm their audience, which can often alienate listeners because such behaviors violate the 
present conversational norms. They should also consider their listeners’ affective dispositions, 
and either appeal to those dispositions (when generally favorable) or accommodate and 
circumvent them. When under circumstances where participants prefer clear and well-warranted 
argumentation in their discussions, it is often enough the case that most or all of the participants 
generally possess “good” arguments for their differing perspectives, and the arguments that most 
accurately reflect the audience’s preferences and concerns will prove to be the right arguments. 
Readers will recognize the above as a gloss on Aristotle’s description of appeals to a 
speaker’s character (ethos), the audience’s affective dispositions (pathos), and reasons that the 
audience finds compelling (logos), along with an insistence on thinking about each of these 
categories in terms of the audience, rather than the speaker. This insistence on the primacy of the 
audience, however, may seem problematic. I began, after all, by assuming relatively egalitarian 
conditions, and very little political rhetoric responds to such conditions. Many speakers – at 
campaign rallies, protests, official candidate debates, in advertisements and on the floors of 
legislatures – attempt to actively exclude or avoid most or all competing perspectives, and 
cultivate a sanitized safe space for their persuasive appeals. They marshal whatever resources 
they can find in order to portray their position in the best possible light, and to build audiences 
that will accept their position and mobilize in support of it. To be sure, the facts that these 
speakers put so much effort into setting up advantageous contexts rather than trusting in their 
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own oratory to sway audiences, and that audience members frequently reject some or all of their 
appeals, suggest that both speakers and audiences have some sense of the audience’s agency and 
the speakers’ limits. The speakers nonetheless enjoy a capacity to study their audience, to plan 
and shape their appeals, and to wield social and political authority that is rarely possessed by 
ordinary audience members. On this basis, we might then assign a disproportionate power to 
rhetoric, return to concerns about manipulation or domination, and perhaps reclassify persuasive 
practices within more egalitarian circumstances as a special kind of political rhetoric or exclude 
those practices from the category of rhetoric altogether.  
Here, however, I turn to political production, both of the audience and of the institutions 
and infrastructure that connect the speaker with the audience, as a starting point for analyzing 
persuasive practices that might seem especially asymmetrical or anti-egalitarian. Viewed from 
this starting point, it is of course the case that some rhetoric channels political power in harmful 
ways; the question, however, is what political efforts make it possible for a particular rhetorical 
appeal to cause harm. To take an example that I will return to at several points in the dissertation, 
rhetorical appeals that attempt to channel racial resentment among significant numbers of 
audience members, from dogwhistles and other implicit appeals to the increasingly overt racist 
appeals in recent politics in the United States, only prove effective if the speaker accurately 
identifies and targets racist attitudes in the audience. If very few or no audience members 
possessed the attitudes and perceived interests to which race-baiting appeals, or if through long 
efforts of rhetoric and organizing, a large majority of an audience learned to recognize and 
oppose racism in its many forms, such appeals would prove counterproductive. On the other 
hand, the success of racist rhetorical appeals should trouble us, not only or even foremost 
because of what it tells us about the character of someone willing to deploy such appeals, but 
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because that success evidences a failure of previous anti-racist organizing and warns of the 
possibility that such appeals will reaffirm and reproduce racist attitudes in the audience. In short, 
throughout this dissertation, I maintain that when rhetoric causes harm, it does so largely because 
of broader political efforts and processes that shape audiences into potential willing accomplices 
for speakers.  
Why, then, isolate individual speakers from the audiences and systems that enable them? 
There are some plausible reasons to focus on speakers’ behavior as individuals. For example, if 
we center ethical concerns when thinking about rhetoric, speakers who act in knowingly harmful 
ways may be ethically responsible in different ways than audience members. Similarly, when 
attempting to mobilize audiences who are already hostile to certain kinds of rhetorical appeals – 
for example, an audience that recognizes racist appeals for what they are and finds them 
reprehensible – the responsible speaker may be an apt target for a call to action. In terms of 
rhetoric’s political effects, however, the move to emphasize individual speakers as potential 
manipulators and bad actors was a political response to the novel political problem of increased 
plurality in early modern Europe. As discourses of science and rationality proliferated, religious 
disagreements fueled conflict, and printed information spread faster and to more people, the 
ability to build solidarities became newly worrisome for people attached to existing – and rapidly 
destabilizing – political order. These worries, and their important origin point in the early work 
of Thomas Hobbes, have influenced many contemporary critiques of rhetorical practices, even 
when the critics prefer very different modes of political organization than their early modern 
counterparts. As a result, the dissertation attempts to place worries about rhetoric as a practice of 
domination or manipulation in their proper historical context, and recover alternative ways of 
thinking about rhetoric as a political practice.  
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The final through line of the dissertation is a concern with rhetoric as a practice that 
contributes to political change. Both as a scholar interested in socialist, radical democratic, and 
emancipatory political thought and as an activist in the academic labor movement, I start from 
the perspective that current political and social conditions cannot be reconciled with a concern 
for human freedom, dignity, or wellbeing, and that broad and deep change in these conditions is 
urgently needed. The harm caused by rhetoric that appeals to racism, sexism, homophobia and 
transphobia, and other forms of socially-empowered hatred has loomed over many of us while I 
prepared this project. It seems to me, however, that the use of rhetoric to build new solidarities 
and empower excluded communities is less well understood, and less effectively practiced, than 
either open appeals to hatred or empty appeals to a nonexistent national unity. When examining 
political thought about rhetoric, then, I consistently emphasize resources for building counter-
hegemonic solidarities, and for identifying and overcoming obstacles to those solidarities. This 
emphasis has been especially significant when considering cases for applying the dissertation’s 
theoretical claims. As a longtime member and activist in the Graduate Employees Organization, I 
have drawn inspiration from the union’s successes, and motivation for understanding rhetoric 
better from the union’s mistakes. It therefore seemed especially appropriate to focus on these 
successes and failures when applying the dissertation’s theoretical framework to analyzing 
contemporary rhetoric.  
Chapter Summary 
The dissertation begins with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in which I see an audience-centered 
approach beginning with his definition of rhetoric as a capacity for identifying available means 
of persuasion. I couple this audience-centered approach with an understanding of regimes – the 
political order that characterizes a given city, and around which the city is organized – as 
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productive in Aristotle’s thought. That is, for Aristotle, the regime provides the conditions 
relative to which certain appeals are more persuasive and more reliable than others, so that an 
understanding of a city’s political relationships and orientation is the “most authoritative” source 
of effective persuasion.7 On such a theory of rhetoric, no art of rhetoric can be abstracted from 
the concrete conditions in the city some particular speaker inhabits. To be persuasive in another 
place or time, a rhetorician would need to inquire about the regime there, learn what sorts of 
people would be in the audience, and craft appeals that would fit that new and unfamiliar 
audience. Instead of taming rhetoric or enticing rhetoricians to practice philosophy, then, I read 
Aristotle as situating rhetoric within a broader understanding of politics in which regimes 
produce citizens and thereby reproduce themselves. For Aristotle, political production happens in 
the regime, in a way that excludes any substantive sense of plurality within the polis, and rhetoric 
functions as an appeal to already-produced listeners. While Aristotle’s concept of a regime has 
little direct applicability today, it nonetheless grounds an approach to rhetoric that does not start 
from fears of manipulation and domination. It therefore makes clear that these fears do not find 
their origin in the nature of persuasion, but in a political theory of rhetoric that conjures and 
justifies them.  
Having set out the basic elements of an audience-centered theory of rhetoric, I next turn 
to Plato, often perceived as a founding figure in theorizing rhetoric’s evils. On a commonplace 
reading of Plato’s Gorgias, the title character and his fellow rhetoricians lay claim to a terrifying 




7 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.8.1 1365b. Perseus. 
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primary conflict lies in the questions of whether, and how, this power could be used justly. Under 
Socrates’ questioning, Gorgias is unable to defend the claim that he only offers the power of 
rhetoric to be used for good, while Polus and then Callicles are unable to defend the claim that 
using rhetoric to enjoy power over others is desirable or good. After conversation breaks down, 
Socrates turns to crafting a myth for his interlocutors, in which the just and cleansing 
punishments that rhetoricians might avoid in life nonetheless purify souls in the afterlife. 
Socrates’ conflict with Gorgias and Polus, however, repeatedly returns to the question of whether 
they really possess the power that they offer for sale, and Socrates never actually concedes that 
this power exists. Moreover, Socrates himself turns to a haranguing style, closely matching the 
patterns of Athenian political speech, precisely when he criticizes the greatest of Athenian 
politicians for making the city’s people worse, instead of better. This style, which Socrates’ 
interlocutors refer to as dēmēgoria (the practice of “speaking to the people”, or Athenian political 
rhetoric), also fails to persuade Socrates’ interlocutors to want to become better people, and the 
Platonic dialogue devoted to the use of rhetoric in public life ends with none of the participants 
changing their minds in response to each other’s persuasive efforts. Indeed, during Socrates’ 
oration, he tells Callicles that using rhetoric either to dominate people or to make them better is 
impossible, because speakers must first accommodate themselves to the audience before they can 
hope to persuade the audience of anything – if anything, a more extreme version of Aristotle’s 
regime-based approach, in which the corrupt Athenian democracy not only produces the 
audience, but performs a sort of second-order production of speakers who choose to emulate 
their audiences. Reading the Gorgias as a source for the fear and mistrust of rhetoric, I conclude, 
suggests that people bring concerns about rhetoric to the text that they have learned elsewhere.  
Where, then, did we learn to worry about the dangers of rhetoric? Chapter Four 
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documents a striking origin point in the early work of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’ translation of 
Thucydides contains a striking series of tendentious translations around the figures of Pericles 
and Alcibiades, each of which tends to set up these figures’ perspectives as characteristically 
Hobbesian. Hobbes’ Pericles teaches listeners to distrust the advice of orators in favor of 
calculating their own self-interest, informed by their own rational fear of loss and the protection 
that a stable and flourishing city offers from such losses. As a result, this version of Pericles 
takes on the role of a sovereign educator, without whose guidance the city descends into the 
snakes’ nest of squabbling rhetoricians in the assembly. After this descent, Alcibiades comes to 
represent a stunningly talented and ambitious person, whose talents and ambition make him a 
target for the avarice and envy of others. Hobbes’ highly unusual version of Alcibiades presents 
him as deserving better of the Athenians, and ultimately as a second mouthpiece for Hobbes’ 
psychology, on which fear is fundamentally rational and the city’s degeneration leaves only 
cynical self-interest as a viable option for someone like Alcibiades. Taken together, these 
representations of important figures in Thucydides’ history set up a strange rhetorical game 
around the concept of rhetoric. On the one hand, Hobbes sets up the sovereign educator, and the 
process of correct reasoning that the educator teaches to subjects, as outside of, and indeed 
opposed to, “rhetoric”; on the other, “rhetoric” therefore comes to signify forms of persuasion 
that work outside of, and opposed to, the political order that offers the only possibility of stability 
and protection.  
Hobbes’ rhetorical strategy of distinguishing between “right reason” and “rhetoric”, and 
persuading readers to distrust the latter, has proven tremendously influential. Together with 
attempts to accommodate this distrust, histories of reading that distrust into previous texts, and 
the choice to validate this distrust while salvaging some kind of rhetorical practice, Hobbes’ 
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strategy is the primary foil of my argument. Nonetheless, Hobbes’ fear that rhetoricians could 
contribute to the formation of solidarities and communities outside the sovereign political order, 
and thereby undermine and ultimately destroy it, points to an important discontinuity between 
the Aristotelian regime and the modern political community. Aristotle theorized regimes as 
fundamentally closed political orders, self-contained, quite capable of reproducing themselves, 
and most vulnerable not to contestation or mobilization from outside the approved order, but to a 
political degeneration in which a political community spiraled into an exaggeration of itself with 
the result of oppressing and alienating its own members. Hobbes perceived, however, that social 
and technological developments, including the sheer size of modern political communities, the 
speed of political writings, and the rise of new modes of political and intellectual contestation, 
meant that if the Aristotelian regime had ever been practical, it no longer was. Instead, political 
communities were becoming irreducibly plural and contested. A sovereign was needed to 
produce subjects capable of apprehending correct definitions and reasoning from them, so as to 
channel the irreducible plurality of individuals into a unified commonwealth. 
I take up the development of plurality, and its implications for an audience-based theory 
of rhetoric, in the fifth chapter. Contemporary societies typically feature broad political 
contestation, based not on objective or immutable social positions but on politically constructed 
interests and concerns. As a result, the Aristotelian regime, challenged by Hobbes and early 
modern thinkers, simply does not exist as a stable foundation for persuasion in contemporary 
politics. Instead, when broader political conditions enable or support persuasive appeals that in 
turn reinforce those political conditions, this support is complex, overdetermined, and 
contingent. I turn to the theories of Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe to 
characterize these complex political conditions, which unequally support different persuasive 
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appeals, in terms of hegemony. That is, the conditions under which some kinds of appeals – in 
today’s politics, for example, those that justify and maintain inequality in terms of protecting 
freedom – more easily gain support reflect present arrangements of political and social resources, 
which themselves are the product of previous struggles. Rhetoric makes its most significant 
political contributions, however, when speakers seek to articulate interests, identities, and 
concerns so as to create new connections between people that ground solidarity and political 
change. Here, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s use of the concept of articulation to describe creating a 
sense of equivalence between otherwise-separate struggles, so that these struggles consolidate 
and grow in strength, provides an important source for my analysis of how rhetoric builds 
solidarity. Because rhetoric can create new relations of equivalence, it serves to actively produce 
political identities and movements from the irreducibly plural realm of subject positions. I draw 
on resources in Gramsci’s thought for thinking of such rhetorical practices in an anti-elitist way, 
and contrast the possibility of new articulation of progressive and radical political communities 
with the tired and repetitious appeals to whiteness and ethnonationalism that have characterized 
far-right rhetorical appeals in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century.  
I diagnose two significant barriers to building new solidarities across a variety of 
subordinated communities. First, efforts to persuade large numbers of people in a very rapid 
manner, as is often necessary in national electoral campaigns and similar projects, tend to 
gravitate toward the vocabularies and tropes that mass audiences will find most familiar. This 
tendency, combined with the material and political relations of racialized capitalism, forces 
people who want to achieve broad liberatory change to accept longer-term persuasion and 
organizing in order to engage in serious counter-hegemonic struggle. Second, attempts to build 
movements across communities face an intuition, powerfully present in contemporary politics in 
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the United States, that difference is divisive. I trace this intuition to a rhetorical project beginning 
in the work of James Madison, on which the sixth chapter focuses. I use scholarship on the 
American founding and an original analysis of Madison’s papers to show that before and during 
the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Madison’s treatment of the mischiefs of faction focused 
entirely on a struggle between the propertied few and everyone else, fitting into an economistic 
political sociology common to liberal-republican political thought of the period. As unexpectedly 
virulent Antifederalist pamphlets spread in late 1787, however, Madison broke sharply with both 
his previous analysis of faction and with the dominant contemporary political sociology, both of 
which favored his opponents in the new political environment, in favor of an analysis of factions 
as contingent and constructed. While Madison remained committed to the rights of the propertied 
minority, his rhetorical approach during the ratification debates of late 1787 and 1788 evidences 
a turn to the concept of “minority rights” in order to construct a concept of defensively-oriented, 
individualistic citizenship, distrustful of most efforts at political mobilization. This strategy 
aimed at protecting the rights of property, not through a principled defense of that particular 
political entity, but through constructing a broader set of political classes whose members would 
both recognize each other’s formal political standing in order to protect their own, and see any 
faction that might represent some part of their identity as nonetheless compromising others.   
Thanks partly to Madison’s writings in the Federalist and partly to influential 20th-
century appropriations of his project, “Madisonian pluralism” therefore shapes contemporary 
politics by portraying almost all political contestation based on advancing some group’s concerns 
as the product of factious self-interest, and as trading off both with collective national unity and 
with the status of any other given set of political concerns. This rhetorical strategy has the effect 
of portraying most political movements that seek broad redistribution of goods or liberatory 
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social change as attacks on collective unity, while also portraying differences between people 
and groups as grounds for division between them in political contexts. The effects of Madisonian 
pluralism are most apparent in often-unhelpful debates around the category of identity politics, 
where both liberal centrists and economistic leftists reflect the Madisonian logic in their 
insistence that the only meaningful categories of political existence are a universal and privileged 
category of political agency or an ineffective mass of atomized individuals. While some 
academics, consultants, and labor researchers have offered an initially promising rhetorical 
strategy for electoral campaigns to connect demands for racial justice and working people’s 
material needs, I contend that more protracted efforts to build and maintain solidarities are the 
primary task of counter-hegemonic rhetoric.  
In the dissertation’s final chapter, I drawn on the tools and principles developed in the 
rest of the dissertation to analyze the history of the Graduate Employees Organization at the 
University of Michigan, one of the oldest labor unions representing graduate workers in the 
United States and an organization in which I participated throughout my work on this project. I 
draw on extensive archive research and interviews with early activists in the union to uncover a 
strategy of articulation that the union has adopted from its origins in the early 1970s to the 
present. By articulating demands for justice and freedom broadly construed – most notably, 
racial justice and LGBT liberation – with traditional “bread-and-butter” demands under the 
category of “union issues”, GEO has consistently maintained solidarity among its membership, 
and largely across the broader southeast Michigan labor movement, behind demands that might 
not otherwise be perceived as connected to organized labor. This articulatory strategy, however, 
has worked most consistently within GEO membership; to build solidarity behind its demands in 
broader communities, the union has often needed other organizations to repeat and affirm its 
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rhetoric to their own members. At its best, these other organizations gain the opportunity to 
radicalize those demands and solidify a broader movement. The history of GEO’s 1975 strike, in 
which the union won a contractual provision for affirmative action and broad anti-discrimination 
language that (unusually for the time) covered sexual orientation, exemplifies this potential: for 
the anti-racist organizations comprising the contemporary “Third World Coalition”, the union’s 
affirmative action demand became “a moderate and reasonable position” on which further 
demands and action would extend. However, without such allied organizations, the union cannot 
depend on its internal articulatory rhetoric to build external support. The union’s 2020 “safety 
strike” against the university administration’s irresponsible pandemic response and 
overinvestment in policing shows the importance of this distinction. GEO’s articulation of safety 
from the pandemic and from police violence succeeded in building and maintaining solidarity 
among union members, and in providing resources for allied organizations attempting to build 
momentum for racial justice on campus and in the surrounding community. GEO’s rhetoric and 
organizing practices proved less effective, however, in persuading people who did not already 
support the union’s demands or found themselves on the fence. The union, and similar 
organizations, will need to develop its rhetorical appeals and build more sustained 
communication with these not-yet-persuaded people and communities.  
This dissertation offers good news about rhetoric, for the well-intentioned person who 
wishes to persuade others to join in creating lasting and badly-needed change: persuasion does 
not carry the risks of manipulation, trickery, and domination that we have been taught to fear. 
Audience members who accept persuasive appeals do so largely because of prior experiences and 
conceptions of their own interests and needs; to persuade them differently, one must build new 
relationships and organize different experiences in order to produce new political and social 
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expectations. To the extent that persuasive appeals harmfully channel political power, they do so 
because of broader social conditions that collective action can blunt in the short term and end in 
the long term. We need not fear supervillains wielding the power of rhetoric. The bad news, such 
as it is, is that we cannot hope for rhetorical superheroes. Persuasion takes a great deal of work. 
Appeals that have rested on past regimes, or rely now upon hegemonic forces, benefit from the 
invisible and often unintended efforts of all who continue to reproduce and maintain the political 
conditions in which they live; appeals aimed at transformative change require similar efforts, but 
intentional, organized, and coordinated. Recognizing rhetoric’s possibilities, and its limits, 
begins with understanding why we have been misled in thinking about it, and what alternatives 





 “Available Means”: Audience and Regime in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter reads the first book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a resource for an audience-
centered political theory of rhetoric: a political theory of rhetoric on which speakers seek to 
respond to the needs and ideas of audiences in order to constitute shared identities and create 
solidarity. I am not going to argue that Aristotle endorses all of this project; in fact, the goal of 
constituting shared identities and solidarities goes far beyond the agreed-upon actions or 
decisions that I take to be the end of Aristotelian rhetoric. I will argue, however, for reading 
Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric as focused on speakers’ capacity to recognize and respond to 
audiences, rather than on speakers’ capacity to use rhetoric to control or dominate audiences. 
Aristotle’s theory stops at this point – that is, with persuading people to take an action or arrive at 
a judgment, instead of building community or solidarity – because the further steps are political 
background conditions, produced by a given city’s governing regime and providing particularly 
“authoritative” persuasive resources.8  
The assumption that a regime (or “constitution”) reliably produces citizens whose values, 
perceived interests, and conceptions of a good life are consistent with the regime that produced 




8 Aristotle, Rhetoric, edited by W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), I.8 1365b Perseus.  
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and plural societies. Such an assumption requires a much more localized society, in which the 
community can produce and reproduce the appropriate citizens, that is more clearly separated 
from its neighbors than the societies in which most of us live. One could reasonably argue that 
Aristotle overstated the productive role of a polis’ regime even in his own time. We have a great 
many examples of Athenians contesting the merits of democracy itself, not to mention their own 
shifting democratic institutions. These examples, however, occurred in a political community 
that excluded women, slaves, metics (resident aliens, including people whose ancestors had not 
been born in Athens and who had not received a grant of citizenship from the assembly), and so 
on, and nevertheless had a relatively high proportion of enfranchised people compared to other 
Greek poleis. Many of the distinctions that cleave across contemporary polities instead marked 
the boundaries of political standing; as a result, Aristotle’s expectation that the regime would 
shape enfranchised citizens, if overstated, was not unreasonable. 
The distance between Aristotle’s expectations of a regime and anything we would 
encounter today, however, makes his treatment of rhetoric particularly useful as a starting point 
for theorizing rhetoric as audience-centered. As we will see, Aristotle’s regimes produce citizens 
for whom specific appeals are especially apt. The regime’s influence is a better cue for a speaker 
trying to identify the “available means of persuasion” than any other source of information about 
the audience.9 Studying and practicing rhetoric, therefore, is at the same time explicitly political. 
At the same time, consistently with Aristotle’s broader commitment that stasis, revolutionary 




9 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.2 1355b Perseus.  
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political community within which one speaks. The speaker, therefore, doubly depends on the 
audience: not only must speakers attend to their own immediate context and the characteristics of 
their audiences, but they must recognize that their audiences are the products of a specific kind 
of political community and seek to understand the influence of that community. While this might 
seem overwhelming, the relatively limited variation of context, audience characteristics, and 
regime in any given polis offers a fair chance for the Aristotelian rhetorician to effectively 
practice such attention and recognition. While, by the end of the dissertation, I will have moved 
to a far more complex contemporary context, in which social movements, organizations, or 
political campaigns do most of the work of the “speaker”, the Aristotelian model helps us 
theorize the interaction between speaker and audience in a clear and concrete way. For similar 
reasons, the Aristotelian model is also directly useful in the contemporary context if, instead of 
looking to mass mobilization and large-scale political efforts, we look to smaller deliberative 
spaces in which participants understand themselves to exist in a community that has shared goals 
and in which participants’ standing is uncontested. 
I begin this argument by briefly setting out what I take to be the audience-centered theory 
of rhetoric in Aristotle’s work. This theory is primarily focused on deliberative contexts, because 
Aristotle considered these contexts to be the most valuable and important for rhetoric (and, 
indeed, for politics). I turn briefly to the concept of “malicious” rhetorical appeals in the first 
chapter of the Rhetoric, to illustrate why these do not match a manipulative or speaker-centered 
theory of rhetoric, and then survey in some detail contemporary scholarship that reads 
manipulation into Aristotle’s rhetorical theory. I argue that this scholarship involves bringing a 
concern about manipulation into readings of the Rhetoric, and that definitions of manipulation 
either fail to cohere theoretically, fail to correspond to arguments and concerns expressed in the 
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Rhetoric, or both. To make this argument, I examine contemporary rhetorical appeals that might 
seem to count as manipulation, especially around attempts to summon racial resentment in 
support of policies that voters might otherwise reject. Finally, I substantiate and defend my 
treatment of the Aristotelian productive regime.  
2. Availability and Interdependence 
Aristotle begins the second chapter of Rhetoric, Book I by defining rhetoric, 
unambiguously and in his own voice: “Let rhetoric, then, be the capacity of observing (theōrēsai) 
in any given case the available means of persuasion”.10 I read this definition as presenting a 
specific relationship between speakers and audiences, in which 1) speakers want to persuade 
their audiences; 2) well-informed speakers recognize that successful persuasion is decided by the 
reaction of their particular audience, not by the speakers’ ability to control their audience; 3) 
speakers therefore seek to understand their audiences and identify what kinds of appeals, in what 
vocabularies and presentational styles, are likely to be accepted as persuasive by the audience 
members. The available means of persuasion, then, vary across audiences, contexts, and to some 
extent, the commitments and histories of speakers; they are a contingent and empirical 
characteristic of a speaker’s situation. Rhetoric is about identifying these, as Aristotle argues in 
the previous chapter, because it, “just like all the other arts”, succeeds or fails with respect to 
standards established by the situation, not by the individual actor: “for it is not [the task] of 




10 ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2 1355b. 
Perseus. Translations from Greek are my own.  
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correctly treat even those who cannot recover.”11 Following Aristotle’s medical analogy, speakers 
do not have the ability to make audiences persuaded, but to identify and approximate the appeals 
that have the best chance of being persuasive. And since audiences are composed of thinking 
beings, speakers are in the position of having the value of their persuasive appeals judged by 
others, as well as needing to anticipate and respond to those possible judgments. Audiences 
depend on speakers to connect audience members’ concerns, commitments, and context to a 
proposed conclusion. Speakers depend on audiences and context for the available means of 
persuasion, and also on audiences’ reactions and responses for a sense of whether their 
persuasive appeals have been successful. Rhetoric, on my reading of Aristotle, therefore 
functions within a relationship of interdependence.  
If we think about rhetoric through the concepts of availability and interdependence, we 
will not tend to prioritize concerns about manipulation or domination. If I want to persuade you 
of something, and believe that the means of doing so is to discover connections between my 
goals and your commitments, desires, or identities, I might empathize with you, if I thought these 
connections were easy to draw. I might try to compromise, in order to connect with you more 
easily. I might try to frame the question so that, seeing it in a new light, you approach my goals 
more closely, or to reason from a shared commitment to a different position that I hope you will 
come to share. But each of these involve a measure of respect and understanding. To believe I 




11 καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις （οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι 
τούτου προαγαγεῖν: ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς) Aristotle, Rhetoric 
I.1 1355b. Perseus.  
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you as very shallow and not too bright, or have a remarkably expansive idea of my own 
superiority and wisdom, or both, such that what makes you persuadable is far more obvious and 
evident than my motives in persuading you. Such attitudes seem rather counterproductive, if our 
starting point is that persuasion depends on your reaction and that I am trying to understand how 
to persuade rather than pulling from a bag of tricks.  
An audience-centered theory of rhetoric also makes manipulation and domination less a 
concern as our example approaches a more typical rhetorical context. As the context becomes 
more adversarial and as the audience becomes larger, the speaker becomes more dependent on 
understanding and responding to the audience, and imagined superiority to the audience 
simultaneously becomes less well-founded and more vulnerable to the aforementioned 
adversaries. Someone speaking to a friendly audience, perhaps with the benefit of some kind of 
recognized authority – think of a union steward speaking with active and supportive members in 
their own shop, a preacher speaking to a congregation, or an instructor speaking to students  – 
benefits doubly: familiarity with the audience makes it easier to return to familiar themes and 
appeals that work, while the friendliness and, perhaps, authority make it less likely that someone 
else will be trying to identify the available means of making the speaker look like a fool.12 The 
same speakers, in a convention full of labor leaders who disagree about the future course of the 




12 Disagreement, controversy, and various levels of dialectical engagement are all, of course, possible in these 
contexts, and the “adversarial” nature of a speaker’s audience and context is a continuum. Many of us might have 
relatively happy experiences of the following sentences’ more conflict-prone contexts. Nonetheless, I think the 
examples of contexts with relatively “friendly” and constructive disagreement, and the alternatives that tend to more 
destructive or at least agonistic responses, serve to illustrate the point.  
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have to work harder to persuade their audience members. In other words, when they might be 
most tempted to manipulate or dominate their listeners, they are least empowered to do so.  
Audience and the Assembly 
The sharpest contestation, the largest audiences, and the greatest need for rhetorical 
ability, of course, appear in the context of a deliberative assembly. The practice of speaking 
publicly in such a context (dēmēgoria), Aristotle insists, is “nobler and more worthy of the 
citizen” (kai kallionos kai politikoteras) than advocacy in the legal courts, and therefore central 
to an inquiry about the art or craft of rhetoric.13 In the context of the assembly, it becomes clear 
how widely Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric, on my reading, differs from the sense of rhetoric as a 
force of manipulation or domination that threatens individuality and public order. Here’s Hobbes 
opining on the inconveniences of holding sovereign power in an assembly: “they are as subject 
to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers; and becoming one 
another’s flatterers, serve one another’s covetousness and ambition by turns.”14 Or take 
Madison’s sneering assessment of overlarge assemblies: “Had every Athenian citizen been a 
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”15 For each of these authors, 
and many of their contemporaries, the specter of demagogic orators manipulating or seducing 
their moblike audiences was a valuable rhetorical motif that reinforced the alleged rationality, 





13 Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1 1354b. Perseus.  
14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 121/xix.8.  
15 James Madison, The Federalist, no. 55. The Avalon Project.  
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But if we think through rhetoric with Aristotle, the fear of demagogic orators is 
unfounded. The assembly is a space with a particularly large number of audience members, who 
are all invested in the results of political contestation, and therefore the potential for rhetoric 
being “malicious” (kakourgon) is far less in the assembly than it is in the legal courts, where 
jurors’ own wellbeing is not so directly implicated in the verdict, and in which the audience is 
generally smaller and perhaps more predictable in its responses to a particular rhetorical 
strategy.16 The assembly is also a space in which any individual member has at least the de jure 
capacity to be a speaker, while jurors (even Athenian dicasts, whose authority was considerably 
greater than today’s jurors) rather passively listen to advocates’ arguments. While Aristotle never 
explicitly points to this formal blurring of the distinction between the speaker and the audience, it 
nonetheless creates an additional obstacle to speakers attempting to dominate the audience. Not 
only must speakers attempt to understand their audience, the available means of persuading that 
audience, and the known and likely opposing speakers, but they must recognize that any member 
of the audience might have an unanticipated objection, express it, and suddenly alter the field of 
the discussion.  
Audience and “Malicious” Rhetoric 
Moreover, the gesture to “malicious” rhetorical strategies in this passage suggests a much 




16 Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1 1354b. Perseus. C.D.C. Reeve renders the passage quite bluntly: “…public oratory is less 
malicious than judicial oratory, because more common in its scope”. C.D.C. Reeve, tr. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2018), 3. George Kennedy omits this clause on the basis that it is “probably a comment by a later reader”, but if so, 
the comment nevertheless accurately summarizes the argument of Aristotle’s previous sentences. Kennedy, tr. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
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returned to. In context, there are two types of rhetorical practice that Aristotle criticizes in the 
first pages of Book I: speaking outside the subject (i.e. making appeals that do not speak to the 
questions at hand), and attempting to persuade others of what is “debased” (ta phaula). Neither 
of these translate directly into manipulation. Speaking outside the subject, as Arthur E. Walzer 
has argued, is problematic on technical rather than moral grounds: if a rhetorical strategy is 
limited to only “persuading” an audience on some point by talking about something that is 
largely separate, such as by blaming a victim or attempting to develop listeners’ sympathy for 
one’s client, then the strategy amounts to an end run around the technical task of persuading 
listeners that one’s substantive position is correct.17 This is why Aristotle criticizes those 
rhetoricians who, he says, contribute nothing to the central task of rhetoric and instead seek only 
to prompt the most helpful pathos for their position. The practice of speaking outside the subject, 
where allowed, supports the “malicious” aspects of forensic rhetoric, insofar as dicasts, who have 
a lesser attachment to the results of a trial than assembly members have in the results of a vote on 
legislation, might get more involved in the theatrics of condemning an implausibly accused but 
unpopular defendant than in the process of carefully evaluating the facts of a case.  
As for persuading others of what is contemptible, the category speaks to the intent, 
values, and commitments of the speaker, not to the relationship between the speaker and the 
audience. Aristotle introduces the concept and its condemnation parenthetically, in the context of 
a claim that rhetoric and dialectic argument have a fundamental similarity: “Also, one should 




17 Walzer, “Aristotle on Speaking ‘Outside the Subject’”, in Alan G. Gross and Arthur E. Walzer, eds., Rereading 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 40-41.  
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for us to do both (for one should not persuade of what is contemptible) but so that whatever is at 
hand may not slip past us, and so that, should someone make use of arguments that are unjust, 
we have the means of counteracting them [the arguments].”18 The parallel with syllogistic 
arguments makes the claim clear. Given sufficiently different plausible premises, one can reason 
to opposite conclusions. For most audiences, some means of persuasion exist for a similar 
process, as when competing speakers defend the claims that, on the one hand, taxation is too low 
to cover popular or necessary public expenses and, on the other hand, taxation is high enough or 
even excessive. A strategic rhetorician will try to identify all of the plausible persuasive appeals, 
including for positions they reject; these include appeals that a particular rhetorician could not 
even credibly make, but that an opponent might.  
Many readers of the Rhetoric have seen its opening chapter as particularly high-minded 
or even moralizing compared to the rest of Book I, let alone Book II.19 Nonetheless, the concerns 
Aristotle expresses here are more serious if speakers have less control of their interactions with 
audiences, and the tone of I.1 should not be taken to imply an overriding concern with 
manipulation. Speaking outside the subject can only effectively persuade audiences if the 
audiences work under rules that permit irrelevant appeals. Aristotle mentions laws governing 
forums in many cities, including Athens’ Areopagus, that prohibit some or all such appeals; 
courts today have strict rules governing relevance, and similar rules were not unknown in the 




18 ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν （οὐ γὰρ 
δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν）, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ 
λύειν ἔχωμεν. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1 1354b. Perseus. 
19 Walzer, “Aristotle on Speaking ‘Outside the Subject’”, 39.  
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speaker finds reprehensible, this suggests that no speaker can unilaterally ensure that their own 
position wins out. Speakers depend on audience and context.  
3. Manipulation in the Contemporary Rhetoric Scholarship 
The evidence for reading the Rhetoric as a resource for an audience-centered political 
theory of rhetoric, and therefore separately from modern concerns about manipulation, has 
received little attention in contemporary political theory literature. Instead, most writers have 
taken the Rhetoric as a resource for answering precisely concerns about manipulation, along one 
of three broad and occasionally overlapping currents: deliberative, ethical, and elitist.  
Deliberative Readings: Avoiding Manipulation 
First, scholars who share a broad commitment to deliberative democracy, and therefore 
worry that at least some rhetorical appeals threaten the project of rational intersubjective 
deliberation, have looked to Aristotle’s work as a resource for distinguishing between rhetorical 
appeals that support deliberation and those that undermine it. In a sympathetic review of this 
project, Bryan Garsten argues for two theses that helpfully sketch its tendency: “(a) that recent 
efforts to integrate rhetoric into theories of deliberative democracy depend for their coherence on 
finding a clearer conception than we currently have of how rhetoric can influence judgments 
without compromising their freedom, and (b) that the extra attention Aristotelian rhetoric has 
received is valuable even when considering the unique challenges posed by modern 
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conditions.”20 Here, the generally egalitarian concern for deliberation, where the freedom of 
individual subjects is central, meets the use of Aristotelian thought to protect that freedom to 
reason. Elsewhere, Garsten has argued for Aristotelian rhetoric “as a constitutive part of 
deliberation” that invites individuals to direct their capacity for judgment on questions of public 
interest.21 While the fear of demagogy shoots through Garsten’s thoughtful and often provocative 
work, Simone Chambers has theorized that fear especially clearly by distinguishing between 
what she calls “deliberative rhetoric” and “plebiscitary rhetoric”.22 Chambers offers an account 
of deliberative rhetoric as a rhetoric that “creates a dynamic relationship between speaker and 
hearer”, similarly to Garsten, and describes the plebiscitary alternative as “concerned first and 
foremost with gaining support for a proposition and only secondarily with the merits of the 
arguments or persuasion for that matter.”23 While demagoguery is a subset of plebiscitary 
rhetoric, Chambers fears that the broader category damages democratic societies insofar as it 
arouses and mobilizes existing views rather than persuading people to actively deliberate on 
specific questions.  
Ethical Readings: Discarding Manipulation 
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226.  
21 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 174.  
22 Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere”, 324-325.  
23 Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere”, 336-337.  
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whether Aristotle can fairly be read as sharing a commitment to egalitarian deliberative projects, 
in favor of reading the Rhetoric as subtly pushing rhetoric into some kind of ethical framework. 
The primary treatment of this reading is Eugene Garver’s book-length examination of the 
Rhetoric as an exploration of practical reason.24 Garver, the only author to my knowledge to 
extensively develop the concept of “available means of persuasion”, takes the view that for 
Aristotle, “rhetorical argument differs from argument in general in that rhetorical argument is 
essentially ethical”.25 Garver claims that cultivating the art of rhetoric, centered on making 
arguments including credible arguments about one’s character, will tend to have the effect of 
producing improved moral character. Moreover, since (on Garver’s reading) the rhetorician will 
try to identify available argumentative means of persuasion, while sophists focus on gaining and 
expanding a bag of tricks that only accidentally draw on rhetoricians’ insights, rhetoricians 
develop a capacity that sophists only try to parasitize.  
Garver justifies this reading by introducing a concept from elsewhere in Aristotle’s work: 
a distinction between external ends, which are the things an art produces that anyone would 
recognize as useful or valuable (in this case persuasion), and internal or guiding ends, which are 
things that one recognizes as valuable because of one’s training in the art.26 For Garver, the 
external end of rhetoric is influencing someone’s behavior; the internal end is identifying 




24 Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).  
25 Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric,  
26 Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 28-29.  
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rhetoric, regardless if one actually deploys them.27 While Garver’s treatment of rhetoric differs 
from the deliberative theorists above, his understanding of sophists resembles Chambers’ concept 
of plescibitary rhetoric to a surprising degree: both Garver and Chambers find fault with speakers 
who are concerned with “winning” and influencing behavior to the detriment of identifying and 
making good arguments or treating audience members as ends rather than means, respectively. 
Thus, for Garver, rhetoricians see manipulation as beneath themselves, and Aristotle’s treatise on 
rhetoric invites people who might otherwise seek the quickest way to win to instead develop 
characteristics that support rhetorical excellence. 
Elite Readings: Using Manipulation 
A third group of political theorists, rejecting the idea that rhetoric could be anything but 
manipulation, have read the Rhetoric as a project for identifying and enabling acts of what 
Daniel DiLeo has recently called “benign manipulation”.28 If the first group are deliberative 
theorists of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the second are ethical theorists, we might describe this group 
as elite theorists. For many of the elite theorists, Aristotle was writing primarily to instruct his 




27 By way of analogy, seeing the best moves, avoiding blunders, and accurately analyzing positions are constitutive 
of being a chess master. If a master-level player chooses not to play the best moves when teaching a child, or loses 
or draws games against players of similar or greater skill, we would not think that these events make them a bad 
chess player.  
28 DiLeo, “Aristotle’s Manipulative Maxims”, The Review of Politics Vol. 82 (2020), 392. Cf. Dirk Jörke, “Rhetoric 
as Deliberation or Manipulation? About Aristotle’s Rhetoric and its Misuse in Recent Literature”, Redescriptions 
Vol. 17, No.1 (2014), 68-85; Edward W. Clayton, “The Audience for Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, Rhetorica Vol.22, No.2 
(2004), 183-203; Carnes Lord, “The Intention of Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’”, Hermes, Vol.109, No.3 (1981), 326-339; 
Tina Rupcic, “Founding Speech: Aristotle’s Rhetoric as Political Philosophy” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 
2017). A somewhat different argument that Aristotle views rhetoric as both manipulative and amoral can be found in 
Gary Remer, “Rhetoric, Emotional Manipulation, and Political Morality: The Modern Relevance of Cicero vis-a`-vis 
Aristotle”, Rhetorica, Vol. 31, No.4 (2013), 402-443.  
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preservation or in order to impose good laws on flawed people. Scholars adopting this approach 
tend to describe some, usually substantial, overlap in Aristotle’s and Plato’s philosophical 
commitments, but a sharp break on the political value of rhetoric. Nearly all of these scholars 
take more or less for granted Plato’s apparent rejection of rhetoric on grounds of 
manipulativeness or a monologic mode of discourse, and see Aristotle as offering a very different 
model.29  
The specifics of the elitist model vary; for some, it is a specifically political model, in 
which rhetoric is a useful tool for “statesmen” inducing the masses (or, for that matter, selfish 
oligarchs) to follow the prescriptions of those with a superior understanding of the political.30 
For others, Aristotle is providing a model for philosophers and politikoi to act almost like public 
intellectuals, offering provocative and instructive appeals that shape deliberation and discourse 
while creating space for their fellow citizens to think with them.31 Mary Nichols has offered a 
reading of Aristotelian rhetoric that is notably directed toward mutual and collective 
improvement, if nonetheless critical of early deliberativist treatments of rhetoric and insistent on 
the supremacy of political knowledge over rhetorical strategy.32 All of the elite theorists, 
however, tend to emphasize two key points. First, like the deliberative theorists of rhetoric and 




29 A notable exception is C.D.C. Reeve, who argues (primarily with reference to the Phaedrus) that Aristotle’s 
rhetorical theory extends a philosophical project that Aristotle and Plato largely shared. Reeve, “Introduction”, in 
C.D.C. Reeve, tr., Rhetoric, lxxxiii-lxxxvii. Lord, “The Intention of Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’”, is more typical of the 
scholarly approach I’m discussing: for Lord, Aristotle and Plato share similar philosophical commitments, but 
Aristotle is more committed to seeing these philosophical commitments publicly disseminated.  
30 Cf. Lord, “The Intention of Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’”, 337-339; DiLeo, “Aristotle’s Manipulative Maxims”, 390.  
31 C.D.C. Reeve, “Philosophy, Politics, and Rhetoric in Aristotle”, in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, edited by 
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 191-205.  
32 Mary P. Nichols, “Aristotle’s Defense of Rhetoric”, The Journal of Politics Vol. 49, No. 3 (1987), 657-677.  
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responsive to Plato’s; second, unlike either, they take Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric to have been 
intended as a tool for those with a superior knowledge of the political to disseminate their 
knowledge and prudence among their less-informed fellow citizens.   
Each of these projects – deliberative, ethical, and elite – offers intriguing and useful 
textual resources, and we have much to learn from many of the works cited above. Deliberativist 
readings of Aristotle have enriched thinking about democratic deliberation, especially in 
response to overly rationalist and exclusionary models of what deliberation should look like.33 
Ethical readings of Aristotle, particularly Garver’s, offer depth to a history of practical reason, 
while elitist readings helpfully emphasize the connection between Aristotle’s thinking about the 
rhetorical and the political. Nonetheless, I offer two claims about the contemporary pattern of 
centering manipulation in readings of the Rhetoric. First, there is very little evidence for reading 
manipulation, not only as a central concern for Aristotle, but as a central concept in his theory of 
rhetoric; to do so, one needs to either define manipulation in unacceptably broad terms, or to 
assign anachronistic concerns and concepts to the text. Second, the concern with manipulation, 
by emphasizing individual speakers and their behavior over context, elides a crucial connection 
between the Rhetoric and Aristotle’s other work – that of the regimes that shape both speakers 
and audiences. I will develop these claims in the next two sections, while the following chapters 
will help explain how manipulation became central in scholarly treatments of the Rhetoric and, 




33 This project ultimately draws far more on radical democratic and agonist approaches to democratic theory than to 
deliberative approaches. Nonetheless, Chambers’ “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere” and Gormley’s “Deliberation, 
unjust exclusion, and the rhetorical turn” have been especially valuable in clarifying my understanding of rhetoric in 
the context of mass politics, while Garsten’s Saving Persuasion was particularly generative for framing this project. 
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4. Defining Manipulation 
To make manipulation (as contemporary political theorists understand it) a central 
concept of the Rhetoric, we would need a definition of manipulation that meets several criteria. 
First, it has to describe a relationship of power, inhabited by speakers and audiences, in which 
speakers possess the capability to alter audiences’ behavior without similarly finding their own 
behavior shaped by the audience. This criterion captures the intuition that manipulation is at least 
primarily one-way, which drives the concern about manipulation involving the domination or 
corruption of audience members’ choices. Second, this power relationship has to differ from the 
interactions involved in what Aristotle understood as dialektikē – shared philosophical inquiry, to 
which he provocatively claimed rhetoric is a “counterpart” – so that there is, indeed, a 
problematic concept internal to rhetoric for Aristotle to have had an opinion about. (We might, 
for analytical reasons, also want “manipulative rhetoric” to be a subset of rhetoric, so that the 
adjective modifies the noun instead of being redundant.) Third, we need examples of Aristotle 
having something to say about this relationship; the evidence that manipulation is a central or 
even important concept in the Rhetoric will strengthen in proportion to the role that Aristotle’s 
opinions about it permeate the text.  
DiLeo’s definition of “manipulative rhetoric” provides an illustrative starting point for 
thinking through these definitional problems. For DiLeo, any “speech that obtains assent to a 
choice without threat or bargaining but through claims or argument unrelated to those by which 




34 DiLeo, “Aristotle’s Manipulative Maxims”, 379.  
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elements to this definition. To begin with, the listener has almost entirely disappeared from the 
definition, leaving only a speaker, the speaker’s beliefs and justifications, and the “claims or 
argument” included in what the speaker says. The person from whom assent is obtained not only 
has nothing to contribute, but apparently offers nothing relevant to how a speaker chooses 
manipulative claims. Instead, manipulation happens in DiLeo’s account when a speaker chooses 
the maxims that will push passive listeners to follow a wiser (or, in less benign cases, more 
foolish) policy than they otherwise would have chosen. Examining cases of alleged manipulation 
in a more contemporary context will help us understand why we should reject ascribing 
manipulation a central place in Aristotle’s thought.  
Case 1: Appealing to Unshared Principles 
Consider a nonreligious person defending egalitarian and redistributive social policies in 
front of an audience composed largely of Christians, who chooses to ground their appeals in 
references to doing good to the least of Christ’s brethren, loving one’s neighbor, and similar 
concepts out of the Christian bible. At least some of these appeals must certainly count as 
manipulative for DiLeo on the basis that they involve “unrelated” arguments. A person who does 
not believe in the Last Judgment would never find the best or decisive reason for feeding the 
hungry in a parable suggesting that those who do so will be admitted to heaven at that time; a 
person who has no faith in the Christian god will not be swayed by being informed that loving 
one’s neighbor is a duty second only to loving that deity. But defining the choice to appeal to the 
beliefs of audience members, rather than imposing one’s own beliefs as authoritative, as 
necessarily manipulative seems extreme. We can find considerable room for an ethos of humility 
or respect in an attempt to connect one’s own commitments, values, and intentions to those of 
audience members, even if there is also room for an attempt to cynically appeal to beliefs that the 
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speaker considers otherwise useless. When Bryan Garsten points to moments in John Rawls’ late 
work that endorse arguing from audience members’ beliefs as “a sympathetic portrayal of 
rhetorical argument”, he makes exactly this point: even if Garsten sees manipulation as a central 
problem of rhetoric and I do not, we share the intuition that basing arguments and appeals on 
audience members’ prior beliefs has no fundamentally manipulative element.35 It is unclear 
whether Chambers would see this type of appeal as “plebiscitary” or “deliberative”, since one 
could describe such appeals both as speech deployed “strategically for the purposes of winning” 
and as speech that “engages citizens’ practical judgment and as such treats its audience as 
autonomous deliberators deserving of respect”.36 Nonetheless, a definition of manipulation 
including a speaker’s choice to make arguments provisionally based on beliefs that the speaker 
does not share seems to fail condition 1 – it doesn’t necessarily, or perhaps at all, involve a one-
way power relationship.  
Case 2: Appealing to Contemptible Attitudes 
Very well, one might say, but that is an example of arguments. Surely maxims, statements 
of principle, and other appeals that tug at audience members’ affective commitments, disrupt 
their judgment, and bypass rational deliberation count as manipulation. Let’s take a case that 
seems particularly pressing in contemporary politics, and will recur elsewhere in the dissertation. 
Ethnonationalist political appeals that demonize immigrants and people of color have, for some 




35 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 187.  
36 Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere”, 337. 
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support of policies that steal tremendous wealth from the working class, demolish an education 
system that was already none too strong, and at present, actively assist the spread of a deadly 
pandemic.37 The number of Americans who recently voted for such politicians and are materially 
better off now than they were four years ago cannot be more than a small fraction of the number 
who did, in fact, vote for Donald Trump in 2016 and for far-right local politicians, state 
legislators, governors, or members of Congress then and since. Even in 2020, when Trump’s 
reelection campaign was defeated, a large minority of voters (a higher percentage than in 2016, 
and a much higher absolute number of voters) either found these vicious and hateful appeals 
attractive enough to override whatever practical drawbacks they experienced from far-right rule, 
or at least did not find that these appeals overly detracted from whatever benefits far-right rule 
grants to them. Isn’t the frequency with which white voters vote “against their own interest” 
evidence that racist, ethnonationalist, misogynistic, homophobic, and transphobic appeals have 
successfully manipulated them? 
Well, no, I don’t think so. For the moment, I will leave to the side the fraught and 
objectionable concept of people voting “against their own interests”. We can pick it up again in 
Chapters 4 and 5, once we have moved into the contemporary case of radical political and social 




37 We should not forget the use of misogynistic, homophobic, and transphobic appeals for the same purposes, but it 
appears that racial resentment, empirically speaking, is especially significant in support for far-right politics. See, for 
example, Alan Abramowitz and Jennifer McCoy, “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and 
Polarization in Trump’s America”, The Annals of the American Academy 681 (January 2019), 137-156. Katherine 
Cramer has argued for a broader “politics of resentment” driving far-right mobilization and negative partisanship, 
but this can often operate in parallel with racial resentment specifically. Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of 
Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2016). 
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only argue that the relevant appeals do not count as manipulation in any politically relevant 
sense. Instead, when far-right politicians make hateful appeals, an Aristotelian framework 
captures such appeals in a non-manipulative frame: these appeals attempt to establish the good 
character of the speaker, and as such, are appeals to ethos.  
Here, I am thinking of a compelling point that journalists such as Adam Serwer and Zack 
Beauchamp have recently made.38 The cruelty of white supremacist appeals and violence not 
only builds community among some whites, but also confirms that the speaker making those 
appeals (or the leader taking credit for violence) is a trustworthy member of the white 
supremacist community. Beauchamp quotes a Trump supporter, personally harmed by 
interruptions in federal spending caused by a 2019 budget showdown over Trump’s promised 
border wall, expressing her frustrations in particularly telling terms: “I voted for him, and he’s 
the one who’s doing this …I thought he was going to do good things. He’s not hurting the people 
he needs to be hurting.”39 For this disappointed voter, the state’s power to coerce and destroy has 
a rightful target – the racialized enemy – and a political candidate’s expressions of hatred and 
anger toward that enemy seemed to demonstrate that the candidate had the character and 
commitments to correctly wield state power. With this voter finding badly-needed paychecks 
held up by a bumbling attempt to force Congress to fund the wall, she felt betrayed because the 




38 Adam Serwer, “The Cruelty is the Point”, The Atlantic, October 3, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/the-cruelty-is-the-point/572104/; Zack Beauchamp, “A Trump 
voter hurt by the shutdown reveals the real reason the president attracts hardcore supporters.”, Vox, January 8, 2019, 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/8/18173678/trump-shutdown-voter-florida.  
39 Beauchamp, “A Trump voter”.  
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We might struggle to empathize with unhappy white supremacist voters, and the idea that 
anyone would see white supremacist appeals as evidence of a candidate’s trustworthy ethos may 
shock the conscience. But where is the manipulation in this series of appeals? A speaker who 
genuinely shares an audience’s affective experiences and commitments and offers evidence of 
this is providing useful information to them. If that speaker, when given power, acts in 
accordance with these commitments and also acts in ways that harm audience members, this is 
less a case of betrayal or manipulation than of tradeoffs. Some portion of the electoral audience 
is willing to vote for a far-right racist candidate whose economic or public health policies harm 
them; after this harm becomes apparent, it seems that some part of this audience remains willing 
to accept policy drawbacks in some areas in order to indulge their racism in others.  
Case 1: Appealing to Unshared Principles 
Consider a nonreligious person defending egalitarian and redistributive social policies in 
front of an audience composed largely of Christians, who chooses to ground their appeals in 
references to doing good to the least of Christ’s brethren, loving one’s neighbor, and similar 
concepts out of the Christian bible. At least some of these appeals must certainly count as 
manipulative for DiLeo on the basis that they involve “unrelated” arguments. A person who does 
not believe in the Last Judgment would never find the best or decisive reason for feeding the 
hungry in a parable suggesting that those who do so will be admitted to heaven at that time; a 
person who has no faith in the Christian god will not be swayed by being informed that loving 
one’s neighbor is a duty second only to loving that deity. But defining the choice to appeal to the 
beliefs of audience members, rather than imposing one’s own beliefs as authoritative, as 
necessarily manipulative seems extreme. We can find considerable room for an ethos of humility 
or respect in an attempt to connect one’s own commitments, values, and intentions to those of 
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audience members, even if there is also room for an attempt to cynically appeal to beliefs that the 
speaker considers otherwise useless. When Bryan Garsten points to moments in John Rawls’ late 
work that endorse arguing from audience members’ beliefs as “a sympathetic portrayal of 
rhetorical argument”, he makes exactly this point: even if Garsten sees manipulation as a central 
problem of rhetoric and I do not, we share the intuition that basing arguments and appeals on 
audience members’ prior beliefs has no fundamentally manipulative element.40 It is unclear 
whether Chambers would see this type of appeal as “plebiscitary” or “deliberative”, since one 
could describe such appeals both as speech deployed “strategically for the purposes of winning” 
and as speech that “engages citizens’ practical judgment and as such treats its audience as 
autonomous deliberators deserving of respect”.41 Nonetheless, a definition of manipulation 
including a speaker’s choice to make arguments provisionally based on beliefs that the speaker 
does not share seems to fail condition 1 – it doesn’t necessarily, or perhaps at all, involve a one-
way power relationship.  
Case 3: Appealing to Unshared Contemptible Attitudes 
We might think, then, that the strongest case for viewing racist appeals as a case of 
manipulation lies not in cases where an openly white supremacist and hateful candidate is 
mobilizing audience members’ racial resentment, but in what Ian Haney-López has called 




40 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 187.  
41 Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere”, 337. 
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on racial issues”, “intentionally sought to manipulate race as a means of getting elected”.42 If, as 
Haney-López has argued, this type of racial appeal succeeds in getting voters to support policies 
that hurt the vast majority of Americans but especially harm communities of color, to the benefit 
of a small and wealthy minority, then perhaps we could go from this example to a more coherent 
sense of “manipulation”. We might locate the power relationship in the speaker’s ability a) to 
recognize a characteristic of the audience that enables specific claims about trustworthiness, b) to 
make those claims in a misleading but persuasive way, and c) if and when these appeals succeed 
and result in the speaker’s election to office, to govern with an agenda that may not have much to 
do with the crucial appeals. The rise of what social scientists variously call “implicit racial 
appeals”, “coded racial appeals”, and simply “dogwhistles” adds an important contextual 
element, enabling speakers to simultaneously make racist appeals and deny having done so.43 It 
then follows that in the case of racist appeals, some speakers can rhetorically convey an 
appearance of ethical community within a white supremacist society, thereby strengthening their 
claims to represent a plurality of voters and gaining an alleged mandate to carry out their (largely 
unrelated) policy agenda.  




42 Ian Haney-López, Dog Whistle Politics: How coded racial appeals have reinvented racism and wrecked the 
middle class (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 35.  
43 There is now an extensive literature on strategic racism, racial appeals, and the political consequences thereof. For 
examples that I have found particularly helpful or provocative, along with Haney- López, Dog Whistle Politics, see: 
Tali Mendelberg, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); Robert E. Goodin and Michael Saward, “Dog Whistles and Democratic 
Mandates”, The Political Quarterly Vol. 76, No. 4 (2005), 471-476; Jennifer M. Saul, “Racial Figleaves, the 
Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump”, Philosophical Topics Vol. 45, No. 2 (2017), 
97-116; Jennifer M. Saul, “Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language”, in Daniel Fogal, 
Daniel W. Harris, and Matt Moss, eds., New Work on Speech Acts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
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First, we have arrived at a concept of manipulation that satisfies our first and second criteria at 
the cost of making the third criterion unachievable. That is, the case of politicians using racist 
appeals to gain the trust of voters and enact policies of which those voters would likely otherwise 
disapprove seems to involve an asymmetrical power relationship and to rely on methods that 
differ from Aristotelian dialectical inquiry (and do not comprise the totality of rhetorical 
argument), but it is nearly impossible to situate such a case within a significant portion of 
Aristotle’s intellectual and political project. This will become increasingly clear in the following 
sections, when we examine what Aristotle means by a regime and what work a regime does for 
rhetorical and political actors. For now, I will point out that the relevancy problem – that a 
politician can develop an ethos that is good for winning elections, then enact a policy agenda that 
has little to do with the election-winning appeals – depends on a framework of elective 
representation that one struggles to find anywhere in Aristotle’s political thought.44 In an 
assembly that itself decides on questions of policy, an attempt to develop trust on an irrelevant 
point, then sway the assembly to follow the speaker against the assembly members’ better 
judgment, has far less traction. This would quite literally involve “speaking outside the subject”, 
and as we have seen in Section 2, Aristotle sees this tactic as largely inapplicable to deliberative 
assemblies.  




44 The exception proves the rule. Steven Skultety’s defense of competitive and elective institutions in “the best city” 
in Aristotle’s thought rests on an idealized set of conditions in which virtuous citizens with exceptional political gifts 
compete for the trust of similarly-virtuous, but less politically gifted, citizens in deeply benign elections. Even if we 
grant Aristotle’s “best city” as an unproblematic statement of Aristotle’s political commitments and agree with 
Skultety’s interpretation of that city, I think we would struggle to identify such a set of conditions anywhere in either 
Aristotle’s political context or our own. Steven C. Skultety, “Competition in the Best of Cities: Agonism and 
Aristotle’s ‘Politics’”, Political Theory Vol. 37, No. 1 (2009), 44-68.  
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leads to counterintuitive results. As manipulation, the dogwhistle exists at least somewhat in 
tension with the bad character of the speaker; to the extent that a speaker’s racism is most 
personally felt and most vicious, the speaker’s racist appeals are least manipulative. This 
resembles, yet goes beyond, the pattern of “hyper-sincerity” that Elizabeth Markovits has 
criticized.45 Markovits argues that “deliberative theory as it currently stands gives us no 
satisfactory way to critique hyper-sincerity” and attempts to recover resources of irony, humor, 
and creativity from the works of Plato and Hannah Arendt and assimilate those resources into a 
broader and more inclusive deliberative approach. For Markovits, the problem of hyper-sincerity 
rests in a democratic tendency to emphasize openness, transparency, and frankness – 
exacerbated, perhaps, by some trends in deliberative democratic theory – that provides an 
impulse toward overly simplistic and often divisive rhetorical appeals. This analysis therefore 
focuses on how hyper-sincerity becomes a rhetorical trope and, as a result, crowds out more 
precise, nuanced, and thoughtful appeals; this focus continued in a more recent critique of 
Donald Trump’s rhetorical techniques.46 I want to draw out a different implication. It is not only 
that a focus on sincerity can go too far; in a comparison between two candidates who benefit 
from appeals to racial resentment, a personally hateful bigot and an urbane dog-whistler, the 
more sincere and therefore less manipulative candidate is clearly the bigot. Treating 




45 Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech, and Democratic Judgment (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).  




when we try to apply theory to practical political problems.  
Finally, and most importantly, when we describe dogwhistles and other covert or coded 
appeals as “manipulation” when they increase support for a politician whose policies might 
otherwise be unattractive, we risk emphasizing atomized interactions at the cost of recognizing 
the broader social, historical, and institutional conditions that give those interactions shape. I 
have already gestured toward this point above, insofar as the electoral system and federal 
representation in the United States both enable “manipulative” bait-and-switch techniques in 
which an elected official can successfully make representative claims on some constituents while 
simultaneously enacting policies of which a majority disapprove. White supremacy and high 
levels of racial resentment among white voters are not timeless facts, but the product of ongoing 
social and historical processes. Aside from late-night tweets – admittedly, a significant and 
disturbing exception – the crafting of political appeals most often involves extensive planning 
and consideration from a whole corps of public relations specialists. Including late-night tweets 
and the most wayward of hot-mic rambling, all political appeals depend on the attention, either 
outraged or gleeful repetition, and amplification provided by complicit mass media and some of 
the more engaged listeners. To depict a single politician, isolated from the institutions, 
collaborators, and audiences that enable them, as a titanic puppet master or terrible clown 
obscures precisely the elements responsible for making the politician seem larger than life.  
The case of racist appeals, cynically offered to persuade listeners with racist attitudes that 
a candidate is trustworthy so that the candidate, in power, can advance an economic agenda that 
these listeners might not otherwise support, may be the closest thing to manipulation that we can 
observe in contemporary political rhetoric, although in Chapter 5, I will argue that it still does 
not count. Nonetheless, it doesn’t meet the first condition. Even if we ignore the wide array of 
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individual and collective support on which they depend, speakers who adopt this strategy shift 
their own positions, sometimes with self-destructive consequences, to more effectively appeal to 
audience members. It may fit the second condition, insofar as there are kinds of speech aimed at 
persuading or changing a listener’s opinion on a given subject, other kinds of speech that attempt 
to persuade a listener to overlook that subject in favor of other considerations, and the appeal to 
character tends more towards the latter. But this only shows that character-based appeals that 
persuade in spite of possible policy differences are a subset of the broader category of persuasive 
practices. I, at least, hesitate to claim that all such appeals manipulate. Preferring a politician that 
one views as trustworthy is, all else equal, a reasonable position, and making claims about one’s 
trustworthiness therefore seems a valid form of persuasion. Finally, the case of racist appeals 
fails to meet the third condition: to effectually persuade audiences, speakers rely on a political 
mechanism that we cannot reasonably locate within Aristotle’s thought. This is because Aristotle 
had a fairly specific concept of how persuasion interacted with broader political conditions, 
centered on the regime (politeia), and the kind of contested and overdetermined social 
formations we see at play in this case. A further analysis of this kind of political contestation will 
occur in Chapter 4, through the concept of hegemony; for now, I will develop the regime as a 
political unit in Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric.  
5. From Forum to Regime 
About halfway through Book I of the Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that that a knowledge of 
regimes (politeiai) is “the greatest and most authoritative” (megiston kai kuriōtaton) of all the 
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things that enable persuasion.47 There is much to think through in this claim, and in the following 
argument, and we will return to it shortly. For now, I will simply use it to illustrate the thesis of 
this section of the chapter. For Aristotle, regimes are productive: they produce citizens whose 
values, perceived interests, and conceptions of a good life are consistent with the regime that 
produced them, and therefore to reproduce a polis that fits relatively well with the previously 
existing regime. It follows that the means of persuasion that are available in a democracy 
necessarily differ from those available in an oligarchy. Speakers do well to develop an accurate 
and detailed understanding of the regime governing any city in which they would like to speak 
persuasively; without doing so, they fail to understand important characteristics of their 
audiences. While rhetoric today plays a crucial productive role with respect to constructing 
solidarities and even new publics in audiences, as I will argue in Chapters 3 and 4, Aristotle and 
most other classical political theorists tended to take that productive role largely as given by 
regime, and therefore not usually a function relevant to rhetorical contestation.48 While classical 
rhetorical theory has a category for rhetoric that reproduces audiences appropriate to a given 
regime – Aristotle calls it epideictic rhetoric, the rhetoric of collective praise and blame – this 
actually demonstrates the central role of the regime in producing “good” citizens. After all, an 
epideictic rhetoric that praised values antithetical to those of the polis in which the speech took 
place – imagine Pericles soberly explaining that the Athenians needed to ban silver money and 




47 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.8.1 1365b. Perseus.  
48 The exception, for Aristotle, was when faulty (hēmartēmenai, Politics 1279a20) regimes degenerate to the point 
of provoking revolution (stasis). Politics V.1302a24-30.  
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would just be a failure.  
Forums, Ostracism, and Where They Come From 
Two promising, if not fully developed, points in the Rhetoric literature support this 
reading of the Aristotelian regime. Each of these largely sidesteps manipulation in favor of 
examining the political relationships interacting with rhetoric in Aristotle’s thought. First, Arthur 
Walzer’s treatment of “speaking outside the subject”, which I turned to briefly in the second 
section of the chapter, uses the idea of a forum in which speech takes place to develop what it 
means to speak to or outside the relevant subject. Walzer begins with forum as a generic 
category: the context of a court or a deliberative assembly or a public event, entailing the 
distinction between forensic, deliberative, and epideictic rhetoric, respectively. This grounds a 
practical and substantive distinction between classes of rhetoric, as theorizing an art of rhetoric 
involves tailoring technique and types of appeal to the kind of forum involved. Walzer further 
turns to the details of the forum in a particular community: rules of evidence, regulations on 
subject matter and techniques, and the objectives and concerns that are characteristic of a given 
public space. These kinds of details connect the rather abstracted theoretical concept of a forum 
to the more specific concept of a governing regime. Walzer does not explore this in detail, and 
turns too readily to the idea of politike (political knowledge), rather than politeia (regime), as a 
regulator of rhetoric, which otherwise might run amok. Nonetheless, the idea of forum as 
producing “the character of a particular audience” is worth thinking through in more detail.49  




49 Walzer, “Aristotle on ‘Speaking Outside the Subject’”, 51. 
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the way that Walzer’s forum does, Ethan Stoneman’s argument for rhetoric’s role in the process 
of ostracism gestures toward the role of rhetoric within a regime.50 Stoneman reads the Rhetoric 
together with the Poetics to set up the rhetoric of ostracism as a kind of “tragic catharsis” that 
simultaneously reinforces the bonds between citizens, protects against potential tyrants, and 
limits the harshness of elite conflict.51 As a result, rhetoric, via ostracism, acquires a “capacity to 
clarify, and thereby affirm, the grounds for political inclusion (and exclusion).”52 Like Walzer, 
and like the elite theorists, Stoneman takes Aristotle’s statements that rhetoric is an “offshoot” of 
politics to indicate that the study and employment of persuasive speech ought to be subservient 
to the study and understanding of the polis.53 But because Stoneman adopts a “relativistic 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of constitutions”, on which no possible regime has a 
sufficiently strong claim to justice to justify destabilizing and transforming a present regime, he 
rejects the elite theorists’ view of rhetoric as a tool for political reformation.54 Instead, rhetoric 
figures as a stabilizing and preserving force that replicates and reproduces the regime’s founding 
principles.  
I would like to emphasize and extend a specific concept from these two articles. Each 
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fora in which rhetoric takes place, and for Stoneman, the regime produces a conception of 
citizenship (and, by contrast, a conception of a “first citizen” who might be on the way to 
tyrannical aspirations) that rhetoric reinforces and reproduces. Each article, however, leaves 
undertheorized the intuition that regimes would have a productive role. I argue that regimes play 
a decisive role in Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric because they produce the audiences to which 
speakers appeal. A democratic regime not only produces democratic audiences, but shapes more 
specific aspects of the audiences based on the nuance and texture of the regime prevalent in a 
given polis. The residents of an oligarchy owe their predispositions, biases, and values largely to 
the specific oligarchy in which they were raised, and it follows that attempting to speak across 
the boundaries of separate regimes carries a broad range of challenges.  
We find the primary textual evidence for this interpretation about halfway through Book 
I, where Aristotle identifies a knowledge of regimes (politeiai) as “the greatest and most 
authoritative” (megiston kai kuriōtaton) of all the things that enable persuasion.55 The 
relationship between regime and persuasion follows:  
“One should not, then, leave unnoticed the telos of each regime (politeias), for that which 
approaches toward the end is chosen. The telos of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of 
aristocracy, things related to education and legal usage (nomima); of tyranny, self-protection. It is 
clear, in fact, that one should distinguish the characters (ēthē), legal usages, and things held to be 
profitable according to each telos, if indeed choices are made with reference to this. Since proofs 




55 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.8.1 1365b. Perseus.  
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demonstration of character (because we rely on a speaker on account of his appearing to be a 
certain way, such as if he appears to be good or well-intentioned (eunous) or both) we should 
also have available the characters of each regime. For the character (ethos) that is most 
persuasive is necessarily that which corresponds to each.”56  
The first sentences here ride on a characteristically Aristotelian psychological premise: 
we choose things because we think (at some level) that those things are good for us. When we 
choose things collectively through deliberation, we do so on the basis of a shared sense of how 
those things are good for us collectively.57 While this sense is far from perfect, the ruling telos 
(“end”) of a society, corresponding to the regime, defines both the shared sense of what is good 
and worth striving for and the people who get to make decisions in the polis, and these 
intellectual and institutional conditions will correspond. As a result, arguments about the 
common interest that appeal to the prevailing sense of the common interest will enjoy a 
tremendous advantage. Second, however, the regime produces specific conceptions of a good 
citizen, and appeals to ethos succeed when they demonstrate that the speaker properly models 
these conceptions. As a result, the bulk of Aristotelian persuasion happens within and responsive 
to the productive work that a given city’s regime does. Speakers who want to understand their 
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Regimes and Their Missing Pieces: A Brief Turn to the Politics 
We should note at this point two significant deviations from the more detailed treatment 
of regime that Aristotle offers in the Politics, which he cites at the end of this section of the 
Rhetoric. These omissions, combined with the citation to the Politics, suggest that it’s worth 
briefly examining what the cited passages say, and then returning to the Rhetoric with that 
information clearly in mind. First, several regimes are outright missing. The “polity” (politeia, 
implying that this form of regime is closest to what Aristotle envisions as a natural political 
community) in which the many rule in the interests of the entire community does not appear at 
any point in the Rhetoric; while a benevolent monarchy, in which a godlike ruler provides for the 
needs of all, is name-checked along with the utterly corrupt tyranny, Aristotle also includes a 
“kingdom” (basileia), in which the monarch is subject to laws, and neither monarchy nor 
kingdom are assigned a constitutive telos in the above passage.58 In other words, two out of the 
three regimes that Aristotle apparently endorses as “correct” (orthos) in the Politics are either 
entirely or substantially missing from the regimes that a competent rhetorician must understand 
in the Rhetoric.  
Second, Aristotle presents the third of the “correct” regimes in a decisively distorted 
fashion, compared to the presentation in the Politics: the telos of aristocracy is not virtue, but that 
which approximates “education and legal usage”. This is quite a step down. In the Politics, we 
can find nominal aristocracies that somewhat fall short, but nonetheless “choose officeholders, 




58 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.8.1 1365b-1366a. Perseus. 
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virtue with regard for the people.59 These nominal aristocracies involve a synthesis of either 
oligarchy or democracy, respectively, with a concern for public virtue that Aristotle considers 
constitutive of aristocratic regimes. The closest connection between aristocracy and the 
“education and legal usage” formulation that I can find in the Politics refers not to an 
overarching telos, but to a kind of personal aristocratic virtue: at the end of Politics III, Aristotle 
suggests “it is on account of the same kinds of things that a man might become excellent 
(spoudaios) and that one might set up an aristocratic or monarchical city, insofar as nearly the 
same education and character (ēthē) make a man excellent and make him citizen-like and kingly 
(politikon kai basilikon).”60 But this suggestion does nothing to establish education and character 
as the telos of aristocracy, and the difference between “education and character” and “education 
and legal usage” is substantial: one at least gestures to virtue, while the other points to norms and 
expectations without specific reference to virtue and justice. Instead of aristocracy signifying the 
rule of the actually virtuous, the aristocracy of the Rhetoric’s treatment of regime points to the 
rule of those who appear virtuous by following laws and displaying the traits of a privileged 
upbringing.  
Elite theorist Larry Arnhart notices the first omission in his book-length commentary on 
the Rhetoric, but misses the second.61 As a result, he misinterprets the omission in a way that has 
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manipulation. For Arnhart, the aristocracy of the Rhetoric and the nominal aristocracy of the 
Politics are the same regime, which one can find in political practice. It follows that Aristotle’s 
omissions simply exclude those regimes which “rarely, if ever, exist in practice” and therefore 
are “inappropriate subjects for the Rhetoric, since the rhetorician can deal with political things 
only as they are known from the ordinary experience and common opinions of men.”62 On this 
reading, Aristotelian politikē fundamentally accesses philosophical truth in a way that 
Aristotelian rhetorikē does not, and as a result, Arnhart suggests that Aristotle envisions an 
“architectonic supremacy of politics over rhetoric”.63 The conclusion that the practitioners of 
politikē are therefore also the most capable rhetoricians, and therefore that rhetoric is the tool by 
which philosophers improve cities and push them toward aristocracy, follows naturally enough 
from Arnhart’s position.64  
The gap between the aristocracy here in the Rhetoric and the various real and nominal 
aristocracies in the Politics, however, reaches a bit too far for Arnhart’s reading to cover. One 
could reasonably read the shift from virtue to apparent virtue or legality as a basis for aristocracy 
in terms of practicality, but the further move to the appearance of legality and upbringing 
involves a shift away from principle entirely. The aristocracy of the Rhetoric has, to put it simply, 
ossified into a formal system in which the “best” are merely the “good” families, and in which 
virtue does not appear in any particularly developed way. Instead of aristocracy taking the place 




62 Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning, 74.  
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64 Cf. Rupcic, “Founding Speech”, 142-143; DiLeo, “Aristotle’s Manipulative Maxims”, 384-385, 390-392.  
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rhetoricians might try to guide a city toward, aristocracy takes its place among the regimes that 
fall short in all-too-predictable ways, in which a speaker will be well advised to understand and 
respond to the prevailing political conditions.65  
We can draw a stronger connection between this summary and the more extensive 
treatment of regime in the Politics, then, through Arlene Saxonhouse’s critical account of justice 
in the latter text. For Saxonhouse, Aristotle’s treatment of justice in the Politics is not only 
aporetic, developing problems without solving them, but also reveals exclusion and resulting 
resentment at the core of every regime, even the apparently “correct” ones.66 Saxonhouse, with 
Aristotle, emphasizes a fundamental ambiguity around the concept of justice: since people can 
simultaneously be equals in one respect and unequal in others, any distribution of political 
standing and access will result in someone resentfully believing that according to the dimension 
they consider applicable, the regime deprives them of their rightful position.67 This difficulty 
applies both to aristocracies and oligarchies, and therefore disrupts any rigid distinction between 
“correct” and “falling-short” regimes; the suggestion that even a perfectly virtuous monarch 
would, by ruling, necessarily exclude the rest of the polis from truly sharing in a political 
community disrupts this distinction further.68 The problem of exclusion applies even more to 
those whose exclusion is taken most for granted. In the context of ancient Athens, we would 
most readily consider slaves, metics (resident aliens), and Athenian women: people who, even 
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regime, no matter how democratic or open, because they did not count as members of the 
dēmos.69 Any regime’s claim to justice – and, perhaps, any claim to virtue – is always 
contestable, always contested, and fundamentally unstable.  
Back to the Rhetoric: Aristotle’s Productive Regimes 
If Aristotle’s most developed and considered examination of political regimes points to 
this instability, we have a straightforward explanation for why the brief of regimes in the 
Rhetoric simply leaves out whether a regime is truly devoted to the common good or not. 
Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric generally discourages the public contestation of a regime’s claim 
to justice, on the basis that the life of a citizen in almost any polis is better than life outside one. 
The first step in crafting appeals requires the recognition that regimes have a practical, 
commonly perceived set of privileged traits and values, and that understanding, modeling, and 
appealing to these privileged traits and values is a decisive element in rhetorical practice. 
Politically informed rhetoricians will not stop at recognizing these contextual characteristics; 
they will also seek a sense of how and why the prevalent regime produces these characteristics, 
and likely a closer grasp on the nuances of the regime – its detailed texture, beyond its status as 
an oligarchy, democracy, or something else – and how these nuances affect everyday politics. By 
developing this awareness, speakers come to access the substantive and generally agreed on ends 




69 We can see a contemporary equivalent of this kind of exclusion in the concept of “white democracy” or 
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“good breeding” and legal observance, and appeal to these ends in attempting to build consensus 
with audiences. In Aristotle’s rhetorical model, when speakers engage with audiences, they do 
well to engage with the regime that produced those audiences, in order to make clear that the 
proposed course of action will achieve approved ends and that the speakers’ characters are those 
of good citizens.   
One might think that we would want a rhetorical mode that can build movements and 
construct solidarities outside of the range of projects approved within a dominant regime. And 
yes, I think we would, and I turn to that approach from Chapter 4 onward. But Aristotle bites that 
bullet, no less in the Rhetoric than in the Politics, and insists that the central point to deliberation 
is preserving the existing regime: “because everyone is persuaded by the beneficial, and that 
which preserves (sōzon) the regime is beneficial.”70 Such a universal position, unattractive as it 
might be today, reflects the problems around political justice that I discussed above. It is 
difficult, perhaps impossible, for someone working within an Aristotelian framework to 
simultaneously make the case that the present regime is so terrible as to merit stasis (mass 
rebellion) and the case that whatever future community might arise from the ashes would be 
enough of an improvement to make the struggle worth it. Some of this difficulty owes to the 
Aristotelian perspective on political community, in which the good life is only possible within a 
polis. The rest of the difficulty, however, arises from the problem of finding an audience that is 
enough a part of a political community for a speaker to address them in political terms, but 




70 πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.8.1 1365b. 
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follows that preservation, not to mention improvement, will in this framework generally depend 
on the extent to which a speaker can portray the relevant measures as reflecting the best aspects 
of the existing regime.  
This should also provide us with a response to the claim, especially common among 
elitist readings of the Rhetoric, that Aristotle subordinates the rhetorical to the political in a way 
that makes rhetorical practice the tool of political philosophers. Aside from the problems that the 
Politics raises for anyone who wants to understand political philosophy as an agenda for 
implementing aristocracy, the Rhetoric treats rhetorical appeals as responsive not to politikē – 
political knowledge – but to politeia, the existing regime. To the extent that studying politics 
allows the rhetorician to more effectively engage in public deliberation, that study will prove 
helpful; to the extent that someone wants to impose their allegedly-superior knowledge of 
political philosophy on the masses, such a project would likely prove hubristic.  
6. Conclusion: An Unsolved Problem 
So far, we have the beginnings of an audience-centered theory of rhetoric, but one that 
relies heavily on an Aristotelian concept of a political regime for conditions that no longer 
obtain. Political communities today have a rather lesser capacity for reproducing a sense of a 
collective good and have to hold a much larger number of people together. Many of us wish to 
live peacefully, if not always happily, with others who have entirely different ideas of what a 
good life is like; we may – I think with good cause – insist on a reasonably good life for 
everyone instead of a particular kind of best life for a privileged few. And even those who might 
find an Aristotelian polis attractive will struggle to find such a community in the present 
moment.  
In this chapter, I have tried to disrupt the idea that manipulation is a natural or 
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constitutive element of rhetoric by examining a classical text of rhetorical theory that does not 
contain a developed concept of manipulation. If this disruptive and denaturalizing argument is 
correct, it implies that modern scholars who find manipulation in the Rhetoric do so because they 
have brought a concept of manipulation with them from somewhere else. In the following 
chapters, I will trace the origins and history of the link between rhetoric and manipulation, as 
well as examine how we can construct an audience-centered theory of rhetoric in the world of 
political and social plurality, outside the ruling presence of the Aristotelian regime.  
To begin with, however, I need to address whether the Aristotelian disregard for 
manipulation was anomalous within his own context. In particular, when we consider classical 
treatments of rhetoric, Plato’s portrayal of rhetoric in the Gorgias and, secondarily, in the 
Phaedrus often seems to portray rhetoricians as malevolent supervillains. If we read Aristotle 
responding to this Platonic portrayal, then the Aristotelian approach to rhetoric might be an 
anomaly in a long philosophical attack on rhetoric. We might then be tempted to retain a strict 
hierarchy in which rhetoric is a second-best for people who can’t follow philosophical argument, 
as when Amélie Oksenberg Rorty argues that “Aristotle moderates Plato’s attack on the dangers 
of metaphors, analogies, and similes … he nevertheless thinks that metaphor and myth can serve 
as didactic instruments for those who cannot be persuaded by strictly logical argumentation.”71 
On this argument, we would have no reason to see the manipulation-rhetoric connection as 
historically specific or ideological; instead, we would have considerable cause to wonder 
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have to wait for the following chapters. 
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 Supervillainy, Dēmēgoria, and the Limits of Rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias 
 
1. Introduction 
Even if Aristotle theorized rhetoric as dependent on audience and regime, as I’ve argued 
in Chapter 2, the prevailing conception of Aristotle’s Rhetoric holds that it was an important 
moment in Aristotle’s break with the Academy. Plato, the story goes, had no use whatever for 
rhetoric, as anyone could tell from reading the Gorgias. Indeed, many scholars have attributed to 
Plato a theory of rhetoric that I will describe as the supervillain theory: rhetoric provides a 
powerful capacity for deception and manipulation, which allows for unjust rhetoricians to 
manipulate doxa (popular opinions) and thus to flatter the masses, build empires, imprison and 
execute philosophers, and otherwise misbehave.72 If rhetorical supervillains often crash and 
burn, as Socrates depicts Pericles, Themistocles, and others doing in the third section of the 
Gorgias, this is just another case of injustice proving self-destructive. Other scholarship has 
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that dialogue apply to rhetoric used for unjust purposes, but not against rhetoric used to, say, 
protect hapless philosophers in court, or to direct people to seek philosophical or medical aid.73 
In this chapter, I want to step back from the idea of rhetoric as a power that can be used well or 
badly, and instead to interrogate the limits of rhetoric as displayed in the Gorgias. I argue that the 
critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias serves to describe a series of limits to the potential of rhetoric 
and therefore provides reasons to reject the supervillain theory.  
The crucial question in this chapter is the relationship between rhetoric and power. If, on 
something like the supervillain theory, rhetoric simply is power because it allows speakers to 
dominate or manipulate audiences through a capacity that is internal to speakers, such a capacity 
would profoundly constrain political institutions and practices. Rhetoric would pose a serious 
threat to institutions reliant on popular consent, let alone support. One could design institutions 
that operate rhetorically to constrain any deliberation or mobilization outside those institutions, 
so as to monopolize rhetorical power and wield it in service to the state.  Alternatively, one could 
allow constant rhetorical conflict, in order to create a perpetual hostile balance of power between 
elite rhetoricians who struggle for personal and factional supremacy. Each of these options, like 
their plausible combinations, supposes that rhetoric is essentially forceful, analogous to a 
political weapon of mass destruction. And as we’ll see in the third and fourth chapters, these 
options, as well as their shared theoretical foundation, are crucial for understanding the 
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Plato, however, endorses no such theory. Plato portrays the forcefulness of Athenian 
rhetorical styles during the Peloponnesian War, in which the Gorgias is unambiguously set, as 
contingent and counterproductive.74 But more importantly – and largely unrecognized by 
contemporary scholarship – the dialogue calls into question the central claim, made first by 
Gorgias and then defended by Polus and Callicles, that rhetoric equates to power over audiences. 
Each of Socrates’ interlocutors is doubly exposed: first, as engaging in a profit-seeking exercise 
of advertising power for sale, and second, as nonetheless dependent on their audiences, and 
therefore unable to wield the power they claim to possess. Socrates himself is accurately 
described by his interlocutors as adopting dēmēgoria, the practice of “public speaking” common 
to Athenian politicians, and his attempts to persuade his interlocutors fare no better than their 
attempts to persuasively defend themselves. Both the Gorgias’ overall narrative arc and a series 
of specific textual elements suggest that the dialogue sets up a theory of rhetoric as an 
overwhelming force liable to abuse in order to discredit that theory. Instead, at least once in the 
dialogue, Plato has Socrates explicitly subscribe to an audience-centered theory of rhetoric on 
which speakers depend on audiences (and, therefore, on the political regime governing any given 
audience) for the resources for persuasion.   
2. The supervillain theory’s advocates: their motives, and their vulnerabilities 
In the Gorgias, the eponymous rhetorician claims quickly enough that “the power of 
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freedom for men generally in their own persons and of rule for individuals in their cities”.75 Plato 
has Gorgias add a touch of melodrama to this claim: Gorgias mysteriously describes this 
“greatest good”, makes Socrates ask what it is, and only then answers with considerable 
elaboration, including typically Gorgian alliterative flourishes and the claim that such power 
allows its possessor to make their doctor or trainer a “slave” (doulon).76 It is already clear that 
Gorgias claims to have this power, as well as to be able to teach it to others, as Gorgias had 
provided that information well in advance of Socrates’ extraction of a definition of rhetoric.77  
It is crucial to understand the dimensions of Gorgias’ claim. To say that one has the power 
of persuading is, in the Attic Greek of the fifth and fourth centuries, nearly the same as saying 
that one has the power of producing obedience: one of the verbs often translated as “to obey”, 
peithomai, is simply the passive verb “to be persuaded”. That Gorgias claims that this ability 
turns experts in other arts into one’s slaves is not much of an additional stretch, considering that 
he claims to wield supreme authority over juries, members of assemblies, and the attendees at 
any other public meeting.78 While Socrates presses Gorgias to clarify what kinds of persuasion 
rhetoric accomplishes, Gorgias’ slightly impatient answer is understandable: “I’m talking about 
the sort of persuasion, Socrates, as in the courts and in other crowds (ochlois), just as I was 
saying – and it’s about what is just and unjust.”79 In the first few lines of Socrates’ and Gorgias’ 




75 Plato, Gorgias, in Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. (Oxford University Press, 1903), 452d-e. Perseus. 
Translations are my own, unless otherwise stated.  
76 Gorgias, 452e.  
77 Gorgias, 449a.  
78 Gorgias, 452e.  
79 “ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι 
ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.” Gorgias, 454b.  
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rhetoric) in a clear and complete form: people who possess the art of rhetoric can alter the 
masses’ perceptions of what is just (or normative) and what violates principles of justice, and 
therefore gain influence over entire poleis. Rhetoric persuades audiences about justice and 
violations of justice, and thereby gets some of its force from the powerful normative 
commitments that it implicates.80 But its essence is power, in the form of moving large numbers 
of people to do one’s bidding. And Gorgias’ expansive claims about rhetoric’s power are crucial 
to the narrative and argumentative arc of the dialogue.  
Many scholars too quickly pass from questioning the power of rhetoric in favor of 
questions about how this power is used or, in some cases, how the power inevitably tends to be 
used. On this interpretation of the Gorgias, Socrates (and Plato) oppose rhetoric because the 
power that it exerts over audiences is ill-founded, based as it is on doxa instead of on episteme, 
and therefore tends toward manipulation and abuse of those who don’t know better.81 Socrates 
stipulates to the claim that rhetoric has power in order to argue that this power is necessarily 
abusive or, in a more moderate reading, consistently badly used by sophists and rhetors. Thus, 
for James Doyle, Socrates takes the position “that membership of some of these ethically-
charged categories – namely orator, democratic politician, and tyrant – are strictly incompatible 




80 As James Doyle correctly points out, the persuasion is about justice and injustice, but Gorgias never says that 
rhetoric is about these concepts. Socrates’ later move to conflate these is done without Gorgias’ agreement. James 
Doyle, “Socrates and Gorgias”, Phronesis (Vol. 55, No. 1, 2010), 16. 
81 For examples of this move, see James Doyle, “Socrates and Gorgias”, 1-25; Murray, “Plato on Power, Moral 
Responsibility, and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias’ Art of Rhetoric”, 360-361; Simone Chambers, “Rhetoric and 
the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?”, Political Theory 37:3 (2009), 326-
327.  
82 Doyle, “Socrates and Gorgias”, 5. Emphasis in the original. 
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R. Bensen Cain widens this critique to argue, in surprisingly modern terms, that “[t]he misuse of 
language is what makes it possible for sophistic rhetors, such as Gorgias and Polus, to mislead 
their listeners, hide their real views, and remain oblivious to the inconsistencies of their 
positions.”83 Cain’s Plato has very nearly the same critique of rhetoric that Hobbes and Locke 
would adopt in the 17th century: rhetors abuse language to equivocate and to misrepresent, and 
therefore mislead their audiences.84 Readings of the Gorgias along this line, as I will argue in the 
chapter’s conclusion, tend to anachronistically flatten Plato’s concerns about rhetoric in a way 
that makes those concerns resemble the very different theoretical interventions of early modern 
political thinkers. For the moment, however, I am treating them as examples of an interpretive 
approach to the Gorgias which has Plato adopting a position of inveterate hostility to most 
persuasive practices.  
There are, of course, examples of a more moderate reading. On this reading, Socrates’ 
hostility towards rhetoricians and sophists in the Gorgias does not exhaust the possibilities of 
rhetoric, because rhetoric is more capacious than its advocates in that dialogue seem to 
understand. Christina Tarnopolsky has argued that the sharp conflict between Gorgianic 
“flattering rhetoric” and Socratic “dialectic” early in the Gorgias points to a “Platonic rhetoric” 
that, if not comprehensively presented in the dialogue, nonetheless constitutes an alternative to 




83 Cain, “Shame and Ambiguity”, 213.  
84 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 25; John Locke, An essay 
concerning human understanding, v.2 (London: W. Otridge, 1812), 42, HathiTrust Digital Library.  
85 Christina H. Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato’s Gorgias and the Politics of Shame (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 50-62.  
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the Gorgias points to a “noble (kalon) rhetoric” that he identifies with Plato’s broader “literary-
rhetorical project”, but sees Socrates’ engagement of Gorgias and Callicles as less 
confrontational than Tarnopolsky does, in part because Stauffer reads Socrates as attempting to 
convince Gorgias that Gorgias’ rhetorical powers should be used in defense of philosophy.86 
Similarly, Alessandra Fussi sees the “bitterness” of Socrates’ “radical attack on rhetoric” as one 
side of a complex Platonic engagement with rhetoric, in which “the philosopher and the 
rhetorician may need each other more than Socrates wants us to believe”.87 While these authors 
recognize important complexity in Plato’s treatment of rhetoric, they nonetheless also neglect the 
question of rhetoric’s actual capacity for persuasion in the Gorgias.  
This question is not neglected in the actual text of the Gorgias. Neglecting the power of 
rhetoric would be to render it as something like the Ring of Gyges (Republic II: 359a-360d): a 
ring of invisibility that allows readers to imagine that it’s possible to practice injustice without 
fear of punishment and, through the course of the dialogue, consider whether acting unjustly 
under such circumstances would in fact be desirable. That the Ring of Gyges is fictional does not 
change the usefulness or value of Glaucon’s hypothetical. Socrates’ interlocutors in the Gorgias, 
however, are not challenging Socrates to defend justice in the abstract. Instead, Socrates is 
questioning his interlocutors about the nature of the skill that they advertise, which is the power 
to persuade audiences. It would be strange for Socrates to simply accept that this skill exists and 




86 Stauffer, The Unity of Plato’s ‘Gorgias’, esp. 177-182. See also Nichols, “The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato’s 
‘Gorgias’”, 145-149.  
87 Fussi, “Why is the Gorgias so bitter?”, 55.  
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The first and perhaps clearest indicator that Gorgian rhetoric does not fully possess the 
power that Gorgias claims to possess is the fact that the power is, in fact, being advertised.88 That 
is, Gorgias (like practically all other sophists) are offering to teach their skill to paying students, 
and Gorgias’ and his student Polus’ flowery and melodramatic claims of the impressive power 
that Gorgias wields should certainly be understood accordingly. Indeed, the claims not only of 
teachers for hire, but of paid speechwriters, were generally seen as somewhat less credible in 
ancient Athens. Plato went to considerable effort to clearly separate Socrates from the class of 
sophists, who were distinguished by the practice of for-profit teaching, and there is some 
evidence that Socrates suffered from association with them. For example, in the Apology (19c), 
Socrates blames Aristophanes for making the Athenians think badly of him, clearly referencing 
Aristophanes’ play The Clouds, which portrayed Socrates and the other denizens of the 
“Thinkery” as teaching paying students the skill of making wrong overcome right in the courts. 
While the aspect of accepting payment is nowhere in the charges, Socrates then gratuitously adds 
that he himself never made money by teaching like Gorgias and others did (19d-20a). His remark 
that “nonetheless, it seems to me a fine thing indeed, if someone might be able to teach people in 
the manner of Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis … to persuade the 




88 Though this is not the main focus of her paper, Rachel Barney’s description of the first section of Gorgias’ speech 
as “The Advertisement” nicely captures the nature of Gorgias’ tone and argumentative direction. Barney, “Gorgias’ 
Defense: Plato and His Opponents on Rhetoric and the Good”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 48, 
Issue 1 (2010), 95-121. Devin Stauffer’s recognition of “Gorgias’ … related desire to expand his following of 
students” is also apt on this point. Stauffer, The Unity of Plato’s ‘Gorgias’, 27.  
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can only be taken as bitterly ironic.89 
Socrates’ attempts to insulate himself from accusations of paid teaching seem to reflect a 
broader Athenian distrust of sophists. The sophistic practice of charging for teaching also 
receives a sharp rebuke in Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, likely published around the same time 
as the Gorgias: “Most ridiculous of all, they [sophists] distrust those from whom they are about 
to exact payment, even though they are just about to pass on to them the knowledge of justice.”90 
In other words, not only do sophists charge for their services and therefore invite distrust, but 
their claim – attributed to Gorgias in Plato’s dialogue – that they also teach their students justice 
is belied by the fact that they don’t trust their students to pay without setting up an escrow 
through a third party.91 Indeed, Isocrates, himself vulnerable to charges of sophistry-for-hire, 
seems to have adopted a policy of only accepting payment for his educational services from non-
Athenian students, while teaching fellow Athenians for free as a public service.92 Later, 
Demosthenes had the clients for whom he wrote legal speeches lament the lack of sophistication 
and political acumen that, when harassed by trained and experienced legal sharks, forced them to 
hire Demosthenes’ services in order to have a chance in the courts.93 The extent of this distrust is 




89 “ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ᾽ εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ 
Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος … τοὺς νέους … τούτους πείθουσι … σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ 
χάριν προσειδέναι.” Apology, 19e-20a, Perseus. 
90  “ὃ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον, ὅτι παρὰ μὲν ὧν δεῖ λαβεῖν αὐτούς, τούτοις μὲν ἀπιστοῦσιν, οἷς μέλλουσι τὴν 
δικαιοσύνην παραδώσειν…” Isocrates, Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, ed. and trans. by 
George Norlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), Perseus.  
91 Socrates makes the same point in the Gorgias at 519d.  
92 Yun Lee Too, The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, power, pedagogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 108-111.  
93 Cite.  
 70 
offers power over an audience into the mouth of a paid rhetorician would have tended to make 
that claim less credible for a contemporary Athenian reader.  
The background of Athenian distrust for sophists (and by extension, rhetoricians) also 
provides a contextual reason to read the Gorgias as directly confronting questions of rhetoric’s 
power. This distrust would make a dialogue in which Socrates merely accused sophists of 
injustice largely superfluous; Athenians of the 4th century already apparently believed that 
sophists made the stronger argument appear weaker, misrepresented questions of justice, and 
therefore undermined Athenian institutions. It might be that the Gorgias was another attempt to 
convince readers that Socrates was not a sophist, and therefore retroactively justify Socrates’ 
project by divorcing readers’ perceptions of Socrates from their general distrust of sophists, 
much as the Apology passage discussed above. As we’ll see later, however, the Gorgias actually 
implicates Socrates in Athenian rhetorical practices to an extent unparalleled in any other 
Platonic dialogue. If Athenians generally believed that sophists’ rhetoric had power and that this 
power was prone to abuse, Plato’s portrayal of Socrates confronting Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles 
makes more sense as an intervention against the untrammeled power of rhetoric. Gorgias, Polus, 
and Callicles claim to possess a capacity to commit broad injustices and to remake politics as 
they wish, but they are mistaken in this claim. Socrates’ rhetorical appeals in favor of a concern 
for justice and the improvement of one’s fellow citizens, if informed by a better political 
disposition than his interlocutors generally display, are no more successful in establishing the 
power of rhetoric to persuade those who do not wish to be persuaded.  
The direct textual evidence for an intervention emphasizing the limits of rhetoric is 
dispersed, but clear. Socrates’ initial questioning of Gorgias elicits the clear and developed theory 
of rhetoric as a superpower precisely because Socrates enquires about the limits of rhetoric’s 
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power. To be sure, Gorgias claims that rhetoric is the art of creating persuasion, but Socrates 
quickly gets him to admit that other arts create persuasion to the extent that they create 
knowledge and that the knowledge created is action-guiding (453d-e). “Rhetoric, then,” Socrates 
concludes, “is not the lone producer of persuasion,” and since Gorgias agrees, the crucial 
question is “of what kind of persuasion, and about what, is rhetoric the art?”94 We’ve already 
seen that Gorgias thinks rhetoric creates persuasion about justice and injustice, and therefore is 
the source of political power. And the evidence that Gorgias cites for this power is that 
Themistocles and Pericles convinced Athenians to militarize and build defensive fortifications, 
and that these constructions projects therefore happened because of the politicians, not the 
builders who actually carried out the projects (455e). Socrates immediately asks to hear more 
about the power of rhetoric, because “looking at it like that, its greatness appears like something 
supernatural”.95 But here, just as Gorgias begins to further expound on rhetoric’s power, he 
catches himself, and reminds Socrates that one shouldn’t wield rhetoric for purposes of injustice, 
and that if a student does so, that Gorgias, as the teacher, can’t be held responsible. 
Commentators typically follow Gorgias’ digression, and this digression leads away from politics 
and the question of rhetoric’s actual power and toward the question of whether Gorgias himself is 
a responsible teacher of rhetoric.96  




94 οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν δημιουργός. … ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν 
τέχνη; Gorgias, 454a. Perseus.  
95  δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι. Gorgias, 456a. Perseus. 
96 Stauffer, The Unity of Plato’s ‘Gorgias’, 33-35, Murray, “Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility, and the Alleged 
Neutrality of Gorgias’ Art of Rhetoric”, 359-361. Cf. Doyle, “Socrates and Gorgias”, 10.  
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admit that rhetoric is as powerful as Gorgias has claimed: “Doesn’t it make everything easier, 
Socrates, to become, without learning anything about any other arts but this one, just as capable 
as the other practitioners?”97 The fact that Gorgias goes back to insist on this point of relative 
capacity – which has already degraded from mastery over the practitioners of every other art to 
being just as good as they are – in the middle of defending rhetoricians from responsibility for 
abuse is telling. For the time being, Socrates follows Gorgias in examining whether rhetoric uses 
its great power responsibly, rather than whether the power is as great as Gorgias claims, but this 
is explicitly not a concession: “Whether the rhetor is or isn’t a match for those others on account 
of having that skill, we’ll examine later, if the argument takes us in that direction.”98 But it turns 
out that Socrates doesn’t return to this question when speaking directly to Gorgias. While 
Gorgias, speaking as a foreigner, is on safe ground praising past Athenian leaders, it would be 
unfair or at least extremely thoughtless of Socrates to force him to admit that these leaders were 
less praiseworthy than initially suggested.99 Whatever the reason, Socrates does not return to the 
question of Pericles’ and Themistocles’ worthiness until he is arguing with Callicles, and here he 
directly confronts the question of whether these and other politicians actually enjoyed power 




97 οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν 
ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν; Gorgias, 459c. Perseus. 
98 εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς 
λόγου ᾖ… Gorgias, 459c. Perseus. 
99 Arlene Saxonhouse has pointed out the importance of Callicles’ citizenship for his ability to practice parrhēsia 
(Athenian “frank speech”), which Gorgias and Polus lack as foreigners. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy 
in Ancient Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 90. Otherwise thoughtful and illuminating 
analyses of Plato’s treatment of parrhēsia that miss this crucial point include Sara Monoson, Plato’s Democratic 
Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
158-159 and Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants, 101-102.  
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“completing the arguments” (497b) and, then, that Socrates finish his argument even without 
Callicles’ cooperation (506b) is perhaps best explained by Gorgias’ awareness that Socrates is 
examining the question Gorgias had earlier brought up without putting him in an awkward 
position.  
Socrates’ harsh attack on past Athenian leaders is controversial. For some commentators, 
the attack is clearly excessive, while others see it as communicating a broader critique of 
Athenian imperialism.100 Callicles certainly finds it objectionable, and makes a point of his 
dissatisfaction with Socrates’ line of argument, through grudging admissions and an accusation 
that Socrates is just another Spartan sympathizer (515d-e). But this attack follows, not from 
premises that Socrates clearly endorses, but from the premise that Gorgias initially introduced 
and Callicles reaffirmed: politicians, in their capacity as rhetors, possess a capacity to make 
citizens better, and therefore can be held responsible for any failure to do so. If this power in fact 
exists, and Pericles and others failed to improve the Athenians in the manner that a farmer would 
tame animals, it follows that they were political failures. Callicles objects to this conclusion, but 
is either unable or unwilling to take the only logical way out: to bite the bullet and admit that 
rhetoric doesn’t give the power to unilaterally improve or debase one’s fellow citizens. Callicles’ 
failure to find this way out is, if anything, emphasized by Socrates’ repeated references to the 




100 Stauffer’s claim that the attack is “unreasonable” represents the former perspective well. Staufffer, The Unity of 
Plato’s ‘Gorgias’, 152-154. I tend to favor the emphasis on these leaders’ contributions to Athenian empire. See 
Saxonhouse, “An Unspoken Theme in Plato’s Gorgias: War”; Svoboda, “Athens, the Unjust Student of Rhetoric”, 
294-295.  
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as you said”, “it seems”.101 The blame for Athens’ imperialism may or may not fall on the city’s 
leaders; what Socrates insists upon is that if they had the power to do anything else, they were 
responsible for leading the city into its imperial phase “without temperance or justice”.102 The 
text of Socrates’ and Callicles’ disagreement makes Gorgias’ insistence on the power of past 
Athenian politicians untenable.  
3. Socrates’ weaponized dēmēgoria 
Readings of the Gorgias that emphasize Plato’s hostility to rhetoricians and sophists, as 
well as those that emphasize Socrates’ gestures to a “true” or “noble” rhetoric late in the 
dialogue, tend to neglect the extent to which Socrates in the Gorgias is enmeshed in the practices 
he appears to condemn. Socrates is accused of practicing conventional Athenian dēmēgoria 
(“public speaking”) early in his conversation with Callicles, uses the term generically to refer to 
politicians and others who speak frequently in the Assembly, and then eventually uses the verb 
form for his style of “haranguing” Callicles for several Stephanus pages (519d). A series of 
stylistic elements suggest that Socrates is in fact mimicking, or even adopting, exactly the 
manner of speaking associated with Athenian assembly speeches, and that this is important for 
understanding the broader treatment of Athenian and sophistic approaches to rhetoric in the 
Gorgias. Plato’s critique of rhetoric does not attribute rhetoric’s failures to flaws in the speakers, 
such as the rhetors and sophists portrayed in the Gorgias. Instead, rhetoric’s limits come from 




101 ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου; εἰ ἦσαν… ὡς σὺ φῄς; ὡς ἔοικεν. Gorgias, 516d-e. Perseus. 
102 ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης. Gorgias, 519a. Perseus. 
 75 
largely constitutive of rhetoric – if one were not seeking to persuade an audience, one’s speech 
would not be rhetorical – Plato indeed has a sharp critique of Athenian rhetoric. But I will argue 
in this section that the critique applies to Socrates (as portrayed in the dialogue) as well as to his 
interlocutors.  
Socrates’ status as a dēmēgoros (“popular speaker”, in the sense of someone who speaks 
in the assembly) in the Gorgias is quite surprising. Plato only rarely uses the term, in any of its 
verb or noun forms. In the Apology, the verb form dēmēgorein appears once (36b) in a list of the 
many Athenian public activities that Socrates habitually neglected. Elsewhere, Plato generally 
treats “public speaker” (dēmēgoros) and “rhetor” as interchangeable in Socrates’ vocabulary 
(Protagoras, 329a). The example Socrates gives of such a person in that passage is, 
unsurprisingly, Pericles, and Socrates is complaining that public speakers are so good at 
delivering their speeches that “when questioned even briefly, these rhetors stretch their speech 
again over the full-length course”, a complaint implicit in his similar demand of brevity from 
Gorgias (449a).103 Nowhere outside the Gorgias does Plato even approach suggesting that 
Socrates qualifies as a dēmēgoros, and in the Laws (908d) the dēmēgoroi appear alongside 
generals, tyrants, witches, and sophists among the evildoers that spring from the ranks of the 
impious. Contemporary and later usages generally lack this negative connotation, but don’t fit 
any better with the character of Socrates as usually described by Plato or other contemporaries. 
Aristophanes uses dēmēgorein in the Ecclesiazusae to refer to any kind of public speaking, as do 




103 καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω, σμικρὰ [329β] ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Plato, Protagoras, in Platonis 
Opera, ed. John Burnet. (Oxford University Press, 1903), 329a-b. Perseus. 
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Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Cassius Dio generally follow this pattern. Aristotle’s use of 
dēmēgoria (e.g. at Rhetoric 1354b) to refer to the class of rhetoric we generally translate as 
“deliberative”, contrasting with “forensic” rhetoric (dikanikē), theorizes the common non-
Platonic usage in which the term refers to the practice of speaking in the ekklesia in general, and 
Socrates was well known for avoiding that practice. It is therefore unsurprising that Christina 
Tarnopolsky takes Callicles’ accusation that Socrates is a “popular speaker” as potentially 
devastating to Socrates’ integrity, and also seems to see the accusation as false.104  
But, at least as far as the Gorgias is concerned, the accusation is not false, insofar as 
Socrates eventually admits during one of his long monologues that “truly you’ve made it 
necessary for me to harangue (dēmēgorein) you, Callicles, since you refused to answer”.105 
Indeed, not only does Socrates seem to confess to the accusation, but the rhetorical style he 
adopts is aggressive and even overbearing. Consider a longer section of this monologue, which 
immediately precedes Socrates’ “confession”:  
“For I notice that whenever a city lays hands on one of these political men for their 
wrongdoing, they are violently upset and complain loudly about their terrible suffering: after all 
the good they’ve done for the city, now they’re unjustly ruined by it, or so they say. But the 
whole thing is a lie. No leader of a city could be ruined unjustly by the very same city that he 
rules. The same risk is run, both by the pretended statesmen and by the sophists. For even the 
sophists, who are otherwise so wise (sophoi), do this one strange thing: they say they’re teachers 




104 Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants, 102.  
105 ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Gorgias, 519d. Perseus. 
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their students cheat them of their fees and otherwise don’t show any gratitude for the good 
they’ve done them. Now what logic could possibly be more illogical than this lawsuit? These 
men, having been made good and just, indeed after having all their injustice chiseled out and 
replaced with justice, now do the injustice they no longer know how to do. Doesn’t that seem 
strange to you, companion?”106  
Let’s begin by recognizing the substantive parallel between Socrates’ mockery of sophists 
complaining at being defrauded by those whom they taught to be just and Isocrates’ observation 
that the sophists of his (and Plato’s) day would set up escrow systems to avoid being defrauded, 
which we saw on page 8. Plato has Socrates saying things at this point in the dialogue that could 
reasonably be attributed to relatively thoughtful sophists of Plato’s own time. Similarly, when 
Socrates suggests that Callicles’ love of Demos (both a person of that name, and the Athenian 
demos) stunts Callicles’ ability to think and act philosophically, he is using a play on words that 
Aristophanes had used in The Knights to attack Cleon, and which had previously appeared in the 
work of Euripides. Stylistically, however, Socrates’ polemic has very little in common with the 
way that Isocrates or Demosthenes or other fourth-century rhetoricians chose to present 
themselves. Instead, it’s a cutting parody of Gorgias’ preferred alliteration, which favored plays 




106 αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ 
σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι: πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ 
τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν: προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως [519ξ] οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς 
τῆς πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ 
γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα: φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι 
πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὑτούς, τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν 
οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, [519δ] εὖ παθόντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους 
ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν 
τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; Gorgias, 519b-d. Perseus. 
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intensely declarative, harsh style common to Pericles’ successors in the Athenian assembly. As 
Brad Levett has pointed out, Socrates uses Gorgianic repetitions (a technique called polyptoton) 
in his “someone who does x is an x-er and therefore knows about x” formulation earlier in the 
dialogue, where he forces Gorgias into an apparent contradiction about the epistemic limits of 
rhetoric.107 This formulation gains much its persuasive force, in Attic Greek usage, from an 
alliterative and conceptual repetition. Here, however, Socrates’ approach is far more harshly 
parodic, as he uses these repetitions to undermine the validity of sophists’ rhetoric: these wise 
men (sophistai) are normally so wise, but for this bit of absurdity, their argument (logos) could 
not be more illogical (alogōteron), and so on. The other half of Plato’s stylistic maneuver, the 
close resemblance to the rough-edged polemic of wartime Athens, requires a bit more unpacking.  
Athenian political contestation, like contestation in most collectively governed polities, 
was never a gentle affair. As Ryan Balot has shown, the personal risks of voicing one’s own 
opinions in the assembly meant that not only did Athenians pride themselves on the contribution 
of democratic deliberation to their own personal courage, but it also took personal courage to 
engage in democratic deliberation.108 Balot has argued that the long arc of Athenians’ “ideology 
of democratic courage” was one that constructively incorporated many of the critiques and 
regimes that challenged it, and over Athens’ history as an independent and collectively-governed 
polis, Balot’s argument has much to recommend it. However, the Gorgias discusses a much 
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steady degeneration in democratic life. Arlene Saxonhouse’s argument that the Gorgias’ narrative 
takes place (impossibly, but also significantly) across the entirety of the Peloponnesian War is 
helpful here.109 As Thucydides tells the story, wartime Athens went from considering both 
interest and justice and blaming necessity for its occasional lapses, to narrowly avoiding 
atrocities in accordance with its assembly’s best judgment of its own interest, to openly 
victimizing others against its own interest, and finally ended up turning on its own public 
servants in patently self-destructive ways.110 If Socrates’ interlocutors move from conversing 
with him to declaiming, threatening, and eventually refusing to do anything more than snipe at 
him, with Callicles managing both of the last two, Socrates gets more punchy and snide over the 
same timeframe, and his sarcastic and invective-laden attack on Athenian politicians, sophists, 
and Callicles is the culmination of this trend. In other words, Socrates’ rhetorical tactics during 
the dialogue seem to mirror a pattern of increased hostility in Athenian political discourse during 
the war.  
Socrates’ one-time-only status as a dēmēgoros may be his best chance at persuading 
Callicles, a Peloponnesian War hardliner and lifelong admirer of Pericles, to reconsider his 
commitment to political power above everything, since this rhetorical move brings Socrates into 
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least, this maneuver displays much more attentiveness to the conditions under which Callicles 
might be persuaded than we see from Socrates earlier in the conversation. Consider the 
conclusion of the first of Socrates’ lengthy fables (493d), when he asks if he’s persuading 
Callicles through the use of a fable, Callicles confirms he’s unlikely to be persuaded through that 
or similar fables, and Socrates turns immediately to a new, but similar, fable. At this earlier point, 
where Socrates’ fables are functioning as arguments from analogy, the focus is on finding 
arguments that will compel Callicles to admit that Socrates is right, and when Callicles suggests 
that this is not an effective way to persuade him, Socrates steamrolls ahead. The attempt to adopt 
characteristically Athenian dēmēgoria suggests that even though Socrates’ new rhetorical 
strategy is overtly hostile and involves some degree of browbeating, the overall strategy is still 
closer to being capable of persuading Callicles.  
The turn to dēmēgoria causes problems for existing readings of Plato’s treatment of 
rhetoric in the Gorgias. Two readings, Devin Stauffer’s and Christina Tarnopolsky’s, are 
especially relevant here, because each plays up Plato’s concern with a noble rhetoric that would 
be an alternative to the depicted practices of Socrates’ interlocutors. Stauffer has argued that the 
overall arc of the Gorgias has Socrates trying to persuade Gorgias to participate in a “noble 
rhetoric” that would defend philosophy as Socrates practices it, in large part by defending his 
own philosophical practices from Callicles and people like him.111 On Stauffer’s reading, 
Socrates’ logos of the afterlife (which most readers of the Gorgias, against Socrates’ insistence, 
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and Socrates’ earlier engagement with Callicles is meant to dismantle Callicles’ intellectual 
resources. Gorgias cooperates, at least partially, with Socrates, by repeatedly urging Callicles to 
continue a conversation that Callicles no longer wishes to engage in; if Socrates is occasionally 
harsh or overbearing in his interactions with Callicles, it is simply to expose the importance of 
the conflict between Socrates and Callicles and to demolish the latter’s critique of philosophy. 
Socrates’ goal, at least with respect to Gorgias, is to build a relationship rather than to demolish a 
way of life, and Stauffer sees Socrates’ conversation with Gorgias as demonstrating the need for 
an enriched understanding of justice rather than portraying Gorgias as a buffoon or a con man.  
Christina Tarnopolsky’s reading of the Gorgias portrays Socrates’ questioning of Gorgias, 
Polus, and Callicles as a scathing challenge to sophists’ way of life. On this reading, while 
Socrates’ “shaming elenchus” calls his interlocutors to account, it does so in a way that is too 
harsh, alienating, and fails to persuade interlocutors to improve themselves.112 In contrast, a 
Platonic “respectful shame” that mobilizes Gorgias’ epideictic abilities as well as Socrates’ 
critical questioning would more effectively summon one’s listeners to take inventory and 
potentially improve themselves.113 After all, if a student has submitted a severely flawed paper, 
there is a tremendous pedagogical difference between “don’t submit a paper that does x, y, and z 
again” and “I think you can do better in x, y, and z areas” or “make a better argument for x, y, 
and z claims”: the latter accompany the (potential) shame that someone might experience when 
their work is criticized with encouragement and respect, which are of course absent from the first 
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audiences an opportunity to expand their conceptual horizons and marks a crucial turn in Plato’s 
works from depicting Socratic dialectical strategies to original Platonic insights, which are often 
critical in their appropriation of Socrates.114 Thus, Plato partly breaks with Socrates’ austere 
insistence on harshly examining the beliefs and souls of the people around him in order to open 
possibilities of persuading readers to want to examine themselves.  
While both of these thoughtful and sharply different treatments of the Gorgias are helpful 
in other areas, each has real shortcomings in accounting for Socrates’ turn to dēmēgoria in 
addressing Callicles, especially from 515-520. Stauffer’s view that Plato has Socrates trying to 
build a partnership between Socratic philosophy and Gorgianic rhetoric does not explain why 
Gorgias and other sophists come out even worse than Callicles does in these blistering remarks; 
if Callicles is the one whose heroes are being torn down, Gorgias is the only one of the sophists 
bundled up with the condemned politicians who is a spectator to his own demolition. Similarly, it 
is hard to read Socrates as seeking assistance in a potential future trial when he repeatedly 
dismisses the idea that he should learn to help himself in such straits. Tarnopolsky’s implication 
that Socrates is not in fact engaging in dēmēgoria follows from her connection of Socratic 
shaming with the practice of elenchus: Socrates most harshly shames his interlocutors in the 
Gorgias, on Tarnopolsky’s reading, when questioning them, and Plato’s introduction of a nobler 
rhetoric and “respectful shaming” contrasts with Socrates’ practice of exposing his interlocutors’ 
errors through interrogation. But the most searing passages of the Gorgias immediately precede 
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dēmēgoria and he indicts nearly every major political figure of the past century of Athenian 
democracy. If Plato depicts Socrates as overly harsh in this dialogue, this harshness matches with 
Socrates at his most Athenian.  
One way forward in understanding Socrates’ dēmēgoria in the long third section of 
Gorgias might be to compare it to Socrates’ unusual suggestion to both Polus and Callicles that 
harsh corrections occasionally serve the cause of making a soul more just. This suggestion, 
which differs from Socrates’ insistence elsewhere (cf. Republic I, 335e) that justice does not 
involve harming people, combines with Callicles’ overall recalcitrance to imply that Socrates is 
engaging Callicles in a way that Callicles might recognize as a harsh (if not entirely unfair) 
correction. Socrates is serving Callicles a bitter medicine, and Callicles is rejecting it. The bitter 
medicine of Socrates’ demegoric attack on his interlocutors may, in this respect, resemble the 
more common Socratic practice of harshly questioning other interlocutors. Here, I am thinking of 
Jill Frank’s recent argument that the Socratic elenchos, while not physically violent, nonetheless 
contains a substantial element of browbeating when Socrates attempts to tame Thrasymachus in 
Republic I, or aggressively dismantles other interlocutors’ views.115 Frank offers the provocative 
suggestion that Plato portrays incomplete and controversial arguments so as to illuminate a 
possibility of “persuasion in the middle voice”: a grammatical ambiguity in Attic Greek that 
provides for a listener to be persuaded by a speaker either without much personal agency (the 
passive voice) or with the listener’s active engagement and assent (the middle voice).116 This 
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construction of an agreed-upon position than on elenctic demolition; it might simply involve an 
overall ethos of respectful engagement of audience members. In any of these cases, the mutual 
rejection of these possibilities by the characters of the Gorgias illustrates the inability of rhetoric 
to force agreement where listeners insist on disagreeing.  
4. The limits of rhetoric in the narrative of the Gorgias 
Whatever else we have to say about the atypical persuasive methods that Plato depicts 
Socrates engaging in during the Gorgias, these methods do not persuade any of the dialogue’s 
characters. Gorgias, who had perhaps played a role in keeping the conversation going earlier 
over Callicles’ irritated objections, disappears from the final pages of the dialogue; Polus, much 
earlier. Socrates’ batlike friend Chaerephon, presumably still present, has contributed nothing for 
practically the entire dialogue. Callicles does not speak after agreeing to hear Socrates’ final 
speech, although unlike the other two interlocutors of the dialogue, he is at least still being 
directly addressed during the speech. There is no reason, however, to suppose that Callicles 
adopts a life of philosophy in response to Socrates’ appeals. Instead, where Plato’s aporetic 
dialogues generally end up with the participants admitting that their previous efforts were 
unsatisfactory and they have more to do, the ending of the Gorgias is unusual both in Socrates’ 
high level of confidence and in his isolation from his interlocutors.  
It will not do to explain Socrates’ isolation by saying that his attempts to copy his 
interlocutors’ methods are inapt or artless, and that he therefore embarrasses himself to no 
purpose. In the Gorgias, Socrates’ speeches are well tailored to the various styles he adopts and, 
overall, competent and occasionally elegant. The myth that spans the last five pages of the 
dialogue is one of the finest examples of epideictic rhetoric (rhetoric that attempts to persuade 
about what is praiseworthy and blameworthy) to be found in classical Athenian texts. The 
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blistering polemic of 515-521 may not be particularly pleasant, but it is certainly well-composed, 
as are the fables Socrates uses to argue against Callicles from analogy. Indeed, Plato may have 
rested his thumb on the scale, as some scholars believe Gorgias’ responses to Socrates’ questions 
to be a caricature or at least transparently illogical, and Polus is hardly an able student in his 
awkward and overblown channeling of Gorgianic rhetorical stylings.117 Socrates’ claim that 
rhetoric is a “knack” rather than an “art” (463b) compounds the insult Plato offers to 
contemporary rhetoricians: not only does Plato depict Socrates as a more capable orator than one 
of the Greek-speaking Mediterranean’s most famous rhetoricians and that rhetorician’s student, 
but Socrates claims that rhetoric isn’t worth learning and, implicitly, that he’s outperforming his 
interlocutors without any particular effort. And yet, in terms of its immediate effect on the 
audience Plato depicts, Socrates’ rhetorical display achieves next to nothing. This is more telling 
than we usually realize.  
It surprises nobody that Gorgias (in the dialogue) or his overenthusiastic and imperfectly 
competent student Polus fail to convince Socrates of their expansive claims. Plato hardly ever 
has Socrates learn much from his interlocutors, and paid rhetoricians are not the interlocutors one 
would expect to successfully persuade Socrates of anything. It is similarly unsurprising that 
Callicles fails, at least on Plato’s terms, to demolish Socrates’ entire way of life. But it’s 
incongruous for Socrates to so thoroughly fail to persuade any of his interlocutors. Compare 
Republic I, where Thrasymachus’ objections, which are not altogether unlike Callicles’, are more 
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conversation. In that part of the Republic, Socrates’ methods are his usual: he establishes that 
Thrasymachus’ conventionalist understanding of justice is incoherent, invites Thrasymachus to 
help discover what justice actually is, and moves on. Here, Socrates goes to much more effort, 
adopting a broad range of the rhetorical styles available to his contemporaries, and accomplishes 
far less.  
This pattern makes very little sense if the Gorgias is a dialogue about the proper use of 
rhetoric, or about whether rhetoric is simply worthless or capable of pointing to justice. In either 
of these cases, Plato would be depicting Socrates’ speeches as an alternative to the problematic 
and objectionable ones of his interlocutors, and one might expect Plato to portray a superior 
alternative in a superior light. But, in terms of the result, he doesn’t. Confronted with 
interlocutors no more daunting than elsewhere (Republic I, Protagoras, etc.), Socrates does less 
well by employing this alternative “nobler” rhetoric. But if the Gorgias is a dialogue that 
primarily points to rhetoric’s limitations, if the Gorgias sets up the supervillain theory, not to 
portray Socrates as a heroic opponent of supervillains, but to expose the hollowness of 
rhetoricians’ entire claim to power, the failure of Socrates’ rhetorical appeals is not only a natural 
way for Plato’s narrative to end. It’s very nearly necessary. If Socrates questioned Gorgias, Polus, 
and Callicles, demonstrated that their claims didn’t stand up to dialectical scrutiny, and 
proclaimed the rhetoricians defeated, Plato would have set up rhetoric as a mirror universe 
version of philosophy. Philosophers would deal strictly in truth, justice, and beauty, goateed 
rhetoricians would deal strictly in trickery and domination. The idea of a rhetoric that serves 
justice rather than ignoring it would be absurd, because rhetoric would be banished on principle 
from questions of justice.  
Put another way, I am arguing that Plato’s critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias is far deeper 
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than generally recognized. Instead of focusing on whether rhetoric is being used well or badly, 
Plato cuts all the way down to the question of whether rhetoric in fact grants speakers the kind of 
power that he has Socrates’ interlocutors advertise. Once that claim is demolished, then rhetoric, 
whether directed to just or unjust ends, is dependent on the audience and therefore on the regime 
rather than on the speaker’s own capacity for domination. And Plato attributes exactly this 
conclusion to Socrates at 513b-c:  
“If you expect that anybody in all of humanity can give to you an art which will create 
great power for you in the city, while you remain unlike its regime (politeia), either better or 
worse, it seems to me you’re not rightly advised, Callicles. ...Whoever can most completely 
make you like [the Athenian people] is the one to make you a rhetorician and a statesman, at 
least the sort of statesman you want to be, because everyone being addressed with the words 
they’re accustomed to hearing is delighted, but vexed by those meant for foreigners.”118 
No rhetorician can bridge a sufficiently fundamental disjuncture between their own 
commitments and those of their audience. Socrates cannot dominate Callicles through rhetorical 
superiority; no matter how genuine the appeal to share a commitment to justice, the appeal relies 
on consent or at least cooperation to be effective. And by centering the incompatibility of 
Socrates’ dialectical practice with Athens’ spokesman in the dialogue, Plato demolishes rhetoric’s 
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defense.  
5. Conclusion: The genealogy of the rhetorical supervillain 
Re-reading the Gorgias as an inquiry into the limits of rhetoric has a significant impact on 
how we can understand the role of rhetoric in political theory and practice. Aristotle’s famous 
claim that rhetoric is the counterpart to dialectic, discussed in the previous chapter, is neither a 
straightforward repudiation of Plato’s condemnation of rhetoric nor an attempt to define rhetoric 
in terms that constrain rhetoricians to standards of good behavior. Instead, it is primarily a 
methodological difference. Where Plato is carrying out a rather sharp-edged attack on sophists 
under the guise of a dialogue about the nature of rhetoric, Aristotle is attempting to define the 
terms on which a practice called “rhetoric”, which we all agree is about persuasion in some 
sense, can be understood as a mode of intellectual endeavor. This re-reading of Plato’s critique of 
rhetoric is therefore helpful for a relatively narrow project of trying to understand the work of 
ancient Greek philosophers more nearly on its own terms. But it has much broader political 
implications. If Plato is not in fact the theoretical origin point of the perspective that sees rhetoric 
as a uniquely damaging political practice, it is exceedingly difficult to find such origins 
elsewhere in classical political thought. Other critics of specific Athenian, Hellenic, or later, 
Roman political practices never suggest that rhetoric as such is the problem with those political 
practices. Instead, they see certain types of rhetorical practices as symptomatic of flaws in the 
political orders – the regimes – that they are criticizing.  
In our contemporary political vocabulary, however, there is a very common usage of 
“rhetoric” that is not only strictly pejorative, but also simultaneously fearful and dismissive. To 
be rhetorical, on this usage, is both to fail to be intellectually rigorous – even to be anti-
intellectual – and to threaten or disrupt the established and approved political order. We have an 
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idea of rhetoric as a tool of political contestation that is much closer to the one that (Plato’s) 
Gorgias held than the one that Plato and Aristotle held: rhetoric produces the domination of 
audience members’ passions and judgment. If this idea was not well regarded in classical 
political thought, what made it so much better regarded in much of our contemporary political 
thought? In the following two chapters, I argue that early modern political thinkers decisively 
broke with the ancients on the scope and capacity of rhetoric because this allowed for opposing 
“rhetoric” and “manipulation” to the concept of the instrumentally rational individual that was so 
crucial to their new political visions. 
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 Calculative Self-Interest, Fear, and Sovereignty: The Rhetoric of Hobbes’ 
Translation of Thucydides 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter uncovers a series of surprising and unconventional renderings in Thomas 
Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. These renderings, which 
center on the figure of Pericles and, to a lesser extent, Alcibiades, are symptomatic of a 
sophisticated and original Hobbesian engagement with the relationship between rhetoric, 
political order, and self-interested individuals, and Hobbes’ engagement with these questions also 
carries broader significance for how we understand the role of rhetoric in modern political 
thought. Hobbes’ Pericles directs his listeners to distrust rhetoricians engaged in political 
contestation in favor of their own calculative self-interest, inward-focused affective states, and 
consequent reasoning along the lines of Pericles’ instruction. Along these lines, Hobbes sets 
Pericles up as a kind of sovereign educator: Pericles’ education of the Athenian audience allows 
for temporarily overcoming the limits of collective deliberation by uniting them in the individual 
calculation of self-interest. A surprising parallel emerges in Hobbes’ depiction of Alcibiades, who 
emerges as a sort of failed sovereign, consistently presenting Hobbesian psychological and 
political insights but without the standing or the political success required to unite and educate a 
city. Finally, by directing readers to learn from Thucydides, Hobbes also plays a role as a 
political educator who guides readers to reason from the correct premises that he himself has 
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provided. Hobbes’ complex strategy allows for modeling a rhetorical appeal that reinforces 
sovereign authority and political order, denies the rhetorical status of this appeal, and portrays 
rhetoric that undermines political order as manipulative, self-serving, and representative of the 
entire category of “rhetoric”. This rhetoric about rhetoric goes much further than the pattern in 
Leviathan that Bryan Garsten has described as “a rhetoric against rhetoric”.119 That is, Hobbes 
goes beyond directing his considerable persuasive skills toward frightening readers away from 
oratory as such, adopting a more complex strategy of persuading readers to discriminate between 
Hobbes’ invented rhetorical categories. Hobbes is therefore committed to theorizing both an 
instrumentally rational individual subject and a new understanding of rhetoric as a manipulation 
of such subjects.  
To develop Hobbes’ commitments at this point in his long intellectual career and the 
translation strategy that he adopted to further these commitments, I begin by situating this paper 
in the wave of recent scholarly interest in Hobbes’ translations of Thucydides and other works. 
Where most recent scholarship focuses on three prefatory notes to the translation, I emphasize 
Hobbes’ renderings of the translation itself, which, while less explicit or argumentative than the 
prefatory notes, nonetheless comprise the “Thucydides” from whom Hobbes directed his readers 
to learn. Next, I analyze Hobbes’ renderings of Periclean rhetoric in the opening books of the 
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strategic advice to a Lacedaemonian audience and identify clear through lines that match 
Hobbes’ own philosophical commitments, while differing from Hobbes’ renderings of similar 
and even identical phrasing elsewhere in the History. These through lines evidence not only 
Hobbes’ sympathies, but also a strategy of drawing readers toward those sympathies by 
emphasizing Pericles’ wisdom, downplaying Alcibiades’ flaws, and warning of the dangers of 
assemblies and rhetoricians. Finally, I connect the rhetoric of Hobbes’ Pericles and Alcibiades to 
Hobbes’ broader engagement with the relationship between rhetoric, politics, and philosophy. 
Hobbes’ strategy in preparing and publishing the translation clarifies the role of eloquence in his 
political project. Rather than distinguishing between “good” or “bad” rhetorical techniques on 
the basis of the technique or of the substance of the appeals, Hobbes’ critique of rhetoric targets 
the use of eloquence to extend or deepen a commonwealth’s plurality, while reserving a role for 
practically any technique of persuasion as long as it elevates and secures the authority of the 
sovereign.  
2. Translating Thucydides: Hobbes’ Constraints and Opportunities 
As the first work Hobbes published under his own name, the translation of Thucydides 
has received a steady increase of scholarly attention as a resource for understanding the early 
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Rejecting an earlier tendency to downplay the translation’s significance for Hobbes’ broader 
intellectual projects, scholars have drawn on three prefatory notes to the translation – a 
dedicatory letter to Hobbes’ student William Cavendish, the third Earl of Devonshire, a preface 
titled “To the Readers” explaining the value of Thucydides’ history and describing the 
supplementary maps and notes, and a biographical introduction titled “On the life and history of 
Thucydides”, henceforth “the Life” – and these notes’ implications for the translation’s role in 
Hobbes’ broader intellectual project and in the early modern politics of translation.121 Many of 
these analyses have relied on a binary set of possibilities: either Hobbes published, in Kinch 
Hoekstra’s words, “a full and faithful translation”, or else he engaged in a wholesale 
transformation of “his Thucydides into a thoroughgoing Hobbesian by selection and 
construal.”122 The latter possibility overstates the case of Hobbes’ Thucydides, although Hobbes’ 
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drastic transformation of the original.123 The former, however, neglects the influence of 
translators’ political and intellectual commitments on their choice of language, as well as 
suggesting a moral dimension to the act of translation that may not readily apply. 
Robin Sowerby’s paper-length analysis of Hobbes’ translation, the earliest of which I am 
aware, takes Hobbes’ renderings of Thucydides’ speeches to be “deliberative rhetoric at its most 
severely analytic and persuasive”, and argues that the translation is emblematic of a broader 
Hobbesian practice of “employing the techniques of eloquence in the service of science”.124 
Sowerby simply dismisses the possibility “of Hobbes’ translation seriously misrepresenting the 
Greek”, on the basis that “his intellectual integrity would not have allowed him to appropriate 
Thucydides’ text to support some thesis of his own.”125 More recent studies of the politics of 
translation, both on translating Thucydides and on Hobbes’ own career as a translator of classical 
texts, have complicated this account. Emily Greenwood’s rich analysis of the methods and 
stylistic choices of Thucydides’ translators has revealed a wide range in many of these choices, 
often connected to the cultural and political resources on which the different translators drew.126 
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forces at Syracuse draw on the horrors of trench warfare in the First World War, where she 
specifically references the work of Wilfred Owen.127 We can compare this grim and bloody 
portrait of ancient warfare to 19th- and early 20th-century translations of Pericles’ funeral oration, 
which turn the speaker into a proto-nationalist with truly overwrought appeals to a warlike and 
hypermasculinized patriotism.128 Henry Jones has identified a systematic political intervention in 
Benjamin Jowett’s translation of Thucydides, emphasizing the role of leaders in democratic 
cities, in keeping with the profoundly pessimistic assessment of the democratic masses’ capacity 
for judgment that Jowett expressed in his private correspondence.129 While most of her treatment 
of the Thucydides translation focuses on the frontispiece and prefatory materials, Alicia 
Steinmetz has pointed out that Hobbes’ translation at times “gives the specific impression that 
words such as ‘boldness’ and ‘modesty’ merely expressed the subjective passions of those who 
used them”.130 Most strikingly, Alexandra Lianeri has argued that the hostility towards 
democratic governance that pervaded Hobbes’ engagement with Thucydides shaped elite 
reception of classical texts and theories of collective governance for the following two 
centuries.131  
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strategic interventions in the act of translation, without attempting to explicitly evaluate whether 
these interventions cross a threshold of impugning the translator’s integrity or faithfulness. This 
scholarly nuance is particularly appropriate when examining translations of Thucydides. 
Thucydides’ own remarks at the beginning of the History are worth quoting: “I made each of the 
speakers say what it seemed to me the various occasions demanded of them, keeping as closely 
as possible to the overall intention of what they really said.”132 Scholars differ as to the precision 
with which Thucydides adhered to what was really said, the balance between the original 
speakers’ intent and Thucydides’ judgment of the rhetorical necessities the speakers faced, the 
implications of Thucydides’ composition of key speeches for his historical project, and many 
further questions that this passage raises.133 The complexities of Thucydides’ own presentation of 
these speeches, and the tensions he faced in presenting these speeches, make it inevitable that 
translators would differ substantially over correct renderings, and that these differences might 
well communicate something important about the translators’ commitments and agendas. As the 
first person to translate Thucydides into English from the original Greek, Hobbes had an almost 
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Hobbes’ commitments and agenda.   
The question, then, is where to find the evidence of Hobbes’ commitments and how those 
commitments found a voice in Hobbes’ Thucydides. So far, the scholarship on this text has 
focused mostly on Hobbes’ prefatory comments, with occasional general analyses of the 
translation’s tone or references to relatively isolated choices of terms. But might Hobbes have 
had a more specific idea of how readers should learn from Thucydides? We should not expect 
any positive lessons to be learned from “the demagogues” whose “crossing of each other’s 
counsels” resulted in “the damage of the public”.134 Hobbes would have no interest in 
contemporary scholarship on the lessons of Diodotus, for example, because in his view, the 
Mytilene debate is an example of undisciplined glory-seeking squabbles over the approval of the 
multitude.135 Similarly, Hobbes repeatedly (and reasonably) centers Thucydides’ narrative and 
the political opinions that he attributes to Thucydides on Athens, while presenting Thucydides as 
anticipating and rejecting Aristotelian political typologies. While Thucydides “least of all liked 
the democracy” and had no patience for “the authority of the few”, he most “commendeth” the 
Athenian government “when Peisistratus reigned, (saving that it was an usurped power), and 
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Pericles.”136  This says a great deal more than might be apparent. Those familiar with Aristotle’s 
political typologies, as many of Hobbes readers were, would readily have noticed that Hobbes 
reduces Peisistratus’ tyranny to the specific fact of “usurped power” and otherwise collapses 
Peisistratus’ and Pericles’ rule into examples of monarchy. In keeping with his own royalism, 
Hobbes offers only the barest lip service to Athenian “mixed” government under the Five 
Thousand, immediately after sharp attacks on both democracy and oligarchy and immediately 
before emphasizing Thucydides’ sympathies for “the regal government”. Athens is the city of 
primary interest to the reader, Hobbes makes clear, and of the Athenian leaders and political 
figures, the only one to receive any explicit praise in the prefatory materials is Pericles. Timothy 
Raylor accurately summarizes the tone of the prefatory comments, as well as the margin notes to 
the translation, when he comments that “[w]ith the sole exception of Pericles, there is no place in 
Hobbes’s Thucydides for the honest practitioner of public eloquence”.137  
Hobbes directs attention to Pericles’ role in the History in the “Life”, both explicitly and 
by contrast with the competing Athenian rhetoricians whom he connects to his parliamentarian 
nemeses. In discussing Thucydides’ early life and education, Hobbes emphasizes the fact that 
Thucydides’ teacher in philosophy also taught Socrates and Pericles. Hobbes’ comment that “in 
those days it was impossible for any man to give good and profitable counsel for the 
commonwealth, and not incur the displeasure of the people” clearly refers to the end of Pericles’ 




136 Hobbes, “Life”. Perseus.  
137 Raylor, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes, 81.  
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terms of Pericles’ eventual loss of support ties the two figures together.138 Similarly, Hobbes 
emphasizes Cleon’s responsibility for banishing Thucydides. Since Cleon began his political 
career as one of Pericles’ foremost political opponents and quite possibly the instigator of 
Pericles’ prosecution for misusing public funds, this again emphasizes a biographical connection 
between Thucydides and Pericles.139 I therefore begin my examination of Hobbes’ translation 
with his treatment of Pericles, who stands as the kind of sovereign monarchic figure who Hobbes 
could reasonably have endorsed as a guide to the fractious and competing Athenian multitudes. 
Alcibiades enters the reading later, but not because Hobbes ever explicitly praises Alcibiades in 
the prefatory notes. Instead, during the period of political deformation after Pericles’ death, 
Hobbes presents Alcibiades as a tragic parallel to the former leader of the Athenians.  
3. Periclean rhetoric and self-interest 
Pericles’ funeral oration is hardly the first place in which a contemporary reader would 
look for a political vision of calculation and self-interest. After all, the final section of the speech 
begins in roughly the following way in practically all recent renderings:   
“Do not consider mere arguments about profit. Anyone can wax on about these, even 




138 Thomas Hobbes, “On the life and history of Thucydides”, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of 
Malmesbury, Thucydides (London: Bohn, 1843). Perseus. 
139 Plutarch mentions Cleon as the first of three possible prosecutors of Pericles identified by historians of the 4th 
century BCE. Plutarch, Pericles, Ch. 35.3. Perseus.  
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resisting the enemy. Instead, gaze daily on the city’s real power, and become her lovers . . .”140  
Here, on the other hand, is Hobbes:  
“And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you ought not to be less 
venturously minded against the enemy, not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any 
man amplifying may recount to you that know as well as he the many commodities that arise by 
fighting valiantly against your enemies, but contemplating the power of the city in the actions of 
the same from day to day performed and thereby becoming enamoured of it.”141  
Hobbes’ rendering shifts the passage’s tone in two important ways, compared to recent 
renderings and to today’s scholarship on the passage. First, Hobbes’ Pericles emphasizes the 
practical calculation of power and interest over appeals to affect and the implication of an erastic 
relationship between citizen and city. Second, Hobbes has Pericles frame this calculation not in 
terms of collective deliberation, or even as an instruction for the audience to accept Pericles’ 
judgment as their own, but instead as a call for individuals to cultivate a capacity for their own 
calculation of their interests. Taking these shifts together, Hobbes sets up Pericles as an educator 
of both the Athenian audience and Hobbes’ own readers, directing both audiences to abandon the 
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141 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 2.43. Perseus. Emphasis is mine.  
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individual audience members. In this section, I draw on Sara Monoson’s reading of the passage 
to sketch an influential contemporary account and develop the two ways that Hobbes’ rendering 
shifts the passage away from this scholarship. I then address Sowerby’s claim that the overall 
tone of Hobbes’ rendering represents a broader translation strategy, providing evidence that 
Hobbes translates Periclean rhetoric differently from other orators in the History, such as Cleon.  
As Sara Monoson has argued, Pericles’ appeal carried powerful cultural connotations that 
combined an invocation of citizens’ need for the city with an appeal to make difficult choices on 
the city’s behalf.142 By identifying service to the city with the role of erastēs, Pericles draws on 
the norms of Athenian masculinity in a way that appeals to all male citizens and emphasizes the 
importance of political unity. Since Athenian masculinity (andreia, which literally meant 
“manliness” but was the most common term in Attic Greek for “courage”) required a daring 
willingness to expose oneself to danger, Pericles’ appeal is particularly appropriate for his 
wartime agenda. Finally, and crucially for Monoson’s reading, Pericles’ reference to the erastic 
relationship emphasizes “relations of mutuality” that both offer a unique vision of individual 
contributions to a healthy polis and suggest a sort of balance and self-restraint that would have 
advanced Pericles’ policy of limited “defensive” war. This reading also fits with the prior 
sentence, in which Pericles wishes to direct the audience’s attention away from someone who 
would merely speak of the “advantages” to be procured from defending the city in war. 
Hobbes’ rendering, however, carries very different political implications. Hobbes begins 
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translate theôménous (“gazing on”) as “contemplating”, which in a similar participial form 
would be theôreoménous. While the latter word – in Attic Greek – derives from the former, the 
two are distinct and there is no textual basis for conflating them. It is unlikely that Hobbes 
simply missed the standard translation here. As Sowerby has argued, Hobbes’ translation from 
the Greek is strikingly competent on both literary and stylistic levels, particularly compared to 
previous translations that had relied overmuch on Latin versions of the text.143 It is also 
implausible to read “contemplating” as carrying the normal force of the Greek term. While there 
is evidence of a usage of “contemplate” in a visual sense in English from the 16th century 
onward, even that sense of the word carries an abstracted and often intellectual force.144 
Elsewhere in the History, Hobbes’ uses of the noun form “contemplation” emphasize a 
calculative consideration of factors that ought to inform a decision or action. To the extent that 
contemplation involves affective factors, the affects involved are treated as data for calculation, 
rather than themselves action-guiding.145 Similarly, Hobbes’ uses of the verb “contemplate” 
elsewhere in his work are strictly intellectual.146 In one of Leviathan’s most famous passages, 
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advantage of mankind, did contemplate the faces, and motions of things; others, without disadvantage, their natures, 
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which they pursue farther than their security requires”.147 Here, the misaligned object of 
calculation – the libidinous attachment to one’s own power, which distracts from seeking peace – 
leads to the war of everyone against everyone in the state of nature, where Pericles’ audience 
would have been well directed to contemplate the city’s power, and therefore to restrain 
themselves and follow Pericles’ war policy.  
We therefore have a clear pattern of usage, in Hobbes’ terminology, that points to Pericles 
telling his listeners to carefully and coldly consider the city’s power, the effect of that power on 
their own well-being, and therefore to devote their energy to securing the city that protects their 
own lives and flourishing. Since theôménous, as Monoson has pointed out, carries in this context 
an erotic connotation, Hobbes’ rendering intellectualizes Pericles’ appeal. Hobbes’ rendering of 
ergôi as “in the actions of the same”, rather than idiomatic “real” or “genuine” that the reference 
to “deeds” generally suggested in Athenian rhetoric, tends also to suggest a cold analysis of 
Athens’ capabilities. And similarly, the unconventional attachment of “daily” to Athens’ actions 
rather than to the act of beholding the city suggests, in Hobbes’ rendering, that the audience need 
only make up their minds about the city’s worth, rather than making a habit of devotion to the 
city. This tendency to intellectualize and de-eroticize Pericles’ appeal continues at the end of the 
phrase, rendered by Hobbes as “becoming enamoured of it” rather than “becoming her lovers”. 
Here, Hobbes neuters the feminine adjective autên, further disembodying Pericles’ appeal and 
creating intellectual distance between the audience and the object of their commitment.  




147 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 75.  
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call for citizens to displace the appeals of orators in favor of their own calculative contemplation. 
My translation above, like many other translations since Hobbes’, contrasts the possibility of 
making lengthy calculations about the self-interested reasons for fighting for Athens with 
Pericles’ appeal to create embodied and erotic ties to the city’s wellbeing.148 In other words, I see 
Pericles directing the audience’s attention to the city’s power and imperial excellence in hopes 
that these will instill affective ties in the audience, beyond the simple calculation that a 
Peloponnesian victory would probably be bad for most individual Athenians. Hobbes, instead of 
contrasting self-interested calculation with a focus on collective excellence, contrasts the choice 
of personally calculating the benefits of attaching oneself to a powerful entity likely to win its 
current conflicts with trusting an orator’s assessment of these benefits. In other words, Hobbes’ 
translation has Pericles’ funeral oration reminding his audience of truths that they could 
determine for themselves and urging the audience not to trust others to do that work for them. 
For Hobbes, properly calculating self-interest requires a distrust of anyone who would tell an 
audience to accept something without properly demonstrating it.  
One might suppose that these renderings are characteristic of Hobbes’ broader style, 
instead of a focused approach to translating Periclean rhetoric. Robin Sowerby has argued that 
Hobbes’ adoption of “rhetorical restraint” in his translation of Thucydides, in which “the appeal 
is always primarily to the intellect”, points the way to a Hobbesian project of “employing the 




148 Cf. Benjamin Jowett, trans., Thucydides translated into English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881). Perseus. 
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substitutes for “science” a term more appropriate to Hobbes’ commitments in the late 1620s, is 
not far off the mark. But in focusing primarily on the funeral oration, Sowerby misses that 
Hobbes’ preference for calculative, intellectual phrasing is not uniformly expressed in key 
orations from the History. For example, Hobbes presents Cleon’s diatribe against Mytilene in its 
full polemical color. Cleon accuses his listeners of “becoming softened” (malakízesthai) without 
earning any “favors” (chárin) from their allies.150 While this language can be read as sexual 
innuendo in English, their force in Attic Greek is considerably more explicit. Hobbes preserves 
this in his rendering of Cleon’s speech, in which the ekklêsia “are softened thus to the danger of 
the commonwealth not to the winning of the affections of your confederates”.151 This already 
differs from the way Hobbes intellectualizes the erotic metaphor that I’ve discussed above, from 
the end of Pericles’ funeral oration. But in fact, Hobbes translates the very same Greek word 
differently when he encounters it in the funeral oration. 
Pericles celebrates Athenians’ moderation as follows: “For we love beauty, yet with 
simple tastes, and wisdom, yet without softness.”152 Here, Pericles is responding to a critique of 
Athenian norms, on which an excessive focus on art and philosophy could leave them unable to 
compete with the austere physical training of Spartan hoplites. For Pericles, the crucial point here 
is that a robust intellectual life does not trade off with physical courage or competence. As 
elsewhere in Pericles’ speeches, Hobbes’ rendering entirely changes the force of the metaphor 




150 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 3.37. Perseus. 
151 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 3.37. Perseus. 
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malakías as “loss of manliness”; Mynott as “effete”.  
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removes any hint of the sexual metaphor involved, but also suggests that the moderation Pericles 
is describing is between mental exercise and mental exhaustion, rather than between wisdom and 
strength. The key virtue that Periclean rhetoric encourages, on Hobbes’ interpretation, is mental 
flexibility that allows individuals to rationally determine what is in their own self-interest, which 
produces military and civic strength insofar as such strength protects the interests of individuals.  
An important consequence of Hobbes’ Periclean rhetoric is the proper situating of honor-
seeking and glory-seeking behavior within the wartime polis.153 Given Hobbes’ tendency to 
suppress erotic and affective aspects of Pericles’ rhetorical appeals, it is striking that references 
to honor and glory pervade the passage: being “sensible of dishonour” aided the “valiant men” 
who died to secure the city’s power; their contribution was “most honourable”; “their glory is 
laid up upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered forever.”154 Far from 
warning against pursuing glory in wartime, Hobbes’ Pericles specifically urges his listeners to 
imitate these glorious predecessors. It turns out, however, that the sort of glory that Pericles’ 
listeners have to look forward to is quite consistent with the broader objectives of calculative 
self-interest and political order. As recent commentators have pointed out, Hobbes’ assessment 
that a certain level of glory-seeking is characteristic of humans, due to the connection between 
honor and power, is tempered by two other considerations: the possibility of educating 
individuals about the possible and desirable kinds of glory through the sovereign’s instruction, 




153 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.  
154 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 2.43. Perseus.  
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commonwealth.155 Each of these considerations appears in the rhetoric of Hobbes’ Pericles. The 
only kind of honor or glory worth seeking, on an individual level, is dependent on the city’s 
victory and prosperity. It is not only the case that glory and honor only obtain because of the 
judgments of others, but also that martial glory and honor depend entirely on the individual’s 
contribution to collective success. Where the competition of orators for the multitude’s affections 
brings civic danger with success, the efforts of soldiers, Hobbes’ Pericles makes clear, bring the 
city’s salvation. As a result, Hobbes has Pericles draw on what Hobbes and Thucydides agree to 
be the fundamental human desire for honor, and indeed use that desire as a part of the self-
interest that the listeners must calculate.  
With the central Hobbesian virtue – the cultivated capacity for self-interested calculation 
– in mind, a brief return to the beginning of this section is in order. The cumulative effect of 
Hobbes’ rendering of these passages of the funeral oration is to quiet the distinction between 
individual profit and the collective good of the city, while introducing a distinction between 
being guided by an “oration” that lacks epistemic authority and being guided by Pericles’ advice 
to examine the effects of the city’s power on the individuals’ well-being. Hobbes’ Pericles 
advises his listeners to disregard rhetoricians, on the basis that rhetoricians possess no 
worthwhile knowledge that the listeners, “who know as well as [they]” the profits of victory, 
lack. This is not self-deprecation. Pericles, in Hobbes’ presentation, is protecting his political 




155 Cf. Gabriella Slomp, “Hobbes on Glory and Civil Strife”, in Patricia Springborg, ed., The Cambridge Companion 
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rhetoricians, such as Cleon, who would undermine it. Put another way, Hobbes has Pericles draw 
a distinction between “rhetoric”, which Pericles’ rivals use while seeking power and glory, and 
Pericles’ instruction of the audience in the principles of right reason. This highly original 
distinction connects rhetoric with domination, and the monarchic instruction of Pericles with 
sovereign guidance for the calculative and rational individual subject.  
4. Periclean rhetoric and civic unity 
While the former connection proved very productive for Hobbes’ project and others, the 
latter connection between rational and calculative self-interest, monarchic instruction, and civic 
order is highly unstable. Hobbes’ Pericles strengthens this connection by emphasizing individual 
calculation as an essentially political act, as well as by arguing that individual self-interest can 
only be advanced through political unity. These elements are especially clear elsewhere in the 
History, when Pericles encourages the Athenians to choose war over retrenchment at the end of 
Book I and when he defends his war policy shortly before his death late in Book II. In these 
passages, Hobbes finds powerful resources for appeals to self-interest while emphasizing the role 
of collective power in securing self-interested citizens from external threats. For example, 
Hobbes repeatedly renders Pericles’ references to slavery as an alternative to Athens’ continued 
dominance in terms of becoming “subject”. The first instance involves a refusal to comply with 
Peloponnesian demands, on the basis that “a great and a little claim imposed by equals upon their 
neighbours before judgment by way of command hath one and the same virtue, to make subject 
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(doúlōsin).”156 At stake here is a move from a very personal threat – Pericles telling the 
Athenians that they must choose war or slavery – to the threat of the status of “subject”, which is 
an exclusively political concept in Hobbes’ vocabulary. This allows Hobbes to create a narrative 
parallel, where one might not otherwise exist, between Pericles warning the Athenians that the 
Peloponnesians intend to “make [them] subject” at 1.141 and Pericles describing the choice to 
end the war as a choice to “be subject” (hupakousai, literally to “give ear to” the enemy) at 2.61.  
One can imagine a very different narrative parallel emerging from Pericles’ claim (at 
1.141) that the Spartans seek to enslave the Athenians (omitted at 2.61, in favor of the milder 
term hupakousai to describe the cost of defeat and retrenchment) and his claim at 2.61 that the 
Athenians’ spirits are brought low by their recent military reverses because “that which is 
unforeseen and unexpected and furthest outside calculation enslaves the mind.”157 Reading the 
speeches together this way would suggest that in the earlier speech, Pericles is attempting to 
outrage his audience at the thought of being enslaved, as part of a broader strategy to gain 
support for war. In the later speech, his audience is already angry at him and he uses calmer 
language to cool them down, cause them to reflect on what he sees as the basic soundness of his 
war strategy, and retain his political influence in Athens. A note of petulance shows through in 
Pericles’ snappish accusation that his listeners’ minds are enslaved, as well as his repeated 
reminders to the Athenians that they voted for the war measures they now disapproved of. One 




156 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 1.141. This is not simply an idiosyncrasy; Hobbes translates the same root 
elsewhere in terms of slavery.  
157 Historiae II.61: δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ. Hobbes: “For 
that which is sudden and unexpected and contrary to what one hath deliberated enslaveth the spirit”.  
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seems to when reflecting on Pericles’ life in the following passage, or as evidence of the 
problems with both Pericles and his audience that Socrates identifies in Plato’s Gorgias. Hobbes’ 
rendering goes beyond this critical aspect by presenting Pericles as a voice of reason at all times, 
flattening the variations in tone, affect, and vocabulary across Pericles’ speeches. As a result, the 
Athenian audience becomes more inconsistent and unreasonable than would otherwise be the 
case.  
Hobbes’ rendering sharpens Pericles’ discussion of collective power and its challenges. 
By phrasing the threats to Athens in terms of threats to Athens as a political unit, Hobbes’ 
Pericles makes collective action seem easier, or at least necessary, for his fellow Athenians while 
heightening the perceived difficulty of collective action among Athens’ enemies. Thus, Pericles 
claims that the Peloponnesians’ greatest weakness in fighting Athens is that  
“inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing 
upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will press 
his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take 
revenge on some enemy and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they 
can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business and the 
greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the 
common estate can do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for 
his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of everyone in several the common business 




158 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 1.141. 
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This criticism of the Peloponnesian alliance ought to apply even more severely, on 
Hobbes’ terms, to the Athenians themselves. After all, the Athenians have many political 
counselors, have equal voting rights among thousands or perhaps tens of thousands of Athenians, 
and disagree on the amount of damage to their “estates” that they are willing to tolerate. The 
crucial link that makes the Athenians’ deliberations temporarily less disastrous than Pericles 
expects their enemies’ deliberations to be, at least for Hobbes, is Pericles himself, who repeatedly 
summons the Athenians to more unity than they otherwise would be capable of. When Hobbes’ 
Pericles maintains that “a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of 
necessity be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing commonwealth shall 
much more easily be preserved”, Hobbes ends up attributing to Pericles the temporary ability to 
unite Athenians’ disparate interests through convincing them that those interests can only be 
achieved through a continued commitment to the Athenian commonwealth.  
Rendering Pericles’ rhetoric as an appeal to calculative self-interest means that political 
unity depends on a stable relationship between self-interest and the commonwealth. Hobbes’ 
renderings of Periclean rhetoric reinforce this relationship. Pericles consistently disciplines 
Athenians’ sense of fear, teaching them to avoid that which most threatens their wellbeing and to 
manage risk rationally. The worst evil an Athenian can face, Hobbes’ Pericles instructs them, is 
the disintegration of the city that allows them to live flourishing lives. Only the city’s power 
stands between Pericles’ listeners and destruction. Their courageous service to the city is 
therefore an act of rational self-defense, and they should look to the threat of political 
subjugation, which would remove the commonwealth’s aegis from above them, as a guide for 
policy.  
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5. Fear, self-interest, and Alcibiades’ Hobbesian insights 
For Hobbes, any politician without Pericles’ manifest superiority is sufficiently equal to 
other politicians that a struggle for public preeminence is risky and even hubristic.159 As a result, 
in Hobbes’ rendering, Alcibiades emerges as a unique character in Athenian politics after 
Pericles’ demise. Alcibiades’ brazen self-centeredness, if less praiseworthy than Thucydides’ own 
withdrawal from politics, nonetheless allows for pithy expressions of self-interest outside the 
context of what Hobbes calls Pericles’ monarchy. Hobbes moderates Thucydides’ criticism of 
Alcibiades from the latter’s first appearance in the History by distinguishing between the masses’ 
justified distaste for Alcibiades’ extravagance and personal irresponsibility and what Hobbes 
portrays as their unjustified fear that Alcibiades desired a tyrant’s power and prestige. Later in 
the translation, Hobbes’ Alcibiades takes a position of epistemic authority before a Spartan 
audience that resembles the authority Hobbes’ Pericles held over the Athenians. In this position, 
Alcibiades turns out to offer a strikingly Hobbesian perspective on fear, self-interest, and military 
psychology. 
Early in the debates over the Sicilian expedition, where Thucydides introduces 
Alcibiades, both Alcibiades’ great talents and his essential untrustworthiness emerge: 
“The masses feared him on account of the magnitude (mégethos), both of the lawlessness 
(paranomías) of his way of life, and the ambition (dianoías) that guided everything he did, as if 
he desired a tyranny, and so set themselves against him. Because of this, although he managed 




159 Cf. Hobbes’ argument from “natural” equality in Leviathan XIII.1-2. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Curley, 74-75.  
 113 
they turned to others, and thus, not long after, ruined the city.”160  
While Thucydides believes Alcibiades’ generalship offered Athens’ best chances at an 
aggressive war policy, it is crucial to note that he treats the Athenians’ grievances as legitimate. 
Thucydides treats Alcibiades’ lawlessness as genuine, not as the allegations of political rivals that 
Pericles suffered from at the end of his life. Similarly, he attributes Alcibiades’ every action to 
the guiding force of an overwhelming ambition, making him at least resemble an aspiring target. 
While the Athenians’ distrust had tragic consequences, these consequences flow in part from the 
mistake of putting the war policy in his hands to begin with.  
For Hobbes, however, Alcibiades’ downfall stems largely from demotic envy of his 
genuine greatness:  
 “For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that concerned his person and 
form of life and for the greatness of his spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that 
aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy. And although for the public he excellently 
managed the war, yet every man, privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge of 
the wars to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the state.”161 
By splitting the overreach of Alcibiades’ life into “excess” in his personal habits but 
genuine “greatness of spirit” in his public actions, Hobbes partly delegitimizes the fear that 




160 Historiae 6.15: φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν 
δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι 
καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, 
καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν. Perseus.   
161 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 6.15. Perseus.   
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suggests a natural superiority that bore out in Alcibiades’ public acts, instead of a fundamental 
desire for superiority guiding Alcibiades’ plans and decisions.162 In the following sentence, 
Hobbes alters the contrast between Alcibiades’ actions in private (idíai) and on behalf of the 
people (dēmosíai), which offers a parallel with the causes of the Athenians’ fear, to instead 
emphasize that the Athenians’ dissatisfaction with Alcibiades stemmed from individuals’ private, 
or insufficiently public-minded, judgments of his behavior. The Athenians are therefore largely to 
blame for alienating him, and in so doing, for the overthrow of the state.163  
This is not to say that Hobbes uncritically endorses Alcibiades. His rendering of 
Alcibiades’ various speeches echo aspects of his rendering of Pericles’, as when Alcibiades 
defends his excessive expenditures on Olympic teams and the arts on the grounds that “to 
strangers this also is an argument of our greatness.”164 Where Hobbes’ Pericles called on 
Athenians to recognize the relationship between Athens’ power and their own self-interest, 
Hobbes’ Alcibiades claims that he performs the vital civic role of making Athens look powerful. 
But not only does this assessment imply that Athens’ power is debatable (at the same time as 
Alcibiades calls for an incredibly ambitious and costly military adventure!), it highlights the 
extent to which Alcibiades’ ambition is only accidentally connected to Athenian success. 




162 Cf. Mynott (“ambitions”); Hammond (“huge ambition”). Even Jowett, who often follows Hobbes quite closely, 
renders dianoias as “far-reaching purposes”. Compare also Aristotle’s virtue of “greatness of soul” 
(megalopsuchia”).  
163 C.D.C. Reeve, “Alcibiades and the Politics of Rumor in Thucydides”, Philosophic Exchange 42:1 (2011), 8-11, 
argues for a reading of Alcibiades very similar to the one I attribute to Hobbes. Steven Forde, The Ambition to Rule 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 72-75, takes Thucydides as at least somewhat sympathetic to Alcibiades in 
that Alcibiades’ character and talents offered Athens its best chance at victory later in the war.  
164 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 6.16. Perseus.   
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Alcibiades defends himself by chiding the Athenians for their envy and telling them that they 
will be proud of him after he dies.  
Hobbes praises Alcibiades with faint damnation. Hobbes paints democratic political 
contestation with the broadest of brushes, condemning all Athenian political figures after Pericles 
as petty self-promoters whose policy disagreements are mere interpersonal squabbles. The wisest 
response to such a political degeneration and the threats that it poses to competent potential 
leaders, on Hobbes’ view, is the response he attributes to Thucydides: engage in politics only as 
one is obligated, and quietly write history and political advice instead. Someone with Alcibiades’ 
ambitions, however, could not accept such a withdrawal. Instead, Hobbes portrays Alcibiades as 
having learned all the lessons from Pericles that his ambition could permit. Hobbes’ Alcibiades 
understands the extent of the backbiting, envy, and mistrust to be directed at anyone of his 
talents, as well as the overall degeneration of Athenian politics. As a result, Hobbes’ Alcibiades 
presents a different and more cynical version of calculative self-interest, along with a series of 
characteristically Hobbesian psychological insights.  
Alcibiades’ unexpected Hobbesian insights are particularly evident in his speech to the 
Spartans, explaining why they should accept him as a useful advisor because – not in spite – of 
his willingness to betray Athens. His sharp and elegant synthesis of fear and reason, as well as 
his sweeping redefinition of the love of one’s city, deserve particular attention. The first of these, 
found in his strategic advice to the Spartans, connects Hobbes’ presentation of Periclean 
calculation with his later direct appeal to fear in Leviathan and elsewhere. According to Hobbes’ 
Alcibiades, the Spartans should invade and fortify a key location in Attica because this tactic is: 
“a thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have 
not yet tasted in this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most is to know certainly what he most 
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feareth and to bring the same upon him. For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most as 
having the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him.”165  
This claim involves translational moves of the kind we’ve seen already and a broad and 
characteristically Hobbesian psychological claim. The renderings of saphōs (generally “clearly” 
or “distinctly”) as “certainly” and of punthanomenos (“learning” or “finding out”) as “to know” 
tend toward a tone of epistemic certainty that matches Hobbes’ later intellectual tendencies. They 
also have the rhetorical function of emphasizing Alcibiades’ authority as a strategist and 
informant, because only a high-ranking Athenian defector could claim “to know certainly” the 
Athenians’ greatest fears. In the same way that Hobbes’ Pericles establishes a relationship of 
epistemic sovereignty over the ekklesia, Hobbes’ Alcibiades sets himself up as authoritative over 
his Spartan listeners.  
The deeper connection between fear and knowledge or reason is also worth examining. 
Alcibiades’ argument for the value of his inside information can be read in a fairly minimalist 
sense of psychological warfare: exploiting an enemy’s fears in some way is likely to accomplish 
more than the direct material results of the attack would otherwise have done. Here, the 
psychological value of fear is doing all the work for Alcibiades – inflicting the Athenians’ worst 
fears on them will be useful because it would be terrifying, and therefore hurt the Athenians 
worse than if they simply calculated the damage caused by another Peloponnesian incursion into 




165 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 6.91. Perseus. Mynott: “The surest way to hurt your enemies is to identify 
clearly the things they most dread and then inflict those on them, since naturally everyone knows precisely what 
their own worst terrors are and fears them accordingly.” 
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is the surest way to cause harm because the enemies know their own fears, while they may not 
know what their true strategic weaknesses are. Alcibiades, on this rendering, may well be 
mobilizing the Spartan perception of Athenian politics as unwise, overreaching, and prone to 
departures from well-informed strategic thinking.  
Hobbes, however, has Alcibiades taking Athenian fear as strategically valuable instead of 
as psychologically valuable, and therefore has Alcibiades suggesting that fear reflects” one’s 
actual knowledge. Knowing an enemy’s worst fear is “the way to hurt an enemy most” – not the 
“surest” way, as most other translators render it – because the enemy has private knowledge of 
what is actually harmful to them and their fears reflect this knowledge. Alcibiades’ insight is 
valuable to the Spartans because it makes this private knowledge indirectly available. Hobbes 
further reinforces this move toward reading fear as rational when he renders eikos (“naturally” 
for Mynott), which generally identifies an assertion as plausible, as “in reason”, implying that 
rather than being merely reasonable (permitted by reason), the connection between knowledge 
and fear is required by reason. Alcibiades’ psychological argument contains implicit premises 
that Hobbes would later explicitly defend in Leviathan, along with the argument that costs and 
benefits are necessarily subjective, such that one’s perception and fear of harm are not only 
private, but correct by definition.  
Alcibiades’ discussion of the love of one’s city (philópolis), in Hobbes’ rendering, is less 
a redefinition of Pericles’ call for public sacrifice than a restatement of the commitment to 
calculative self-interest that Hobbes attributes to both Pericles and Alcibiades. Alcibiades offers 
two main defenses for his trustworthiness, asking his audience neither to consider him a traitor 
nor to mistrust him as a fugitive. First, he argues that he cannot be blamed for having fled to 
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Sparta, because the blame falls on “the malice of them that drave me out.166 The Spartans and 
their allies, in a moment of intense sophistry, are not Athens’ worst enemies – the Peloponnesians 
“have hurt but your enemies”, while the Athenians who drove Alcibiades out “made enemies of 
friends” and therefore have become their own worst enemies. Second, Alcibiades contends, it 
will not do to condemn him for a lack of patriotism simply because he intends to help the 
Spartans “pull down the power of the Athenians both present and to come”. Instead, he says that 
his behavior demonstrates his genuine love for Athens: 
“I love not my country as wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it. Nor do I think 
that I do herein go against any country of mine, but that I far rather seek to recover the country I 
have not. And he is truly a lover of his country not that refuseth to invade the country he hath 
wrongfully lost, but that desires (epithumeĩn) so much to be in it as by any means he can he will 
attempt to recover it.”167  
It’s easy to read Alcibiades’ redefinition of the love of one’s city as a larger-than-life 
version of a homicidal stalker, in large part because his willingness to destroy the city if he can’t 
have it displays exactly those characteristics.168 Most translations reinforce this reading by 
emphasizing the political aspects of what Alcibiades lost: Alcibiades loves that he “once enjoyed 
the privileges of a citizen” (Jowett) or even that he “was secure in [his] role as a citizen” 
(Mynott), and indeed the phrase all’ en hō asphalōs epoliteúthēn strongly suggests that 




166 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 6.92. Perseus.    
167 Hobbes, English Works: Thucydides, 6.92. Perseus. 
168 Jowett’s gloss on this passage conveys exactly this sense, but without any hint of irony.  
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been rejected by the city on account of his disposition toward tyranny, Alcibiades seeks to guide 
the Peloponnesians to victory, reduce Athens to servitude, and take his place as the newly 
installed tyrant of Athens. However, Hobbes plays up Alcibiades’ claimed defensive motivations. 
Alcibiades valued life in Athens because he had “lived in safety”, erasing the political 
connotations of a verb (politeuomai) that invariably denotes living politically. As a result, what is 
“lost” to him when he fled prosecution is less his chances of ruling Athens than the home that (on 
Hobbes’ rendering) he genuinely tried to defend. In Hobbes’ rendering, Alcibiades may have had 
a tragic or self-destructive conception of his self-interest, but his apologia to the Spartans shows 
the consequences of political circumstances that divorce the self-interest of people like 
Alcibiades from the well-being of the polity they inhabit.  
6. Conclusion: Hobbes’ rhetorical model and its significance 
A strategy of modeling a less conflict-producing, more stable rhetorical practice through 
translation is far less direct than the styles and methods Hobbes would later adopt. Nonetheless, 
the commitments that guided Hobbes in the renderings he selected for this translation are 
surprisingly consistent with those he expressed in the 1640s and 1650s. The concept of fear as a 
uniquely rational affect, the commitment to encouraging calculative self-interest in order to 
restrain ambition and glory-seeking behavior, and a tendency to blame civil conflict on the 
competitive and powerful few all appear in The Elements of Law and Leviathan, as well as in 
Behemoth in a somewhat different format. Both the differences in intellectual and persuasive 
method and the continuities between the commitments that guided these texts offer valuable 
insights into the treatment of rhetoric in Hobbes’ work, as well as exposing tensions within the 
modern project of divorcing “public reason” from other sorts of rhetorical appeals. Hobbes’ use 
of the translation, and especially of the figure of Pericles, offers an underappreciated approach to 
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resolving the tension between the use and condemnation of eloquence in early modern political 
thought. First, by displaying the damage that eloquent glory-seekers could do even in a relatively 
homogeneous ancient democracy, the translation warned of the still greater dangers of 
unconstrained rhetoric in a modern, increasingly plural commonwealth. Second, the sovereign 
figures standing above the bickering demagogues of Hobbes’ Thucydides suggest a response to 
the problems of plurality: uniting the diverse interests and concerns of citizens under the 
education and power of a sovereign ruler. Third, however, without the discursive and material 
resources from which later modern critics of “rhetoric” benefited, the translation’s project of 
distinguishing between rhetoric in the service of sovereignty and rhetoric that dislocates the 
joints of the body politic reveals not only its own rhetorical dimensions, but those of similar 
projects.  
The danger that rhetoric poses to the commonwealth, as seen in the first section of this 
paper, looms over Hobbes’ prefatory comments to the translation. The much later statement, in 
Hobbes’ prose autobiography, that he “decided to translate [Thucydides], in order to make him 
speak to the English about the need to avoid the rhetoricians whom they were at that time 
planning to consult” says much about the urgency with which Hobbes regarded his intervention, 
the breadth of the response required, and the limited resources he possessed at the time.169 The 
opportunities for Hobbes’ contemporaries to manufacture controversies to suit their own ends, 




169 Translated in Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 230. Steinmetz, “Hobbes and the Politics of Translation”, 6-7, offers 
an excellent analysis of a similar statement in Hobbes’ verse autobiography, as well as of similar implications in the 
Thucydides translation’s frontispiece.  
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Thucydides’ contemporaries. While political prosecutions for “impiety” were not unknown to 
ancient Athens, the religious aspects of civil and interstate conflict in 17th-century Europe have 
no adequate parallel in Thucydides’ time.170 Other causes of conflict, if familiar to Thucydides 
and his contemporaries, were nevertheless exacerbated through the increased size and 
complexity of the rising nation-state, increased literacy and the printing press, and similar 
factors. Hobbes would, in his mature political thought, conclude that the plurality of interests and 
conceptions of the good meant that the only interest that truly unites humans is the avoidance of 
violent death. Rhetoric, as a practice of connecting listeners’ interests and commitments to create 
a new and contingent solidarity, threatened to empower conflicting factions. In providing a 
classical portrait of the dangers of rhetoricians and factional conflict, Hobbes’ Thucydides 
translation was an attempt to forestall this threat. 
 The sovereign figure of Pericles, and the flawed but decidedly Hobbesian figure of 
Alcibiades, also provide important continuities between Hobbes’ Thucydides and the later 
philosophical treatises. In each case, Hobbes relies on an authoritative figure to provide unity and 
overcome otherwise-dangerous divides in the body politic. In the case of the translation, 
however, the rhetorical appeal to accept sovereign authority comes from the mouth of a 
sovereign figure rather than from Hobbes, a mere philosophical counselor. Pericles’ education of 
the Athenians not only directs the reader to cultivate the ability to calculate self-interest and 




170 The obvious example, in this context, is the prosecution of Alcibiades, but the phenomenon was rather broader 
and continued for many years. See L.-L. O’Sullivan, “Athenian Impiety Trials in the Late Fourth Century B.C.”, The 
Classical Quarterly Vol. 47, No. 1 (1997), 136-152 for a survey of the later proliferation of politically-motivated 
impiety prosecutions.  
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what a Hobbesian monarch could accomplish – not to mention the reminder that such a ruler 
could offer even more, without having to worry about backbiting from people like Cleon. And at 
the same time, the figure of Hobbes’ Alcibiades warns that in a less stable political environment, 
the most gifted of citizens are forced to become dangerous. This combination of calculative self-
interest and correctly calibrated fear, channeled through the authority of a sovereign political 
figure, was further reinforced by Hobbes’ emphasis on the value of Pericles and repeated 
instructions to the readers to learn from the translation in the prefatory notes. Hobbes sets readers 
up to learn from him without, at this point, taking credit for teaching them. Much like a subject 
that, as a member of the Leviathan, has access to the principles and definitions that enable 
correct reasoning, the reader is enabled to reason correctly from the evidence that Hobbes 
provides in the translation.  
What makes this reasoning correct, though? The attempt to persuade readers to accept an 
authoritative standard and reject orators’ appeals to do otherwise, of course, is hardly unique to 
Hobbes. Recent literature on early modern political thought has emphasized the rhetorical 
dimensions of early modern authors’ political interventions. Aside from the extensive literature 
on Hobbes’ rhetorical theory and practice already cited here, scholars have directed new attention 




171 Torrey Shanks’ argument for the influence of Epicurean materialism on Locke’s political thought, and 
consequently for a deep commitment to persuasion and rhetoric “as figural and creative language”, has been very 
helpful in formulating a distinction between rhetoric as it was used by early modern political thinkers and how it was 
talked about by the same thinkers. Shanks, Authority Figures: Rhetoric and Experience in John Locke’s Political 




past, scholars recognize the concern for persuasion within the political appeals these authors 
crafted. But there is an important difference between how political actors use rhetoric and how 
they theorize rhetoric, and if someone theorizes rhetoric as a set of harmful or dangerous 
practices while carefully writing persuasive appeals, this is worth further investigation. For 
Locke and Kant, and for some of their successors, one might explain this by saying that Locke’s 
characterization of rhetoric as “a powerful instrument of error and deceit”, or Immanuel Kant’s 
as “the art of using the weakness of people for one’s own purposes”, reflect a set of concerns 
about a specific mode of persuasion that can be avoided while remaining attentive to style, 
clarity, and persuasion.172 But the rhetoric of Leviathan, as well as in some of the sharper 
passages in the Elements of Law, does not fit with these concerns.173  
The rhetoric of Hobbes’ Thucydides, even if its essential components work through 
sovereign figures, functions primarily as an attempt to remove resources for those who would 
defend robust political contestation and persuasive practices that compete with those Hobbes 
endorses. In this way, it is analogous to Hobbes’ move to put competing perspectives into the 
mouth of “the Foole” or into the category of “absurditie” in Leviathan, and to later theorists’ 




Scott Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014) is one 
of the most extensive and generative revisionist readings. See also Stroud, “Kant, Rhetoric, and the Challenges of 
Freedom”, Advances in the History of Rhetoric 18 (2015), 181-194, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2015.1081528; Michael Clarke, “Kant’s Rhetoric of Enlightenment”, The Review 
of Politics 59, no.1 (1997), 53-74, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500027157; Don Paul Abbott, “Kant, Theremin, 
and the Morality of Rhetoric”, Philosophy and Rhetoric 40, no.3 (2007), 274-292, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25655277.  
172 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Curley, 25. John Locke, An essay concerning human understanding, v.2 (London: W. 
Otridge, 1812), 42, HathiTrust Digital Library. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), trans. and ed. Paul Guyer, 205.  
173 On the moments of sharp polemical rhetoric in the Elements, see Miller, Mortal Gods, 126-130.  
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latter to the realm of deceit and manipulation. Each of these moves attempts to make the favored 
mode of persuasion natural and universal by excluding alternatives from consideration, and each 
does so without closely engaging those alternatives on their own terms. Where the later theorists 
seem more self-contained in this exclusion and lack of engagement, we should attribute the 
relative ease with which they accomplished their respective moves to the increased strength of 
discourses of science, instrumental rationality, and methodological individualism during the 
second half of the 17th century and the 18th century.  
Hobbes had to accomplish a similar task with fewer cultural and intellectual resources; 
for his Thucydides, he did not even have geometry to fall back on. As a result, the tenuous and 
contingent aspects of his rhetorical appeal to sovereignty show through. The attempt to 
rhetorically distinguish between sovereign authority and “rhetoric” appeals not to geometric 
proofs, “right reason”, or the laws of nature and nature’s god, but to the rhetoric of a first citizen 
whose leadership ended in failure and grief. As a result, a tragic note sounds through the 
translation’s political intervention. It warns the reader of the consequences of rejecting sovereign 
authority and embracing rhetoricians’ appeals, but where the theoretical artifice of Leviathan and 
the legalistic and rationalistic appeals of Hobbes’ successors build mutually exclusive 
monuments to a universal and rigid political order, Hobbes’ Thucydides offers only the fragile 
and ultimately fallen figures of a lonely statesman and his terribly brilliant, terribly flawed 
following act. This earliest attempt to marginalize rhetorical appeals occurring within a sovereign 
political order prefigures a characteristic pattern of such projects, in which contestation at the 
margins tended to become struggles over first principles, and rhetoric therefore did the ground-
up work of constituting a new solidarity or public capable of protecting itself from its foes. 
Instead of excluding rhetoric from a stable political order, Hobbes’ project pushed rhetoric 
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toward the revolutionary fringe. Hobbes’ Thucydides inaugurated an early modern project to 
poison the well of rhetoric, persuading generations of political philosophers and statesmen that 
rhetoric as Hobbes’ predecessors understood it was fundamentally misleading, pernicious, and 
productive of conflict. But neither Hobbes, nor his successors, nor the politicians that became 




 Rhetoric as Counter-Hegemonic Articulation 
 
 1. Introduction 
This chapter examines rhetorical practices under conditions of political and social 
plurality, as have generally prevailed since Hobbes’ time. The political significance of rhetoric, 
and its potential for transforming rather than reinforcing existing political conditions, depends on 
whether, and to what extent, it refigures existing identities and relationships in order to create 
new political possibilities. I classify rhetorical appeals in terms of whether, and to what extent, 
they attempt such a transformative engagement with the audience. On this basis, I begin with 
four broad categories of rhetorical appeals:  
1) Minimally, speakers can craft an accommodating appeal, attempting to demonstrate a 
fit with an audience’s perceived predispositions such that the audience accepts the 
speaker or the speaker’s proposed project. This strategy, which often involves 
pandering but does not have to, attempts to use existing, recognized political 
conditions on the speaker’s behalf rather than challenging those conditions at all.  
2) Speakers can also deploy a coalitional appeal, trying to persuade diverse audiences 
that their separate interests temporarily align, in order to build a broader alliance 
aimed at achieving some common goal. Coalitional appeals take audience members’ 
current perceived interests for granted, even when speakers hope to connect those 
 127 
interests to advance a new or unexpected agenda. 
3) Speakers who want to substantially transform existing political conditions will find 
that they must persuade diverse and heterogeneous audiences that their separate 
discontents with present political arrangements are equivalent in some sense and 
therefore grounds for a shared political project. When speakers attempt to accomplish 
this through a populist appeal, they make disparate struggles equivalent based on a 
negative relationship of opposition to a common obstacle.  
4) Speakers can also attempt to create equivalence by introducing a new positive 
dimension on which they hope to build solidarity. Here, articulatory rhetoric 
introduces a principle that, while marginal to the present sense of political 
contestation, nonetheless connects struggles in a way that challenges the prevailing 
common sense.  
These four broad categories of rhetorical appeals illustrate two things about the theories 
of rhetoric engaged in the previous chapters: their historical value, and their present inadequacy. 
The first two categories correspond with an Aristotelian theory of rhetoric as I described it in 
Chapter 2. Accommodating appeals, by fitting the speaker to the audience, gain their political 
leverage through understanding the specific audience and the regime that produces that audience 
and others like it. Coalitional appeals presume a level of diversity that we would not expect 
within the political class of an Aristotelian polis, but this kind of diversity certainly occurred 
among the representatives of different poleis or within political communities extending beyond a 
single city and the immediately surrounding farmland. The third and fourth varieties of rhetorical 
appeals, however, presume a level of political contestation foreign to the Aristotelian regime, at 
which the most central characteristics of a community’s political order become vulnerable. This 
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level of contestation prompted Hobbes to distinguish between “non-rhetorical” rhetoric 
protecting that political order and rhetoric challenging it, but as we’ve seen, this distinction did 
more to fuel attacks on the rhetoric of one’s opponents than any substantial recession of rhetoric 
from political practice. To accurately theorize rhetoric operating at this sharper level of political 
contestation, we need to move from the vocabulary of the Aristotelian regime to a set of concepts 
appropriate to the modern and contemporary political landscape. 
This chapter therefore moves from rhetoric responding to the characteristics of a stable 
regime to rhetoric that both responds to and attempts to alter conditions of hegemony. By 
hegemony, I mean a contingent alliance between interests and identities, centered on a principle 
that, by constructing those interests and identities as naturally connected and mutually 
reinforcing, has effectively defined the common sense of political contestation around them. 
Following the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I see hegemony as simultaneously 
produced by and prompting practices of articulation. 174 An articulation connects conceptions of 
interests, values, and material needs in order to make otherwise-separate struggles equivalent, 
and therefore to build broad, shared political movements. Practices of articulation produce 
hegemony by, over time, successfully connecting struggles and making them mutually 
intelligible so that the struggles become generally recognized as legitimate and, therefore, shape 
and direct relevant institutions and behavior. At the same time, hegemony, precisely by virtue of 




174 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (New York: Verso Books, 2001). I take seriously Mark 
Wenman’s argument against treating “Laclau and Mouffe’s work as a coherent unity.” Wenman, “Laclau or 
Mouffe? Splitting the difference”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 29:5 (2003), 581-606. Where Wenman’s 
argument substantially affects my reading, I make clear which author’s work is most relevant to my argument. 
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therefore constantly offers the possibility of articulation of those marginalized elements. An 
articulation that has succeeded in altering the common sense at some prior point, and therefore 
presently serves to maintain it and to justify a broader political order, is a “hegemonic 
articulation”; one that alters the common sense in favor of a new or different political order is a 
“counter-hegemonic articulation”. 175  
Based on this terminology, this chapter identifies two basic tensions in rhetorical 
practices based on the shift from regime to hegemony as a basic condition for political action. 
First, with respect to the relationship between speakers and audiences, speakers can adopt a 
conciliatory or a confrontational orientation. That is, they can attempt to match their appeals to 
audience members’ existing predispositions, interests, and values; this may make their short-term 
position stronger, but may also involve compromises of principles or of long-term goals that the 
audience does not already share. Alternatively, speakers can challenge audiences to strive for 
goals or adopt principles that they otherwise would not, but doing so can be difficult, and 
requires persuading audience members to understand themselves differently. Generally speaking, 
accommodating and coalitional appeals are “conciliatory”, and populist and articulatory appeals 
are “confrontational”. Second, with respect to broader political conditions, speakers can follow 
an opportunistic strategy, which attempts to draw on a favorable set of conditions in persuading 
an audience, or an organizing strategy, where they attempt to build some or all of the audience 
into a force capable of creating favorable conditions. Generally speaking, accommodating and 




175 The term “counter-hegemonic” to describe struggles against the present hegemonic system comes from Anna 
Marie Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary (New York: Routledge, 1998, 2003), 35.  
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this chapter, then, I argue that articulatory appeals are particularly valuable, and indeed 
indispensable, for people who seek to build emancipatory movements on the basis of a counter-
hegemonic articulation.  
I begin the chapter by drawing on Laclau’s and Mouffe’s work to develop rhetoric as a 
practice of articulation and comparing this rhetorical mode to others. I extend their account of 
articulation to develop an audience-centered theory of rhetoric as a practice of building 
solidarity, enabling new possibilities for political strategies of articulation. I argue that 
articulatory rhetoric engages in hegemonic politics, while coalitional rhetoric does not and 
cannot. At the same time, I defend my distinction between articulation and populist political 
logics, on the basis that while “left populism” as advocated by Laclau and Mouffe necessarily 
contains an articulatory dimension, this dimension originates in the left’s historical and present 
position outside the hegemonic formation, rather than in the core logic of populism.  
The following section of the chapter puts the logic of hegemony into conversation with 
empirical findings in political science. I draw on Adam Berinsky’s analysis of opinions that 
polling undermeasures to show that latent discontent and even clear preferences for political 
change, when marginal to the current hegemonic formation, only become politically relevant 
when people gain access to a discursive framework for expressing their needs and demanding 
that their needs be met. I also engage with literature on dogwhistling and other racist political 
appeals to show that generations of right-wing political appeals have relied on a tired set of 
discursive tropes coupled to a still powerful set of racist, colonialist, and capitalist material 
conditions. Taken as a whole, this section demonstrates the value of counter-hegemonic 
rhetorical articulation in two ways. On the one hand, it shows that by offering a compelling 
framework for demanding change, speakers can activate otherwise-silent voices and connect 
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them with each other. On the other, it provides an account of why Laclau’s “construction of a 
people” – the primary and central articulatory task of left populism – is unique to left populism 
in the contemporary political moment: the right wing already has a conception of “the people”, 
largely unchanged for at least a century and a half, which is unacceptable to those who seek 
emancipation across all forms of subordination. 
In the final section, I turn to the work of Antonio Gramsci to find resources for the 
counter-hegemonic use of rhetoric. I draw on Gramsci’s treatments of oratory, journalism, and 
organic intellectuals to develop an anti-elitist conception of rhetoric, on which persuasion 
depends not only on close attention to building solidarity within the audience, but also on a 
collective process of identifying, refining, and crafting persuasive appeals. I also read the 
concept of a war of position in terms of a contest over rhetorical terrain. That is, suppose a set of 
identities, interests, and material arrangements connected within a hegemonic articulation, and 
others that are marginal or excluded under the present hegemonic conditions. I then read the war 
of position as a contest over whether counter-hegemonic efforts will successfully assimilate or 
redefine enough of the former elements, in addition to the latter, to secure broad political 
support. As a result, I conclude that counter-hegemonic projects must find ways not only to 
connect marginal positions, but to find ways to seize and repurpose aspects of the present 
hegemonic articulation.  
2. Rhetoric as Articulation 
At the time of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and since, the dominant example of 
articulation was the neoliberal articulation of “economic freedom”, in terms of the freedom to 
achieve and enjoy unequal access to material resources, to “democracy” understood in terms of 
Cold War anticommunism. Right-wing rhetoricians who successfully redefined the common 
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sense along these lines – Laclau and Mouffe consistently reference Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher as the propagandists of a discursive formation originating in the thought of F.A. Hayek 
and Milton Friedman – found that a further chain of equivalence connecting economic freedom 
and anticommunist defenses of liberal democracy to a reactionary backlash against movements 
to liberate people of color, women, and LGBT people proved valuable in gaining electoral 
support.176 In the decade after Reagan and Thatcher, the Anglo-American center-left largely 
failed to contest this articulation. Instead, it agreed that there was no alternative to subordinating 
liberal democracy to the market logic, and either feebly contested or outright abetted the right 
wing’s culture war narrative justifying reactionary backlash.177 Laclau’s and Mouffe’s perceptive 
analysis of the neoconservative articulation, the neoliberal discourses that it extended and 
empowered, and the feckless attempts of center-left parties to accommodate this articulation 
remains one of the most insightful and generative attempts to theorize Anglo-American political 
developments in the late 20th century. Their prescription to attempt a counter-hegemonic 
articulation of many struggles against subordination, rather than to accommodate the hegemonic 
articulation that maintains those subordinations, remains accurate. Having a theory of rhetoric 
that explains how to unite struggles is a crucial element in advancing such an articulation.  
Coalition, Articulation, Populism 




176 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 169-175.  
177 Anna Marie Smith’s comment that “political leaders such as [Bill] Clinton merely deploy small-scale tactical 
maneuvers within an already hegemonized space” nicely summarizes the narrowness of the center-left response. 
Smith, The Radical Democratic Imaginary, 176. 
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only theoretically important interaction between rhetoric and agonist logics, and the principles 
and methods used for consolidating the common struggle have far-reaching implications for the 
struggle’s development. For the moment, I will leave out appeals that simply accommodate 
audiences, as these appeals not only leave audiences’ existing perceived interests unchallenged, 
but do not even orient audiences to broader unified political action beyond temporary support for 
the speaker. Of the kinds of rhetoric I have generally identified, we therefore have coalitional 
rhetorics, populist rhetorics, and articulatory rhetorics. To differentiate between these principles 
and methods, I begin by contrasting articulation as proposed by Laclau and Mouffe with methods 
of building a coalition via connecting already-existing interest groups. I then develop a novel 
distinction among the articulating principles that Laclau and Mouffe have theorized. For Laclau 
and Mouffe, populist projects and the possibilities of articulation have become nearly 
coextensive: a number of groups with unsatisfied and frustrated demands unite against the entity 
that they come to see as frustrating their otherwise-disparate demands, and connect their unified 
populist project “either by a specific democratic demand that becomes the symbol of the 
common struggle for the radicalization of democracy, or by the figure of a leader.”178 I propose 
describing as “populist” a rhetoric that constitutes the shared movement primarily in terms of 
opposition to an existing authority or institution, while leaving its internal unity primarily to a 
symbolic or personalist relationship; in this sense, the populist rhetoric uniquely foregrounds a 




178 Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 70. Cf. Laclau, On Populist Reason, 171, on the “empty signifier” that 
represents a chain of equivalences that, taken together, constitute “the people” who can act together to achieve 
equivalent demands.  
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hostile entity that frustrates them.179 In contrast, rhetoric does the work of “articulation” when a 
speaker successfully adds a new, positive source of unity that audience members recognize in 
their own experiences and needs. None of these modes of movement building necessarily 
exclude each other, and all have their uses. Nonetheless, I focus on articulation for two reasons: 
articulation is of the most interest to me in constructing a theory of rhetoric, because rhetoric 
does its most significant political work when it contributes a new dimension of unity, and by 
constituting a new basis for political unity and therefore a possible basis for a new hegemonic 
bloc, rhetoric in its articulatory mode offers the strongest chance of successfully contesting the 
existing hegemonic arrangements.  
A brief example of the coalitional logic will illustrate its general characteristics and its 
political limitations. A few years ago, groups of NIMBY (“Not In My BackYard”, i.e., opposed 
to development projects that would or might affect their own property values) activists and 
environmentalists in New Hampshire who disapproved of a new power line being built through 
their economic and ecological spaces, First Nations activists in the Pessamit Innu Band who 
opposed a hydroelectric development on their sacred lands, and graduate workers at Yale 
University who sought Yale’s recognition of their labor union all learned that Yale’s endowment 
managers intended to sell land that the endowment owned in rural New Hampshire to a power 




179 The “positive” and “negative” forms of articulation are strictly descriptive here – one creates equivalence by 
offering a new principle that adds to existing conceptions of interest and identity, the other by defining those 
conceptions in contrast to something hostile. For example, one can, by organizing antifascist solidarity and defense 
efforts, negatively articulate the community that one is defending – those who feel threatened by neofascist groups 
will recognize themselves as in community with each other to the extent that the articulatory attempt succeeds. 
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widely disparate groups: by forming a coalition to target Yale for public embarrassment, each 
movement would benefit on its own terms from ending Yale’s involvement in the project. They 
mobilized, and they won.180 Early on, a journalist claimed that while the coalition “may lose this 
battle, its very formation points to a different sort of political solidarity … emerging from the 
ruins of Washington, D.C.-style bipartisanship”.181 This assessment, however, simultaneously 
underestimated the coalition’s immediate capacity and overestimated its long-term significance. 
While the coalition managed to successfully pressure Yale, there was no particular reason for the 
coalition to persist beyond its victory. Not much equivalence existed between these disparate 
movements’ goals; indeed, under other circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine members of 
these movements in conflict.182 A political project premised on mobilizing groups based on their 
existing interests can build unlikely allies, but without further work to transform those interests 
into a shared struggle, we should not expect the coalition to last. We also should not expect a 
coalition’s members to devote much energy to rhetoric that builds connections between coalition 




180 Thanks to Charles Decker of UNITE HERE 33 for this example, included in his presentation at the 2019 
Coalition of Graduate Employee Unions conference, and for an open and generative exchange with me on the limits 
of this coalitional strategy.  
181 Sarah Jones, “A New Solidarity in the North Country”, The New Republic, August 10, 2017 
https://newrepublic.com/article/144249/new-solidarity-north-country.   
182 For example, the New Republic article made much of the fact that Coos County, New Hampshire (through which 
the Northern Pass power line was to be built) had swung from overwhelmingly Democratic to narrowly Republican 
in the 2016 presidential election and that many local Trump voters joined the anti-Northern Pass coalition. In 2020, 
however, Coos County election results continued to trend toward the Republican Party, and Trump’s share of the 
vote in the county improved by a percentage point even while his statewide defeat was several points larger than in 
2016. If Coos County’s rural conservatives formed a lasting solidarity with their environmentalist, First Nations, and 
graduate union allies, they had an odd way of showing it. 
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In contrast, those involved in both populist and articulatory projects must constantly 
attend to their own unity, because instead of seizing upon a present alignment of existing 
interests against a common foe and then drifting apart as soon as a momentary victory is 
achieved, they need to build and reinforce the “chains of equivalence” that make them a shared 
movement instead of the various differently disempowered. This dependence on equivalential 
relations is why both populist and articulatory rhetorics formally fit Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
definition of articulation: “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.”183 Indeed, the “left populist” project 
in Mouffe’s most recent work explicitly invokes a positive articulating principle: an expanded 
and radicalized conception of democracy that uses an egalitarian conception of citizenship to 
connect “the variety of democratic resistances against post-democracy”.184 The period since this 
work was published has brought significant defeats for many of the left-populist movements 
mentioned, including Podemos, Syriza, La France Insoumise, and the Corbyn-led Labour Party, 
and decidedly mixed results for the barely left-of-center populist elements in the Democratic 
Party. Still, expanded and radicalized demands for democracy may successfully articulate left-
populist movements in the future.185 Recent support for expansions of voting rights, especially in 
Florida and Michigan, and the surprising support of some elected officials from the Republican 




183 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 91. 
184 Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 36.  
185 For a pessimistic view of Laclau’s populism in political practice, emphasizing Laclau’s “hyperformal” approach,  
see Anton Jäger and Arthur Borriello, “Left-Populism on Trial: Laclauian Politics in Theory and Practice”, Theory 
& Event Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 2020), 740-764. Cf. Smith, The Radical Democratic Imaginary, 177; Lasse 
Thomassen, “Hegemony, populism and democracy: Laclau and Mouffe Today (review article)”, Revista Española 
de Ciencia Política Vol. 40 (March 2016), 161-176.  
 137 
democracy as an articulating principle. Nonetheless, I read Mouffe’s egalitarian “democratic 
demands” as combining two logics that I will try to disambiguate: an articulatory logic 
dependent on a positive principle capable of constituting a new hegemonic alliance, and a 
populist logic that opportunistically responds to a political crisis by connecting that crisis to a 
common foe and uniting otherwise-disparate elements against them. Differentiating between 
these equivalential logics will enable me to show that Laclau’s “construction of a people” is the 
first task of a Left politics not because it is populist, but because it is on the Left and therefore 
requires a new and emancipatory conception of a unified people.186 
It is obvious that appeals that add a new substantive term unifying otherwise-disparate 
elements in the audience modify the identity of those elements. When climate activists and 
prison abolitionists argue that ecological catastrophe and the carceral state have a common origin 
– racialized and colonialist capitalism – and, therefore, that ending these can only be achieved as 
part of an anticapitalist transformation of economic relations, this new moment of solidarity 
alters the identity of anticarceral and environmentalist demands. An anticapitalist account of 
prison abolition will exclude and tend to displace right-wing libertarian critiques of mass 
incarceration, because the latter contrast carceral violence with the alleged freedom of the market 
society, while the former recognizes the prison and the commodity form as simultaneous and 
mutually reinforcing sources of violence. Similarly, an anticarceral environmentalism will reject 
forms of environmentalism that blame environmental damage on overpopulation and the poor, 




186 Laclau, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (New York: Verso, 2014), 143-148.  
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technocratic solutions that attempt to protect compound growth and capitalist productive 
relations while responding to climate change.187  
When appeals unify an audience primarily through a symbol of opposition to a powerful 
foe, however, these appeals modify the identity of the audience’s various elements negatively. 
Where articulation connects via a positive articulating principle, and coalitions unite based on a 
temporary alignment of interests, populist appeals make otherwise-disparate elements equivalent 
with respect to a negative attribute: their opposition to whatever entity the populist speaker 
identifies as dominant and hostile. To successfully draw such a negative equivalence, populist 
appeals must build on advantageous political conditions: discontent that is so broad and 
amorphous as to open an exceptionally wide range of symbolic and rhetorical possibilities 
(Gramsci’s “organic crisis”, in which a previous hegemonic system is disintegrating, and 
“interregnum”, featuring contestation over what will be the next hegemonic bloc), a set of 
relatively developed demands to be presented as unachievable under the present system, or a 
developed common sense of what counts as “the people”, in whose name demands can be 
presented. Populist appeals require these broader advantageous conditions more than articulatory 
appeals do, because by attempting to represent the bulk of a political community in contrast to 
the dominant opponent, populist appeals take on a burden of directly attacking whatever is left of 




187 For examples of scholarly and political progress toward such an articulation, see Nik Heynen, “Toward an 
Abolition Ecology”, Abolition: A Journal of Insurgent Politics no. 1 (2018), 240-247; Ashley Dawson, 
“Capitalism’s Organic Crisis”, Verso Blogs, December 20, 2018, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4141-
capitalism-s-organic-crisis; Elizabeth A. Bradshaw, “Tombstone Towns and Toxic Prisons: Prison Ecology and the 
Necessity of an Anti-prison Environmental Movement”, Critical Criminology no. 26 (2018), 407-422.   
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marginal social positions, will tend to take on articulatory characteristics, as those who recognize 
themselves as excluded from the present hegemonic bloc search for positive principles on which 
to build connections with each other. Meanwhile, it is always possible to craft articulatory 
appeals for marginal and subordinated audiences, because any hegemonic articulation leaves 
space in which to construct a basis for shared struggle outside and against it.  
We can see this difference in the conditions for populist and articulatory strategies with a 
brief reference to successful uses of each. Here, I am thinking of two cases that Laclau and 
Mouffe have connected with populism and articulation, respectively, and two from 20th-century 
U.S. politics that are immediately relevant to this dissertation. Those that Laclau and Mouffe 
have discussed are the Bolshevik demand for bread, land, and peace and the neoliberal 
articulation of freedom with economic hierarchy and privilege; the U.S. cases are the right-
populist invocations of a “silent majority” and a “moral majority” from the 1960s through the 
1980s, and the work to articulate nondiscrimination on the basis of race with workplace 
democracy in the 1930s.188 Each of the populist moves owed much of their success to favorable 
political conditions in the moment. The “bread, land, and peace” demand responded to a 
catastrophic war policy under the tsar, the revolutionary government’s intention to continue that 
policy, and its unwillingness to carry out dramatic programs of land reform or state provision of 
food in the large cities. These conditions allowed the Bolsheviks to use a simple political slogan 




188 On “bread, land, and peace” as a quintessentially populist demand, see Laclau, On Populist Reason, 97-98. On 
the use of “civil rights” to articulate workplace democracy and opposition to racial discrimination within the social 
liberal project, see Eric Schickler, Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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own land, and to exclude other parties as potential representatives of these unsatisfied demands. 
Similarly, references to a dissatisfied “majority” in the United States took advantage of divides 
in the previously-dominant New Deal coalition over racial justice and the Vietnam War, poor 
economic conditions, and hostility to projects of feminism and LGBT liberation to portray a 
reactionary right-wing program as representative of aggrieved white conservatives and 
evangelicals.  
In both cases, the populist program that won broad political support also drew on long 
efforts to articulate marginal political positions. The “bread, land, and peace” demand sprang 
from struggles within the Second International to articulate anti-war struggles and anti-
imperialism with the international liberation of the working class, as well as struggles within 
Marxist circles in imperial Russia over the correct relationship between rural peasants and urban 
proletarians. Each of these struggles had, during the previous decade, marginalized the 
Bolsheviks among other socialist parties; in the months following the February Revolution, they 
provided a framework for a highly successful populist demand: of the active socialist parties, 
only the Bolsheviks had both opposed the war and advocated for workers and peasants sharing a 
revolutionary struggle, offering some basis for their claim to represent both the urban proletariat 
and the rural peasantry. The right-wing populism of the Southern Strategy and the “moral 
majority”, as a reactionary project, enjoyed long-term discursive resources (most significantly, 
languages of white supremacy and anticommunism) as well as the material support of wealthy 
reactionaries. Nonetheless, it had to develop and rework these resources in response to the partial 
successes of struggles for civil rights and social democratic reforms. Both of these populist 
formations, then, benefited from past articulatory efforts while also opportunistically responding 
to political and social crises.  
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Strategies of articulation, on the other hand, can – indeed, must – begin from the political 
margins. A political strategy that attempts to challenge the hegemonic articulation from within, 
as when the Anglo-American center-left tried to protect vestiges of the social-liberal welfare 
state under neoliberalism, cannot do much to counter that articulation or to build a new one. 
Indeed, while the relatively limited project of including both workplace democracy and racial 
nondiscrimination within the civil rights of social liberalism succeeded in building a somewhat 
stable alliance between labor and Black communities, this alliance altered the social liberal 
coalition rather than replacing it. Only the far left of the alliance – communist and socialist 
organizers across races and nationalities – had a counter-hegemonic strategy of uniting 
proletarians outside of and beyond the social liberal formation, and they did not succeed in 
defining the shared struggle on their terms. The neoliberals, on the other hand, explicitly 
challenged the articulation of freedom with equality, which had been characteristic of 19th- and 
early 20th- century socialism and labor radicalism and, increasingly in the 1930s and 40s, 
assimilated into social liberal projects. By using the market to connect freedom with hierarchy, 
the neoliberals reworked an old and otherwise marginal resource – aristocrats’ worry, expressed 
most poignantly by Tocqueville, that egalitarian democrats would drag down their betters – to 
cleverly propose a mechanism by which rational subjects freely recognized their betters.189 This 
connection of freedom with hierarchy created a productive ambiguity, which proved invaluable 




189 Here, I am following Corey Robin’s reading of Hayek’s neoliberalism, on which Hayek’s “economy becomes a 
theater of self-disclosure, the stage upon which we discover and reveal our ultimate ends”, and therefore the 
hierarchies produced by the market spring from our most honest and reliable judgment. Robin, The Reactionary 
Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 151.  
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questions, stood apart from most right-wing contemporaries in his disapproval of discrimination 
on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation and argued that the market would tend to 
reduce this discrimination over time.190 Nonetheless, as we will see later in the chapter, the 
attempt to connect freedom with hierarchy rather than with equality has taken its most politically 
powerful form when connected to a reactionary defense of all of these hierarchies.  
Conciliation and Confrontation in Rhetorical Appeals 
Having clearly distinguished coalition, articulation, and populism, I now have a basic 
framework for describing the role of rhetoric in political strategies relying on each of these 
modes of organizing collective efforts. Rhetoric that attempts to mobilize a coalition, like 
rhetoric that personally connects a speaker to a specific audience, will tend to follow a 
conciliatory strategy, taking as given an audience’s perceived interests and preferences. Rhetoric 
supporting populist and articulatory projects will tend to confront certain conceptions of interest 
and preference in order to disrupt them in favor of a more unified movement; more broadly, such 
rhetoric should typically aim at encouraging political confrontation as part of counter-hegemonic 
projects.  
Speakers trying to contribute to a coalitional strategy need not, as I have suggested 
earlier, spend much effort trying to unify their coalition. Indeed, these efforts could very well 
backfire. If someone speaking on behalf of a coalition attempts to define the coalition in terms 




190 For a partial statement of this position, see Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962, 2002), 21.  
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and reduce the coalition’s effectiveness. This kind of rhetorical problem is well known to 
constructivist theorists of representation, who have argued that the validity of any particular 
representative claim – any attempt to assert that some group of people is the constituency of 
some political actor, who acts on their behalf – is up to the judgment of the relevant constituency, 
who can after all decide whether or not to accept the self-described representative’s portrayal.191 
It follows that to the extent that a political group follows a coalitional strategy, rhetoric’s most 
obvious uses lie in intra-coalition bargaining, in which members try to persuade each other to 
cooperate on demands that aren’t immediately relevant to their perceived interest or even to trade 
off some interests for apparently more important ones, and in efforts to portray hostile candidates 
and programs as threatening to coalition members. Often, the rhetorical aspects of coalition 
building differ little from simple appeals to audience members’ existing preferences: the 
fundamentally Aristotelian model in which speakers attempt to select arguments about their 
intellectual credibility, affective appeal, and trustworthiness that appeal to common dispositions 
within the audience.  
Thinking about the problems of movement building through a rhetorical lens therefore 
reveals the practical problems that coalitional strategies pose to counter-hegemonic movements, 
particularly on the left. Because the logic of coalition takes audience members’ interests as given 
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transform their political circumstances. Political audiences shaped by a prevailing hegemonic 
articulation will tend to be hostile toward those whom that articulation excludes; as a result, 
disadvantaged speakers must adopt strange contortions to demonstrate their trustworthiness and 
representativeness to those audiences. A recent election for one of Georgia’s seats in the United 
States Senate illustrates this point. Raphael Warnock, a left-liberal Black preacher and activist, 
faced recently-appointed senator Kelly Loeffler, a white businesswoman running as a far-right 
“Trump Republican”. Loeffler unsurprisingly resorted to a standard set of racist appeals, 
dogwhistling to a longstanding conservative paranoia about radicalism in the Black evangelical 
church and activist communities. Warnock’s campaign released ads sidestepping what they 
described as inaccurate smears in favor of depicting Warnock walking a beagle puppy. Scholars 
of racial politics in the United States, such as Hakeem Jefferson and Christina Greer, 
immediately recognized and explained the ads’ strategy. In Jefferson’s words, the ad was “meant 
to deracialize Warnock with this cute ‘white people friendly’ doggy”.192 In one sense, the ad 
therefore performed a basic task of political rhetoric: instead of reinforcing the opponent’s 
rhetorical frame by denying Warnock’s alleged radicalism or attempting to justify it, it portrayed 
Warnock as friendly and suburban, and therefore a safe candidate for middle-class white voters. 
In this capacity, the appeal was tactically sound and probably contributed to Warnock’s victory. 
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contexts where political actors cannot (or choose not to) directly attempt to change audience 
members’ predispositions. Responding to dogwhistled racist appeals with a “deracializing” 
deflection implies two judgments about the audience: that the audience is receptive to implicit 
racist appeals if those appeals are left unopposed, and that direct opposition to the content of 
those racist appeals will not successfully persuade the audience.193 To try and build a sufficient 
electoral coalition, the Warnock campaign made an understandable choice to accommodate an 
audience’s indefensible attitudes rather than confronting them.  
Unlike coalitional rhetorical strategies, rhetorical strategies of articulation or populism 
directly confront hegemonic conditions (or at least a partial and tendentious portrayal of 
hegemonic conditions) and therefore open new political possibilities. These strategies can occur 
at a wide variety of levels. I have already discussed Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of the 
neoliberal articulation, connecting the freedom to enjoy unequal distributions of goods and 
privileges to a conception of “democracy” stripped down to representative electoral systems, and 
the CIO’s articulation of workplace democracy and racial nondiscrimination as “civil rights”. In 
Chapter 6, we will see James Madison’s articulation of the “wealthy minority” of landowners 
and bankers in the early United States to the concept of “a minority”, like any other numerical 
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rights against hypothetically-dominant majority factions. And in Chapter 7, I will describe and 
analyze an articulatory strategy adopted by the Graduate Employees Organization at the 
University of Michigan in order to connect racial justice and LGBT liberation as “union issues”, 
which has provided a valuable resource to organized graduate workers and also faced limitations 
when applied to broader social mobilizations. These examples operate on very different scales, 
but in each case the ability to redefine the frontiers of political contestation significantly altered 
following struggles.  
These examples – from Madison and Reagan to the CIO, GEO, and Warnock – illustrate a 
serious problem for thinking about the role of rhetoric in counter-hegemonic articulation. There 
is something of a chicken/egg problem when it comes to rhetoric in electoral politics. If 
hegemonic conditions shape the predispositions of audience members, then people engaged in 
electoral politics have obvious reasons to exercise caution in how they craft appeals to potential 
audiences. Whatever the merits of caution, it does not tend to produce appeals that redefine the 
present terms of political contestation. Politicians at the national level of electoral politics are 
therefore among the last people we should expect to embrace new articulations – consider the 
local politicians and then Congressmembers who supported the CIO and NAACP in the late 
1930s and early 1940s, long before the labor rights/racial nondiscrimination articulation gained 
the support of Democratic presidents – because national politicians depend on favorable material 
and political conditions for the confidence that the new articulation will serve their immediate 
objectives. Examples of nationally significant politicians whose primary political role is directly 
engaging the common sense through social media, effective use of interviews, and high-profile 
conflict with other elected officials prove this rule: those who keep their platforms tend to do so 
because of safe districts that isolate them from the downsides of national controversy. At the 
 147 
same time, conflict is a crucial catalyst for articulation. Anna Marie Smith illustrates this in an 
excellent account of the role of articulation in conflicts over racial equity:  
“Consider, for example, the two sides in the affirmative action debate in California during 
the mid-1990s. The pro-affirmative action side includes civil rights organizations, people of color 
community organizations, feminist groups, progressive trade unions and the AFL-CIO, student 
groups and small leftist organizations. On the anti-side, we have the Republican Party, neo-
conservatives who oppose what they call “special rights” and “preferential treatment,” 
antifeminists, racists who oppose the advance of people of color in any shape or form and 
xenophobes who see affirmative action as an incentive for non-white immigrants to settle in 
California. … To the extent that we are dealing with articulation—and not just a superficial 
coalition—the value of each subject position in the chain is shaped by its relations with the others. 
Ultimately, hegemonic articulation would occur on both a conscious and unconscious level, as 
anti-racism began to operate as a compelling overarching framework for identification for anti-
racists, trade union militants and radical feminists alike. Wherever different subject positions are 
symbolically located together in opposition to another camp, such that their meanings are 
subsequently transformed by their overlapping identifications with partially shared sets of 
beliefs, then we are dealing with an articulated chain of equivalence.”194 
There are three important lessons in this explanation; one clearly intentional, the others 
perhaps not. First, the intentional lesson: when people involved in this struggle actually find 
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on “an unconscious level” because people tend to retrospectively justify and assign value to their 
efforts. New organizers, in the labor movement and elsewhere, learn quickly to ask people to 
come do things rather than to sign papers, read pamphlets, or otherwise make theoretical and 
impersonal commitments. The threshold for this kind of interpersonal political education is not 
very high – people at rallies, on picket lines, or making phone calls tend to talk to each other and 
rapidly build relationships – and it quickly surpasses the official purpose of whatever collective 
action is going on. That is, Smith’s union militants and radical feminists will not only adopt a 
shared framework of anti-racist identification, but will also tend to take each other’s everyday 
concerns more seriously.  
Smith’s compelling example, however, also communicates two other lessons. To the 
extent that these different activist groups remain isolated (for example, if the progressive union 
activists are primarily getting involved to punish a disliked governor or state legislature, and 
mostly keep to themselves), the conflict will do less to articulate interests. The inverse of Smith’s 
logic also holds: to the extent that various organizations and communities fail to effectively act 
together and build relationships while doing so, they will remain “a superficial coalition”. And 
for those individuals who are not already leaders or committed long-term activists in their 
respective organizations, rhetoric at the movement level and at the organizational level plays the 
crucial roles of explaining why some community is involved in a collective struggle, and why 
they themselves should show up with other members of their community. While rhetoric does not 
replace the intellectual and affective contributions of collective action, it gives meaning and 
sense to the choice to show up for actions on high-stakes occasions, especially for those 
community members who are less frequently engaged in organizing and activism. As a result, the 
effective rhetorical connection between communities, built by people in positions of official 
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leadership and in more organic and informal positions, makes the main difference between 
coalitional superficiality and an effectively articulated, solidaristic movement.  
3. Rhetoric, the Common Sense, and Right-Wing Populism 
The argument of the previous section, in which articulatory rhetoric uniquely contributes 
to political projects aimed at securing broad support for emancipatory social change, prompts the 
question of how rhetoric works to persuade people to see their political and social positions 
differently. Here, I am putting a central radical democratic insight, the political construction of 
interests, into conversation with two empirical findings in political science. I examine the “silent 
voices” undermeasured in opinion polls and Adam Berinsky’s distinction between respondents 
who don’t have the cognitive framework to coherently express their perspective and respondents 
who choose not to express their perspective due to perceived social consequences.195 I connect 
these two categories of undermeasured perspectives to a distinction between subject positions 
that are excluded from a hegemonic articulation, and therefore require political work to newly 
articulate, and subject positions that are already articulated into some relation of political 
struggle. People in the former case especially benefit from rhetoric that makes sense of their 
experiences and provides a framework for political action; those in the latter must be persuaded 
either to abandon an existing ideological framework or to understand it very differently. I then 
draw on literature on dogwhistles and other racist appeals to argue that instead of doing new 
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social relations of racialized and colonial capitalism. Because these material and social relations 
do not offer similar support to left-wing populist projects, only counter-hegemonic articulation 
can build frameworks for emancipatory action at the national level.  
“Silent Voices”, Cognitive Complexity, and Common Sense 
Consider why someone would choose not to express their opinion when asked for it. 
Berinsky identifies two variables – cognitive complexity and social acceptability – that, singly or 
together, dramatically affect the likelihood that a respondent will choose to answer “don’t know” 
to a poll question instead of offering a substantive answer.196 A respondent who has no 
meaningful concept of a question’s content has the sort of “nonattitude” that the “don’t know” 
response is supposed to address. Respondents also, however, sometimes have inchoate opinions 
that they find difficult to put into words, in which case the cognitive complexity of the response 
is too high and they default to “don’t know”; in other cases, they realize that they have a 
developed, but unpopular opinion that they prefer not to offer. In either of these latter cases, the 
respondents have a reaction that social scientists should want to measure, but the reaction hides 
behind a “don’t know” response.197 The case of an unpopular opinion, which Berinsky primarily 
examines through the example of white poll respondents self-censoring their disapproval of 
busing, affirmative action, and other government programs designed to alleviate racial injustice, 
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socially difficult responses align with the right wing in this way, and some cases of social 
difficulty involve more immediate or severe responses than Berinsky’s example. In each case, 
however, respondents who choose not to answer a socially difficult question are aware of a 
political struggle, see themselves on one side of that struggle, and believe (reasonably or not) 
that identifying their position in that struggle carries a cost that they presently wish to avoid. 
Given a basis for more optimism, people in this position can be easily mobilized. Respondents 
trying to find rhetorical resources for justifying their views, on the other hand, need something 
more.  
For Berinsky, “elite discourse” provides a valuable but double-edged service: when 
political elites attempt to justify their political positions, they offer resources for citizens 
attempting to justify their own views. The limits of “elite discourse” in Berinsky’s analysis partly 
match the limits of rhetoric in my argument. While elite discourse “enables ordinary citizens to 
combine their many, and potentially conflicting, predispositions into coherent attitudes”, it can 
only do so when “reaching individuals whose predispositions are consistent with that 
rhetoric”.198 That is, elite rhetoric activates existing latent support, but depends on audience 
members both having favorable predispositions and being willing to pass on their new outlook. 
Moreover, any perspectives that are excluded from elite discourse lack this cognitive scaffolding. 
Respondents whose perspectives are excluded therefore face disproportionate difficulties in 
forming, let alone sharing, coherent presentations of their perspectives. Berinsky found that this 
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elite discourse for the intellectual and discursive space to articulate anti-war views.199 Berinsky 
has also identified a similar “exclusion bias in social welfare policy opinion”, partly because of a 
straightforward ideological problem: respondents in favor of social welfare policies must find a 
way to cognitively reconcile “the conflicting values of democracy and capitalism”.200  
In each of the areas in which Berinsky argues that elites fail to provide resources for 
popular opinion, elites’ silence protects systems of imperialism and capitalism. People with a 
lived experience of systemic harm need some kind of articulating principle in order to convert 
that experience into a coherent intervention in current political debates. It’s important, however, 
to be clear about the potential breadth of “elite discourse”, and to identify elements outside of 
competing electoral candidates and parties that provide these rhetorical resources. Community 
organizations, churches, labor unions, and academic institutions all connect participants to 
political themes, concepts, and commitments in specific and contingent ways. For example, in 
years of participating in the labor movement, I cannot count the number of times that longtime 
union members and officers have denounced laws that prohibit public employees from going on 
strike, universally insisting that restrictions on the right to strike or to picket violate union 
members’ First Amendment rights to speech and association. I have never asked them how they 
came to interpret the First Amendment in this way, against a decades-long history of state and 
federal law and of anti-union jurisprudence. I expect, however, that more of them learned it from 
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scholarship.201 This brings us back to the chicken/egg problem of relying on political candidates’ 
and prominent commentators’ strategic communication for connecting marginal and excluded 
perspectives: to do so, they would need a reason to expect that audience members would find 
that perspective appealing. Indeed, in both the Vietnam War case that Berinsky identifies and the 
workplace democracy/racial nondiscrimination struggles that Schickler documents, “elite” 
officeholders introduced antiwar, pro-labor, and anti-racial discrimination perspectives into 
electoral discourse only after confrontation and direct action had made these perspectives 
broadly available to the public.202  
Berinsky’s discussion of cognitively difficult subjects illustrates the consequences of the 
political construction of interests. For Laclau, Mouffe, and others, the social fact of a subordinate 
relationship does not necessarily or immediately entail any political consequences. Instead, the 
move from subordination to a relation of oppression in which subordinates understand 
themselves and their superior(s) as antagonistic), and further to a relation of domination (in 
which the subordinates’ illegitimate oppression becomes , and therefore candidates for a project 
of shared emancipation) can only be produced by political analysis and action.203 Workers’ 
subordination to owners and managers, while often frustrating, stressful, or even personally 
hostile, does not become a relationship of political antagonism until workers engage in collective 
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character until workers connect the struggles associated with their productive role to particular 
sides in other contemporary struggles. As a particular subordinated role or identity becomes 
politically significant, the existence of political struggle also gives individual experiences new 
collective relevance. For example, the philosopher Miranda Fricker has pointed out that for a 
very long time, men engaged in harmful behaviors that the women who survived those behaviors 
did not have a vocabulary to describe. It was not until women who identified themselves as 
feminists connected these behaviors to each other as “sexual harassment” that they built the 
“hermeneutical resources” to build awareness of, and demand accountability for, sexual 
harassment.204  
With this process of political production, in which collective identification and struggle 
creates the conditions for further organizing, it’s worth returning to Berinsky’s respondents, 
attempting to address cognitively complex subjects. People whose perspectives are ideologically 
and socially marginal face a whole series of obstacles in making their experiences politically 
relevant. In Berinsky’s welfare example, for defenders of social welfare policies to resolve the 
contradiction between democratic and capitalist values, they have first to clearly identify 
capitalism as opposing people’s material welfare, then to integrate material wellbeing into a 
broader sense of “democratic values”. Only then is it possible to explicitly reject capitalism in 
favor of materially egalitarian democratic values, or even to argue for limiting and restricting 
capitalist economic relations in favor of social democratic redistribution. Skipping some of these 
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by relying on affective appeals about the material suffering that social welfare policies alleviate. 
Such appeals, however, succeed by mobilizing a sense of solidarity among those audience 
members who benefit from such policies and those who do not. It should not be surprising, then, 
that the rhetoric of anti-welfare politicians so often aims at disrupting this sense of solidarity.  
Right-Wing Populism’s Anchoring Point 
When right-wing politicians racialize social welfare programs and employ dogwhistles 
about whether welfare recipients deserve social support, one element of this rhetorical strategy 
should be clear from the previous section: it disrupts social democratic rhetoric premised on the 
shared dignity of all citizens. If politicians can persuade voters that income redistribution moves 
wealth from the deserving to the undeserving – an appeal which nearly always mobilizes racist 
attitudes – some number of voters who will eventually suffer from cuts to social welfare 
programs, but imagine themselves as deserving, may support these politicians where they 
otherwise would not. Tali Mendelberg and Ian Haney López have produced particularly 
extensive and generative accounts of how racist appeals shape contemporary politics in the 
United States, focusing on the effectiveness of relatively implicit (“dogwhistled”) appeals, which 
mobilize racist attitudes without explicitly referring to race.205 Here, I want to focus on what the 
success of racist dogwhistles tells us about the audience for such appeals and, by extension, 
about the strategic terrain in the United States that enables right-wing populism. First, I draw on 
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dogwhistles: instead of a new response to a norm of “racial liberalism” in the late 20th century, 
which sought to appeal to racist attitudes while protecting speakers from association with the 
worst abuses of the Jim Crow South, dogwhistles are a historically consistent fallback position in 
moments where anti-racist politics gain a foothold in nationwide electoral politics. Second, I 
argue that such appeals go beyond persuading some economically disadvantaged white voters to 
support electoral candidates with regressive or reactionary economic policies. These appeals also 
maintain and exacerbate social and economic hierarchy by developing a politics of grievance 
among white voters with racist attitudes, regardless of those voters’ economic position or 
preferences, and thereby building support for increasingly open racism as a political organizing 
tactic. Taken together, these appeals draw on and maintain a racialized conception of the 
“American people” who are sovereign in the United States, offering a consistent resource for 
right-wing populist strategies that is not similarly available to populist projects on the left.  
As a starting point, consider how little creativity is involved in the racist appeals that are 
now typical of far-right politicians’ rhetoric. As Mendelberg has documented, the tropes 
involved in dogwhistling about criminality, animalistic brutality, economic deservingness, and 
miscegenation all date at least as far back as the mid-19th century, as the plantation aristocracy 
and its white supremacist allies sought to defend racial inequality in a world where slavery 
would not last.206 By itself, this fact should not surprise anybody. People develop discursive 
resources in response to political conflict; we might expect the rise of rhetoric defending slavery 
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target existing beliefs and attitudes in an audience to persuade those audience members to join in 
solidarity with some project of movement, we can expect racist appeals in the present and recent 
past to mobilize similar concepts and assumptions to ones in the more distant past.  
The rise of explicit racist appeals using these vocabularies and tropes, however, did not 
win racial conservatives much more immediate success during the 1860s than such appeals did in 
the 1960s. Instead, white supremacists succeeded in capturing sufficient electoral support to 
eventually establish legal segregation and the political and civil disenfranchisement of Black 
citizens through what Mendelberg calls “precursors to implicitly racial rhetoric”.207 “As part of 
the effort to appease Republican elites”, Mendelberg points out, “white southerners emphasized 
less the negative qualities of blacks and the imperatives of white supremacy, and began to talk 
more of the virtues of laissez-faire government.”208 This new turn to fiscal policy, much like 
comparable tax protests of the 1970s and early 1980s, targeted funding for education, 
accompanied efforts to criminalize Black people and exploit their labor in the prison system, and 
won support from the right wing of the progressive party (at the time, centrist “Liberal 
Republicans” attempting to restrain their Radical counterparts). Having re-established white 
supremacist policies as part of the hegemonic order, both Democrats and Republicans eventually 
converged on “perhaps the strongest norm of racial inequality ever present throughout the United 
States” and, from 1880 to 1930, race disappeared from national political contestation except as a 
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In both the 19th and 20th centuries, then, conservative and reactionary uses of racist 
dogwhistles responded to movements that attempted to establish freedom and equality for Black 
and brown citizens, using a method that allowed politicians to avoid being dragged down with 
the defeated and nationally unpopular causes of secession and legally enforced segregation. To 
the extent that de jure racial equality constituted a norm of U.S. politics, racist dogwhistles 
circumvented that norm while building political resources for overturning it in connection with 
new conceptions of freedom. In the 19th century, the “freedom of contract” under which 
individual workers had no collective legal standing secured employers’ bargaining position. In 
the 20th, what Haney López has called the “freedom to exclude” contributed to attacks on higher 
education, opposition to integrated schools, lawsuits against affirmative action, and widespread 
tax revolts; in each of these struggles, right-wing politicians connected racial resentment and the 
defense of white supremacy to the neoliberal defense of so-called economic freedom.210  
Understood in these terms, racist rhetorical appeals, dogwhistled and otherwise, respond 
to existing racial resentment and material conditions. Speakers who recognize that some 
members of the electorate have already developed racial resentment, a material attachment to 
white supremacy, or both, appeal to these voters’ prejudices and attempt to turn this connection 
into support for some shared project. These appeals, especially as they become more overt, alter 
the space of what Berinsky calls elite discourse to make latent, otherwise unexpressed racism 
more permissible in the public space. This process occurred in the United States between 1990 
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support that naming racist appeals (in her terminology, making “implicit” appeals “explicit”) 
drove down support for candidates associated with such appeals. More recently, however, this 
finding no longer holds; instead, while racist appeals are more recognizable to many people, the 
overall rejection of such appeals is considerably lower.211 The Warnock campaign’s choice to 
accommodate white audience members’ troubling attitudes instead of confronting the Loeffler 
campaign’s racist rhetorical strategy likely reflects an awareness of these unfavorable political 
conditions.  
Recall that Berinsky’s socially difficult polling questions – those that ask respondents to 
express an opinion that the respondents expect to be dangerously unpopular – depend not on the 
actual danger of expressing such an opinion, but on the respondents’ subjective perceptions of 
risk. Racist dogwhistles benefit at multiple levels from the perception that expressing racist 
opinions carries a social cost. In the short term, they activate electoral support that polls often 
undermeasure, improving the odds for right-wing candidates. In the medium term, when racist 
appeals provoke justified condemnation, this condemnation serves to reinforce a sense within the 
audience that there are social costs to expressing racial resentment in public – perhaps not very 
serious costs for billionaire political candidates, but enough to worry most people. Not only does 
racist political communication directly encourage racist attitudes among some white audience 
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audience members (whether materially well-off or otherwise) perceive themselves as excluded, 
deprived, and justified in joining reactionary political projects.212 Racist rhetorical appeals 
therefore not only provide models of racism in elite discourse for people who fear the social 
costs of expressing similar views, but offer these audience members the role of a reserve force 
for reactionary politics. 
While the choice to deploy such appeals for personal gain is reprehensible, such appeals 
depend for their success on widespread attitudes within the audience and on material conditions 
that make scarcity and “deservingness” emotionally resonant for many audience members. 
Individual speakers who rely on such appeals are replaceable. In the broader political context, 
such speakers depend on broader social infrastructure – everything from political staff, to media 
networks, to relationships with other prominent commentators and individuals – to achieve mere 
relevance, let alone substantial influence. Focusing attention on speakers who appeal to an 
audience’s most troubling characteristics, then, risks leaving untouched those broader 
characteristics as a resource for further reactionary projects, or even exacerbating them as some 
audience members are left to adopt increasingly extreme perspectives. Moreover, as long as a 
widespread attachment to racial and economic hierarchy persists in the common sense of U.S. 
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populist appeals from the Right and disfavors those from the Left. The task of forming a 
counterhegemonic formation, on which the excluded and disempowered people will reclaim 
power in a way that emancipates rather than cementing existing hierarchies, therefore 
analytically and practically precedes short-term political efforts toward specific changes. 
4. Counter-Hegemonic Rhetoric 
In the final section, then, I turn to Gramsci’s thought for resources on the methods and strategies 
appropriate to counter-hegemonic rhetoric. First, I draw on Gramsci’s anti-elitist sense of 
persuasion – both in terms of how persuasion happens, and in terms of who is capable of 
persuading and organizing others – to describe the work of rhetoric that provides a framework 
for medium- and long-term movement building. In the context of movement politics, persuasion 
must be dispersed through many different organizers and members. All of these individuals 
require a clear sense of why they are putting time and effort into collective struggle, as well as 
the skills and resources for persuading possible recruits and new activists to join in the effort. In 
this context, the movement’s rhetorical efforts are channeled through a collective speaker – all of 
the many people who attempt to persuade on the movement’s behalf – and Gramsci offers a 
range of resources for understanding rhetoric of this kind. Second, I read the concept of the war 
of position in terms of a contest over rhetorical terrain. That is, under conditions of hegemony, 
the present articulation of certain identities, interests, and concerns creates a defense in depth 
against emancipatory struggles, so that for example “the white working class” signifies an 
element of the electorate whose economic precarity is a resource for reaction and racist rhetorical 
appeals rather than for broad anticapitalist struggles. The war of position, then, signifies 
struggles to redefine the frontiers of political contestation in ways that outflank the hegemonic 
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articulation and enable counterhegemonic efforts to win sufficient support to achieve political 
and social victories.  
Organic Intellectuals and an Anti-Elitist Theory of Rhetoric 
Based on the previous sections, emancipatory uses of rhetoric require an anti-elitist 
conception of rhetoric for practical reasons as well as ideological ones. Politicians generally lag 
behind activists and organizers in articulating counter-hegemonic politics and, left to themselves, 
will typically accept or extend hegemonic conditions in order to garner short-term electoral 
support. It follows that persuasion outside of the realm of elite discourse is central to counter-
hegemonic projects, because such persuasion empowers people both to resist elite appeals and to 
see the possibility of winning material and social goods in collective struggles. Gramsci offers 
several routes toward thinking about rhetoric in this way. Smith’s reading of Gramsci, against 
Lenin and especially Kautsky, has emphasized the first of these routes: Gramsci’s capacious 
treatment of the categories of “philosophy” and “intellectuals” portrays movement building as 
more egalitarian and democratic than a common scheme of “a theoretically enlightened elite 
bringing a deluded mass to its ‘authentic’ consciousness in a top-down manner”.213 Gramsci’s 
arguments that all labor includes at least some level of intellectual labor and that everyone is in 
principle capable of performing the social role of “intellectual” productively muddled the 
categories of “intellectual” and “worker”, suggesting that everyone involved in a mass party 
must do labor in both categories. Similarly, his insistence that a criticism of the common sense 




213 Smith, The Radical Democratic Imaginary, 49.  
 163 
intellectuals’ self-generated insights while potentially grounding a much more sweeping critique 
of “philosophy” in an academic or formal intellectual sense. Each of these moves democratizes 
the tasks of studying the political situation and planning an effective response to it.  
A democratized approach to a movement’s ideology requires a similarly egalitarian 
conception of the audience’s capacity for evaluating the movement’s appeals. Gramsci’s 
treatment of persuasion emphasized audience members’ capacity for “chewing over” orators’ 
statements, recognizing “the deficiencies and the superficiality” in those statements, and thereby 
seeing through attempts to trick or manipulate audience members.214 As a result, Gramsci 
attributed popular distrust of orators and “intellectuals” to incompetence in their presentation and 
style, rather than blaming the masses for mistaken or inaccurate consciousness. In contrast with 
the “very common error … of thinking that every social stratum elaborates its consciousness and 
its culture in the same way, with the same methods, namely the methods of the professional 
intellectuals”, he maintained that audiences of ordinary workers were capable of working their 
way to desirable political positions without relying on overly technical concepts or 
vocabularies.215 This required a complex journalistic strategy that would provide multiple points 
of entry to leftist theory and practice, each suitable for people from different backgrounds to 
think through their own experiences and living conditions. Gramsci’s approach parallels the 
maxim adopted by today’s organizers to “meet people where they’re at” and avoid alienating 
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of an audience-centered approach to persuasion point to the care needed in articulating a political 
vision that appeals to people, and because of that, to the possibility of democratic popular 
movements without a need for an elitist conception of political struggle.  
As I suggested above, thinking about rhetoric in the context of mass popular movements 
also requires a change in how we think about speakers. Thus far, I have generally discussed 
speakers as individuals who are personally responsible for planning, crafting, and delivering 
persuasive appeals, while noting a few areas (such as the contemporary electoral campaign) in 
which this conception breaks down. Classical theorists of rhetoric often focused on such 
speakers, although even in the ancient world, paid speechwriters frequently assisted litigants in 
Athens and elsewhere. Most early modern theorists of rhetoric also focused on individual 
speakers. Even today, it is not uncommon to evaluate political speech as if it were prepared by 
the candidates and organizers who deliver it. But Gramsci’s treatment of superficiality among 
contemporary orators makes a broader point about what it means to craft up-to-date, relevant 
appeals in his time and since. For Gramsci, orators embrace “apparently brilliant” but superficial 
appeals because they are in the habit of speaking quickly and extemporaneously and lack the 
time to carefully and strategically engage any one audience.216 Newspapers respond to a similar 
logistical problem: “articles are usually written in a hurry, improvised, and are almost always 
like speeches made at public meetings because of the rapidity with which they are conceived and 
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pressures that speakers face more than the innate shallowness or ignorance of the audience. 
Many political actors find it difficult to assemble the time and care required to craft appeals that 
persuade in the short and the long term, and these resources are more available to collective 
actors than to individuals. As a result, Gramsci’s engagement with the problem of how to 
effectively create thoughtful, persuasive communication that supports the work of organizing 
mass political movements represents an important turning point in thinking about rhetoric as a 
collective rather than an individual practice. Improved political organization, incorporating a 
wide range of feedback from organizers, members, and researchers, provides more extensive 
resources for thoughtful and persuasive communication in proportion to the insights offered by a 
democratic and egalitarian set of organizing practices.  
Controlling Rhetorical Terrain 
In Chapter 1, I argued that Aristotle’s concept of “available means of persuasion” 
grounded an audience-based theory of rhetoric. Aristotle’s theory, in which a regime could 
reliably produce subjects with a similar conception of goods, loyalties, and values, and therefore 
a fairly consistent audience for certain types of rhetorical appeals, imperfectly describes 
contemporary societies in which conceptions of goods, loyalties, and values are irreducibly 
plural. Nonetheless, hegemony plays a similar role to regime once we recognize the pluralized 
and overdetermined conditions of contemporary politics. Where regimes in Aristotle’s theory 
produced subjects in a relatively self-contained way, hegemony produces a tendentious common 
sense in which most people’s political awareness clusters around the values and interests 
connected in the present hegemonic articulation. The problem of crafting rhetorical appeals that 
undermine the present hegemonic articulation, and finding appropriate speakers to deliver those 
appeals in a way that will gain support for counter-hegemonic struggle, has loomed over this 
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chapter. Here, I turn to Gramsci’s metaphor of the war of position as a way to both diagnose the 
present political conditions and prescribe strategies for altering those conditions.  
Gramsci used the metaphor to describe the need to overcome multiple lines of defense – 
the institutions of “civil society” – protecting the state from an attempt to exploit a crisis to 
rapidly seize state power (i.e. a “war of maneuver”, in which a breach in the enemy lines can be 
exploited and converted into a strategic victory). In Anglo-American readings of Gramsci since 
Perry Anderson, the metaphor is often taken to communicate (if not perfectly clearly) conditions 
peculiar to the Western European context. Rather than needing to seize and redirect coercive 
apparatuses, movements needed to solicit and redirect popular consent in a long-term, attritional, 
and almost certainly electoral struggle.218 This reading often implies that the electoral strategies 
pursued by “Eurocommunist” parties, if not successful, at least had the best chance of success 
through neutralizing some of the institutions that blocked a forcible seizure of power.219 These 
readings, however, capture only part of the war of position’s implications. They emphasize the 
way the metaphor shifts political struggles temporally, by drawing out the process of slowly 
accumulating popular support, but leave out a spatial change: the move from tightly targeted 
conflict focused on a centralized state to a dispersed conflict over “the elements of trench and 
fortress represented by the elements of civil society, etc.”220 Laclau’s comment that the “‘war of 
position’, is, strictly speaking, a logic of displacement of political frontiers” aptly describes this 




218 Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci”, New Left Review 1, no. 100, 5-78. 
219 Daniel Egan, The Dialect of Position and Maneuver: Understanding Gramsci’s Military Metaphor (Boston: 
Brill, 2016), 8-9. 
220 Gramsci, “War of Position and War of Manoeuvre or Frontal War”, Gramsci Reader, 229.  
 167 
position define which side in some political struggle gets to define the terms on which the 
struggle takes place.221 The question of who gets to mobilize certain kinds of rhetorical resources 
equates, in the metaphor of the war of position, to the occupation of favorable terrain.  
The consequences of the neoliberal articulation nicely illustrate the concept of favorable 
and unfavorable rhetorical terrain. At this time, due to the neoliberal articulation, most people 
understand freedom and inequality to be connected in some way: to be free means, in large part, 
the freedom to have more than other people do.222 It follows that when left-liberal movements or 
candidates reassert a commitment to equality as such, they reinforce an existing narrative about 
the limitations of their position. Understood through the metaphor of a war of position, this 
appeal resembles delivering massive reinforcements to an isolated strongpoint, long since 
bypassed, and useless for staging a counterattack. It persuades nobody and motivates few; 
anybody who values political and social equality is already on the left. Those who think they 
would rather be free than equal are, if anything, persuaded negatively – they realize that the 
speaker is not speaking to them – while the prevailing hegemonic articulation does its work 
uncontested. To challenge the neoliberal articulation, speakers would have to persuade audience 
members to adopt a substantive connection between freedom and equality, perhaps on the basis 
that most of us would benefit more from the freedom to receive health care without going 
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Such an appeal would work to re-articulate freedom with equality by directing audience 
members to the fact that the freedom to enjoy inequality is almost always reserved for people 
other than them.  
Where the neoliberal articulation offers the lesson not to let the opponent define one’s 
position, the example of so-called “identity politics” shows the importance of seizing resources 
from hostile forces rather than ceding those resources. While many leftists recognize the origin 
of identity politics among Black feminists who sought to use their lived experience as a guide to 
radical political interventions, many also recognize that a liberal individualist understanding of 
“diversity” has currently captured the language of identity in a way that excludes emancipatory 
practices. A fuller account of how and why the intuition that difference is divisive has spread 
will have to wait for the following chapter. In the meantime, we should consider whether it is 
strategically better to abandon the language of identity and to find a new way to talk about the 
lived experience of difference, or to confront this hegemonic formation and find a way to reclaim 
the language of identity for emancipatory purposes. To my mind, the range of identities that can 
coexist within the same lived experience, the ability of rhetorical appeals to reach very different 
identities, and the general sense that identity is a politically significant concept, all point to the 
conclusion that it would be unwise to abandon identity as a contested term. Instead, the point is 
to get at hegemony from the bottom up through transforming the common sense. And rhetoric – 
in this project’s sense of practices of producing solidarities within audiences – is central to any 
attempt to transform the common sense. 
Reading the war of position as a struggle over how to define the frontiers of political 
contestation also implies a shift in the sites of political struggle. In the previous pages, I have 
returned several times to the importance of experience and judgment in persuading people. 
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Organizers and communicators need a nuanced and accurate understanding of their audiences, 
not only to convince audience members to continue working toward common goals, but also to 
offer goals that their audience members can see as achievable and worth achieving. This kind of 
connection between organizers and the communities that they work in cannot fully develop in 
spaces defined by two- or four-year electoral cycles, especially if campaign staff turn over in 
every election and are only active for a few months at a time. (Since the staff of elected officials 
often serve much longer in that role, those rare elected officials who choose to support continued 
organizing efforts offer an especially valuable political resource.) It follows that even if electoral 
campaigns are instrumentally valuable in achieving emancipatory goals – and they often are – 
they make poor organizing spaces. Developing long-term connections between people and 
between their different concerns and struggles requires finding or creating spaces in which 
people spend time together – unions, churches, community organizations – and, in those spaces, 
advancing identification with counter-hegemonic projects. The moments in which rhetoric and 
action sharply alter “politics as usual” typically follow, and depend upon, much longer efforts to 
how build collective identity and will; if we want the former, we will need the latter.  
5. Conclusion 
The move from regime to hegemony – the move from a self-contained apparatus of 
political production and reproduction to an inherently contested and contestable system of claims 
and representations, in which people tend to understand themselves in certain ways that support a 
particular set of material and social relations – opens new possibilities, but not easy ones, for 
broad and deep political change. For those who want such change, I have argued that articulatory 
rhetoric – rhetoric that both challenges existing hegemonic conditions, and organizes audiences 
in a way that opens new modes of political production – offers a uniquely valuable way forward, 
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and offered some general principles about how to design and deploy such rhetoric. Change-
building, counter-hegemonic, articulatory rhetoric contributes most to building solidarities that 
can help people free themselves under specific ideological, organizational, and strategic 
conditions. Ideologically, articulatory rhetoric does best when it offers a framework that helps 
people name their existing frustrations and suffering, imagine a world that ends that suffering, 
and share these new realizations with others. Organizations that want to engage in a politics of 
articulation do best when they build strong connections in the communities they hope to act 
within and craft rhetoric collectively so as to bring a wide range of experience and knowledge to 
their persuasive efforts. Finally, rhetoric is at its most strategically effective when it 
simultaneously builds solidarity and undermines opposing alliances, by reinterpreting commonly 
valued concepts and identities in a way that makes them protected and advanced by one’s own 
organization and actively hindered by opponents.  
Moving beyond general principles, like the above, requires more developed engagement 
with context, organizational capacity, and political and social history. In the context of 
contemporary political struggles in the United States, the observations I’ve offered in this chapter 
raise the question of how to build solidarity across identities that we have been taught to 
experience as fundamentally different and divided. The first step in answering this question is to 
examine the intuition that difference is divisive – that demands to end the oppression of some 
group of people can only be satisfied at the expense of others, and indeed of aggregate social 
wellbeing – and its origins. This, then, is the task of the following chapter. 
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 Escaping the Long Shadow of Madisonian Pluralism 
 
1. Introduction 
Contemporary conversations about the organization of democratic and egalitarian 
movements often take for granted the divisiveness of plural demands: either the abandonment of 
a class analysis threatens to irreparably rupture the possibility of mass movements, or the 
difficult task of connecting disparate demands and movements becomes obligatory because of 
the erasure of plural demands committed by class-reductionist projects. At the same time, many 
democratic theorists contend that political and social plurality are central to the expansion of 
democratic values and practices. In this chapter, however, I argue that the widely-felt connection 
between plurality and divisiveness is neither natural nor inevitable, but the product of what I call 
Madisonian pluralism: the rhetorical use of social plurality to divide populist movements against 
each other, thus protecting social and political hierarchy and the propertied few while appearing 
to protect minority groups generally. This strategy, in the thought of James Madison and since, 
has tended to constitute the individual as an anti-populist subject who would resist any stable 
identification with any broader entity other than the state. Understanding the nature and origins 
of this approach to pluralism should offer optimism for those of us who hope to build shared 
struggles around a unifying political analysis, while illuminating a history of theories of political 
and social plurality in which these theories often reinforce hierarchy and oppression instead of 
destabilizing them. Instead of understanding plurality as naturally connected to emancipation, we 
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must actively cultivate plurality as a constitutive element of democratic struggle.  
I begin the chapter by drawing on primary sources and recent scholarship on the 
American founding to describe the dominant political sociology of the early United States: a 
fundamental tension between the wealthy few and the laboring many, mediated either through 
virtue and social deference in small republics, state enforcement of liberal individual rights, or 
the expansion of democratic popular sovereignty, depending on different political actors’ other 
commitments. With few exceptions, both Federalist and Antifederalist writers during the debates 
over ratification of the 1787 constitution adopted this binary political sociology; James 
Madison’s early writings against economic leveling reflected it, and his most developed 
treatment of the mischiefs of faction prior to the Federalist, in an October 1787 letter to Thomas 
Jefferson, differentiated “natural” and “artificial” sources of faction – respectively, economic 
differences and religious and philosophical disagreements – and gave intellectual and political 
priority to the former.  
Madison’s turn in Federalist 10 to religion as a consistent, parallel source of faction, and 
to opinion rather than opposing interests as the true origin of faction, therefore ought to provoke 
more curiosity than it has done. This shift in Madison’s thought responded to unexpectedly 
virulent Antifederalist attacks on the proposed constitution as a conspiratorial effort to empower 
the moneyed few at the expense of everyone else, weaponizing the binary sociology in a way 
that made Madison’s previous approach politically inexpedient.  Federalist 10 contains three 
novel rhetorical moves, all of which reframe debates over whether the proposed constitution 
would empower the privileged few over everyone else to a question of whether the constitution 
would protect the rights of individuals and of numerical minorities. First, Madison used the new 
source of faction – differences of opinion, whether religious, philosophical, or otherwise – to 
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connect the concrete minority of wealthy property owners to the very concept of a minority, so 
that any reader who could understand themselves as part of any minority could see in their own 
political worries the dangers looming over the propertied few. Second, throughout Madison’s 
contributions as Publius, he deployed the state as the only entity capable of arbitrating between 
factions, while making the personal or public virtue of elected officials irrelevant. Third, by 
conjuring a web of “various and interfering interests” creating factional identities in constant 
tension, Madison weaponized social plurality against populist impulses. Since anyone feels a 
number of compelling interests, Madison’s rhetoric pushed readers to imagine themselves as 
one-person factions, cross-cut with competing identities and interests and resistant to rhetoric 
calling them to join broader social movements. As a result, Madison protected the rights of 
property, with which he was most immediately concerned, by constructing a novel frame in 
which the rights of the wealthiest individuals came as a package deal with the individual rights of 
everyone else. 
Despite its anti-egalitarian origins and oppressive effects, Madisonian pluralism still 
looms over contemporary democratic theory in the United States, whether agonist or deliberative 
in its theoretical orientations. Some of its contemporary influence owes to Madison’s revival, in 
the second half of the 20th century, by political scientists who took the rhetorical construct of a 
value-neutral minority group to be a political fact suitable as a jumping-off point for studying 
 174 
democracy.223 Invocations of interest pluralism and independent attempts to summon Madison as 
a resource for democratic projects both expose the limitations of Madison’s ideas when applied 
to contemporary democratic theory. More broadly, Madisonian pluralism contributes to the 
uneven rhetorical terrain discussed in the previous chapter by representing movement building as 
an inherently divisive process, and thereby collapsing agonistic rhetoric oriented toward building 
liberatory movements and antagonistic rhetoric oriented toward reinforcing (or achieving) social 
dominance. While I discuss the role of rhetoric in overcoming Madisonian pluralism more fully 
in the following chapter, I conclude by identifying some promising recent attempts to 
rhetorically connect identities that it otherwise divides. 
2. The Few and the Many in the Early Republic 
Scholars have recently taken an interest in democratic voices during the American 
founding, including among Antifederalists.224 Such voices typically phrased their demands in 
terms of the rightful rule of the many in a republican society. A compelling, if late, example is 
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“Few”, those who could live off of the proceeds of others’ labor, on behalf of the “Many” who 
labored to sustain both themselves and the few.225 Manning’s insistence on universal manhood 
suffrage, free public schooling for all children, and even the broader attempt to connect farmers 
and urban wage laborers, all resembled the democratic movements of following decades more 
than they resembled even most radicals of the late 18th century. Manning’s political sociology, on 
the other hand, was far from unique. Here’s Alexander Hamilton, relayed through Madison’s 
notes of the Constitutional Convention:  
“In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the 
few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & creditors &c. Give 
all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the 
many. Both therefore ought to have power, that each may defend itself agst. the other. To the 
want of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws &c.”226 
Here, as with many thinkers affiliated with the “Few”, Hamilton assumed that the social 
power of wealth is meaningless without the protections of political institutions, and that the 
wealthy faced imminent threats without an energetic national government to protect their rights. 
The basic social model resembles Manning’s: a perpetual tension between haves and have-nots, 
in a society that treated political contestation as a fundamental right of citizens, requiring further 
institutional protections for one’s preferred faction. Nearly all Antifederalist authors, and most 




225 Manning, The Key of Liberty: The Life and Democratic Writings of William Manning, “a laborer”, 1747-1814, 
Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
226 Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 4, January 1787 – May 1788 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1962), 187-195. National Archives/Founders Online. 
 176 
Antifederalisms and the Binary Sociology 
The binary Few/Many sociology defined the rhetorical terrain that nearly all 
Antifederalist writers sought to seize in their opposition to the proposed constitution. This 
sociology stretched across the divisions between Antifederalists, whether we adopt Saul 
Cornell’s typology of “elite” and “popular” Antifederalists with the latter subdivided into 
“middling” and “plebeian” elements, David Siemers’ adaptation in which the most hostile 
plebeian writers became “virulent”, or Michael Faber’s move from class backgrounds to 
ideological vocabulary, in which “Rights Anti-Federalists”, “Power Anti-Federalists”, and 
“Democratic Antifederalists” adopted different intellectual foundations for their political 
appeals.227 Antifederalist elitists like Arthur Lee, Richard Henry Lee, and Mercy Otis Warren 
argued that the small, allegedly weak House of Representatives would throw off the balance of 
democracy and aristocracy, creating a recipe for oppression and conflict.228 Smaller republics, at 
or even subdivided below the state level, could preserve both the superiority of the so-called 
“natural aristocracy” and the proper deference of the many, who would recognize the natural 
aristocrats of their own communities. Substantial electoral representation for the masses, in the 
form of a much larger House of Representatives or state legislatures that retained a level of 
power closer to that under the Confederation, would ensure that the social power of the natural 
aristocracy would be checked by the political power of the masses. Centinel, one of the most 
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patience for this balancing act. For Centinel, the proposed federal constitution was a reaction 
against democratic local and state governments, attempting to restore aristocratic privilege and 
concentrated wealth. Later in Centinel’s writings, he would point out that the new Massachusetts 
constitution reflected a similar process: the “men of property and rank”, afraid of losing their 
dominion over poor farmers and laborers, had seized upon Shays’ so-called rebellion to 
consolidate their own power.229  
Centinel used the binary sociology to create a particularly developed and radical 
perspective on the social antagonism between laboring masses and greedy aristocrats.230 His 
commitment to a single axis of social antagonism, however, proved entirely compatible with the 
recognition of a variety of specific modes of oppression. Centinel’s attacks on slavery, in which 
the proposed constitution protected “an odious traffic in the human species”, serve as a 
particularly compelling example.231 In Centinel’s radical democratic imaginary, the oppression of 
slaves functioned in parallel to the oppression of free workers. “Slavery”, he asserted with some 
foundation, “has its advocates among men in the highest stations”, and the protections of slavery 
and the three-fifths compromise owed to the great power of the very wealthy in southern states 
compared to the more democratic northern ones.232 The possibility of an overbearing national 
government with limited popular representation also threatened religious freedom far more than 




229 Centinel XV, in Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
197.  
230 Cf. Faber, “Democratic Anti-Federalism”; Cornell, The Other Founders, 99-105; Martin, Government by Dissent, 
63-68; Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 140-
141.  
231 Centinel III, in Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist, Vol. 2, 160.  
232 Centinel III, in Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist, Vol. 2, 160. 
 178 
the community, as must ensure them great weight in the government; but in the scale of general 
empire, they will be lost in the balance.”233 As a result, no significant expansion in the national 
government’s reach could coincide with popular self-rule; local and state governments could 
respond to the will of the local people far better than a tiny legislature located far away. In each 
of these cases, the few benefited from oppressing, and permitting the oppression of, many 
different sorts of people. Centinel hoped that popular mobilization would hold the few back.   
Contemporary theorists who see social plurality as naturally emancipatory might also be 
surprised by the Antifederalists’ most innovative theorist of economic diversity. The author who 
wrote under the name Federal Farmer adopted a concept of representation prioritizing diverse 
economic roles: “a fair representation”, Federal Farmer insisted, must “allow professional men, 
merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just proportion of their best informed men 
respectively into the legislature”.234 As Cornell has pointed out, this allowed Federal Farmer to 
democratize political virtue: we can find the quality of being best informed in the inhabitants of 
any of these economic roles, and honest advocacy takes precedence over perceiving a numinous 
public good.235 Pluralizing the “few” and the “many” into a range of economic orders, while 
retaining the dominant economic focus of Antifederalist sociology, allowed Federal Farmer to 
defend political equality without endorsing any sort of economic leveling. Indeed, Federal 
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are uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected”.236 This, however, remains possible in 
a political system that allows for equal representation for all, and Federal Farmer worried that the 
new Constitution would put that representation out of reach.  
While connecting economic diversity to political stability, Federal Farmer reacted with 
horror to the removal of religious tests and the supremacy of Congress over modes of 
congressional elections: “it can be no objection to the elected, that they are Christians, Pagans, 
Mahometans, or Jews; that they are of any colour, rich or poor, convict or not: Hence many men 
may be elected, who cannot be electors.”237 Combined with the possibilities of first-past-the-post 
elections or multi-member list elections, either of which might allow for unknown or 
untrustworthy candidates, Federal Farmer expected the new constitution to enable new and 
frightening social cleavages that would disrupt the balance of economic interests, likely to the 
advantage of the wealthy few. To avert these dangers, Federal Farmer concluded, the proposed 
constitution would require an amendment to establish “the qualifications of the electors and of 
elected”, a strict limit on the population of congressional districts, and a clause leaving all other 
regulations to the state legislatures, or at least establishing the supremacy of state legislatures in 
regulating the election of their own federal-level representatives.238 Such amendments would 
ensure that local electorates, guided by consistent racial and religious restrictions on eligibility, 
would select representatives that matched the economic interests prevalent in their small, 
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assured the stability of local herrenvolk republics, unlike Centinel’s radical democratic politics, 
which integrated commitments against slavery and for the protection of religious minorities into 
the more common binary sociology.  
Madison on the Few before Faction 
Scholars have often neglected James Madison’s writings between the “Memorial and 
Remonstrance” and the Federalist.239 Instead, most read Madison’s thought in the Federalist 
with his later published writings, in order to track the development of the ideas that he chose to 
share with the public, or in comparison with the thought of Alexander Hamilton, with whom he 
fell out precipitously in 1791. Two recent intellectual biographies of Madison have recognized 
the development of a concept of faction in Madison’s correspondence, his unpublished essay on 
the “Vices of the Political System of the United States”, and his convention speeches.240 Each of 
these, however, miss a crucial shift in Madison’s treatments of the problem of faction. Prior to 
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the binary Few/Many sociology of his contemporaries. Once he developed the mischiefs of 
faction as a diagnosis for the dangers of this social antagonism, his conception of faction 
remained fundamentally economic until his writings as Publius.  
Madison’s fears of the widespread adoption of paper currency and a potential agrarian 
law pervaded his correspondence before, and his remarks during, the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention. On these issues, he took a more aggressive and intellectually sophisticated approach 
than most of his peers. Gordon Wood has diagnosed early American elites’ fear of paper money 
in terms of a limited understanding of the new political economy: the possibility of a fluid 
currency system, determined by capital flows and calculated investment rather than the gentry’s 
“proprietary wealth and the social identity and influence that stemmed from that wealth”, 
threatened “the only social order they could conceive of”.241 Wood is not wrong to assess some 
of the gentry, particularly those conservative Antifederalists who feared that the new constitution 
would enable paper money and other leveling projects, in this way. But he underestimates the 
degree to which the younger Federalists – not only Hamilton, but also Madison and some of his 
Virginia colleagues and friends – were out in front of this trend.242 Madison’s entry, with James 
Monroe, into land speculation in New York demonstrates a sophisticated sense of political 
economy as early as the summer of 1786. Short of funds to expand their land purchase, the two 
agreed that Madison would ask Thomas Jefferson to secure a new loan from French banks. 
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affect the investment is worth quoting at some length:  
“For the prospect of gain … we calculate on the present difference of price between the 
settled and vacant land far beyond any possible difference in the real value. …there is little doubt 
that by taking a larger quantity, still better bargains may be got. This comparative cheapness 
proceeds from causes which are accidental & temporary. The lands in question are chiefly in the 
hands of men who hold large quantities, and who are either in debt or live in the city at an 
expence for which they have no other resources or are engaged in transactions that require 
money. The scarcity of specie which enters much into the cheapness is probably but temporary 
also. … The same vicicitude which can only be retarded by our short lived substitutes of paper 
will be attended also by such a fall in the rate of exchange that money drawn by bills from 
Europe now and repaid a few years hence will probably save one years interest at least…”243  
Here, Madison says that the land he and Monroe wish to buy is underpriced because the 
land is undeveloped (but will be developed soon), and the owners are cash-poor and likely to 
accept a low price. But he is also arguing that an overall constriction in the money supply has 
deflated land prices, that as the money supply readjusts and expands (partly due to possible 
expanded issues of paper currency), the resulting inflation will partly counteract interest rates, 
and therefore, that now is the time to engage in large-scale land speculation. This sophisticated 
analysis of the economic situation goes well beyond the reflexive revulsion at paper currency and 
debt relief that Wood ascribes to the propertied gentry of the new United States and suggests a 
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Madison’s land venture came with a commitment to protecting the legal and political 
connections of property owners. Earlier in the letter quoted above, he had warned Jefferson that 
aside from currency depreciation (inflation), paper currency was also “producing the same 
warfare & retaliation among the States as were produced by the State regulations of 
commerce”.244 A few months later, writing to James Monroe, Madison condemned  
“the current [maxim] that the interest of the majority is the political standard of right and 
wrong. Taking the word ‘interest’ as synonymous with ‘Ultimate happiness,’ in which sense it is 
qualified with every necessary moral ingredient, the proposition is no doubt true. But taking it in 
the popular sense, as referring to immediate augmentation of property and wealth, nothing can be 
more false. In the latter sense it would be the interest of the majority in every community to 
despoil & enslave the minority of individuals; and in a federal community to make a similar 
sacrifice of the minority of the component States.”245 
Here, Madison had a clear sense of the threat posed by the stable majority of the less 
wealthy to the minority of the wealthier. At this time, however, he presented this threat as equally 
applicable at the state and federal levels.246 An extended republic would provide no relief from 
oppressive majorities, at this point in Madison’s thought, and the possibility of principled moral 
deliberation remained as a possible restraint on majority oppression. His hopes for principled 
deliberation as a check to redistributive movements cratered, however, after George Washington 
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& private, and have Agrarian Laws, which are easily effected by the means of unfunded paper 
money which shall be a tender in all cases whatever.”247 Madison opposed these objectives – the 
“improper or wicked” projects named in Federalist 10’s penultimate paragraph – as strongly as 
Washington did, but with “every thing … not yet right in [Massachusetts]” as late as March 
1787, Madison’s only remaining hopes fell on the upcoming convention.248 Any new 
constitution, he hoped, would include the “federal negative” – the federal government’s ability to 
veto any act of a state government – so as to “restrain the States from thwarting and molesting 
each other, and even from oppressing the minority within themselves by paper money and other 
unrighteous measures which favor the interest of the majority.”249 Here, again, Madison 
discussed oppression in material terms that favored the propertied class. His solutions, however, 
included neither the extended republic nor a theory of social plurality. At this point, Madison’s 
only reason to expect the federal government to better protect the wealthy minority was that 
minority’s superior access to federal office. 
Faction in the Early Drafts of Federalist 10 
Madison began to conceptualize majoritarian oppression in terms of faction, and the 
remedy in terms of an extended republic as early as April 1787, when he prepared a document 
listing the “Vices of the Political System of the United States”. Early in the document, Madison 
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measures “may likewise be deemed aggressions on the rights of other States”, and therefore 
warrant federal intervention on that principle.250 Later on, however, under the heading of 
“Injustice of the laws of States”, Madison introduced factions for the first time by that name:  
“All civilized societies are divided into different interests and factions, as they happen to 
be creditors or debtors – Rich or poor – husbandmen, merchants, or manufacturers – members of 
different religious sects – followers of different political leaders – inhabitants of different 
districts – owners of different kinds of property &c &c.”251 
Four of the seven causes of faction, in this version, were strictly economic, and the only 
concrete example of oppression was Rhode Island’s policy of paper money. Religion, “the only 
remaining motive” to self-restraint beyond the inadequate restraints of enlightened collective 
interest and public opinion, was not to be trusted to cure faction. Nonetheless, Madison only 
referred to religion as a source of factional oppression in a strictly speculative manner: “it may 
become a motive to oppression as well as a restraint from injustice”.252 The extended republic 
appeared for the first time as Madison’s preferred solution to the mischiefs of faction, “because a 
common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be 
formed by a great than by a small number.”253 Unlike earlier commentaries, Madison now 
classified elections that could “most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the purest and 
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effective structural approach of extending the republic.254  
The same approach to faction appeared in a letter to Washington (April 16, 1787), as well 
as in Madison’s comments during the Convention.255 On June 6, defending the popular election 
of the first branch of Congress, Madison spoke to the evils of faction, mentioning religion once, 
in the same terms as in the “Vices”, and economic oppression repeatedly and concretely: 
“Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile 
interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the 
holders of another species.”256 The very next day, Madison repeated the same concern in 
supporting popular elections to the Senate, plus another warning on the evils of paper money.257 
Madison cited the same abuses as his reason for opposing the New Jersey Plan (June 19), 
accepting a term for senators as long as nine years (June 26), and opposing property in land as a 
qualification for officeholding (July 26, on the basis that small indebted farmers were more at 
fault for the “unjust laws of the States” than anyone else).258 Madison’s comments on a long term 
for senators, hopefully “a portion of enlightened citizens”, again rehearsed the standard list of 
economic distinctions (“In all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes … 




254 “Vices”, Papers of James Madison, Vol. 9, 357.  
255 Papers of James Madison, Vol. 9, 383-384. Mary Sarah Bilder has convincingly argued that Madison altered his 
convention notes after the fact, largely to make them a more credible record of the convention. However, these 
alterations do not appear to change the tone or substance of the quotations I have selected. See Bilder, Madison’s 
Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
256 “Popular Election of the First Branch of the Legislature, June 6 1787”, Papers of James Madison, Vol. 10, 33.  
257 “Election of the Senate, June 7 1787”, Papers of James Madison, Vol. 10, 39-40.  
258 “Reply to the New Jersey Plan, June 19 1787”, Papers of James Madison, Vol. 10, 58; “Term of Senate, June 26 
1787”, Papers of James Madison, Vol. 10, 76; “Qualifications for Holding National Office, July 26 1787), Papers of 
James Madison, Vol. 10, 117;  
 187 
of rich & poor.”), omitting religious and philosophical differences entirely. He warned that an 
“increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion” of wage laborers who, under 
“the equal laws of suffrage”, would gain power and increase the danger of “agrarian attempts” 
and similar enactments “of a leveling spirit”.259 Only the extended republic and counter-
majoritarian federal institutions would protect the rights of property owners.  
The same theme recurs in a lengthy letter that Madison wrote to Jefferson, defending not 
only the actual text of the proposed constitution but Madison’s failed proposal for the federal 
negative. Here, Madison distinguishes between “natural distinctions” – economic distinctions 
between rich and poor, subdivided by type of property and status as debtor or creditor – and 
“artificial ones”, including “differences in political, religious or other opinions, or an attachment 
to the persons of leading individuals”.260 Here, again, the only reference to religious oppression 
as such appears in Madison’s justification for the claim that “the inefficacy of [religious] restraint 
on individuals is well known.”261 Barely a month before Federalist 10, Madison’s treatment of 
faction remained economic in its foundations, with other sources of faction merely “artificial”. 
Indeed, his focus on the economic causes of political conflict had intensified, as he had now 
introduced the concept of “natural” and “artificial” social distinctions for the first time, assigning 
analytical and political priority to the former.  
3. Factions of One: The Rhetoric of Madison’s Anti-Populist Pluralism 
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criticisms of the proposed constitution probably reached Madison in time for the latter to 
consider them. Writing to George Washington from New York, Madison remarked that “The 
Newspapers here begin to teem with vehement & virulent calumniations of the proposed Govt. 
… chiefly borrowed from the Pensylvania [sic] papers” suggests that Madison was familiar not 
only with Mason’s comments, but probably with Centinel’s and Federal Farmer’s as well.262 An 
October 21st letter to Edmund Randolph probably references the writings of Brutus, first 
published only three days earlier, and Centinel and Federal Farmer had then been in the papers 
for nearly two weeks.263 Federal Farmer had argued that competing economic interests would 
stabilize small republics, while a national government would empower the wealthiest at others’ 
expense. Other Antifederalists’ “vehement and virulent calumniations” accused the convention 
delegates of plotting to secure oligarchic wealth and power. That Madison and Hamilton, like 
other delegates, had explicitly committed to securing the property rights of the wealthy made 
refuting this accusation no easier, but still more important. 
But how? As we have seen, Madison’s writings up to this point had all focused on exactly 
these property rights. He had just developed a concept of “natural” and “artificial” distinctions 
between persons in a society, with analytical and legal priority to the former. This approach 
would accomplish little when attempting to secure support from a broader public, instead of from 
one of Madison’s closest and most likeminded allies. Strategy and context therefore pushed 
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the first time. The sudden appearance of religion as a parallel source of faction, coupled with 
Madison’s repeated insistence on the durability and severity of economic disparity as a source of 
faction, grounded his first rhetorical move to justify the countermajoritarian institutions of the 
new constitution. Pairing religion with economic difference as durable sources of faction, and 
grounding each in innate differences of opinion and intellect, allowed Madison to fold the 
propertied minority he sought to defend into an endless array of minority interests, all equally 
subject to majority oppression and equally deserving of state protection. With the turn to religion 
offering a promising opportunity to divide Antifederalists and distort their positions, Madison 
then targeted Antifederalist elitists by emphasizing the state as the sole mediator of factional 
conflict and guarantor of minority rights, pushing back against both the politics of local virtue 
and against a trust in enlightened statesmen. Finally, Madison’s treatment of endless “various and 
interfering interests” used the innovative concept of social plurality to press readers to consider 
the conflicting interests in themselves, turning readers toward single-person factions: self-
interested individuals who would distrust rhetorics that constituted solidarities outside of the 
unified nation-state.  
Move #1: Religion, Opinion, and the Endless Proliferation of Minority 
For those of us who have read, re-read, and perhaps taught Federalist 10 for years, the 
repeated gestures to religion as a motive for factional oppression fit a familiar story about 
Madison’s political thought. The origins of faction lie in humans’ fallible reason, combined with 
the freedom to exercise it, resulting in differing opinions. Opinions and passions “have a 
reciprocal influence on each other”, and moreover, people also have material interests stemming 
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from the “diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate”.264 On 
this introduction, we would expect religious and philosophical differences to drive factional 
conflict with equal strength to class differences, and so we feel no surprise when, in the 
following paragraph, we find faction’s “latent causes … sown in the nature of man”, and the 
proximate causes beginning with the “zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning 
government, and many other points…”.265 We should, however, recognize how new this 
terminology was in Madison’s thought. Madison’s interest in religious factions originated during 
the exceedingly rapid production of Federalist 10.266 That Madison had less than a week to write 
Federalist 10, prepared an essay in which much of the argument repeated his earlier notes, and 
yet reorganized that essay to foreground and emphasize the novel religious faction, shows the 
new importance he assigned to pluralizing the sources of faction.  
Nor could Madison have simply recycled his first engagement with religious liberty.267 In 
the “Memorial and Remonstrance”, Madison suggested that factional strife among religious 
sects, far from a natural consequence of religion, originated in the impulse to mix religion and 
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and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced 
among its several sects.”268 Without the meddling of state power, religion would tend toward 
harmony, and having achieved it, would maintain it indefinitely. While the Madison of 1788 
might have used the language of faction to describe a coalition of religious leaders (mostly 
Episcopalians and Presbyterians), uniting to ensure that each of their sects received the favor of 
state funding, the Madison of 1785 appealed to the will of the majority, arguing that “the 
representation must be made equal, before the voice either of the Representatives or of the 
Counties will be that of the people. …Should [the former] disappoint us, it will still leave us in 
full confidence, that a fair appeal to the latter will reverse the sentence against our liberties.”269 
This Madison, happy to appeal to popular deliberation, has little in common with the author of 
Federalist 10 warning that neither collective deliberation – “a body of men, are unfit to be both 
judges and parties, at the same time” – nor “enlightened statesmen”, who “will not always be at 
the helm”, would protect from factious majorities.270  
While Madison’s immediate agenda and rhetorical methods in the Federalists differed 
greatly from the “Memorial and Remonstrance”, one of his opponents was the same: Patrick 
Henry, the driving force behind the “General Assessment” that would have established state 
funding for churches in 1785, also led the Antifederalist efforts in Virginia. Some Antifederalists 
did defend religious difference. We have already seen Centinel’s concern for Quakers and other 
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conscience” as among the natural rights that “are of such a nature that they cannot be 
surrendered”.271 But in addition to Henry’s preference for a state establishment of Christianity, 
we have also seen Federal Farmer’s bigotry which, when it appeared in early 1788, would 
illustrate the most exclusionary elements of Antifederalist thought.272  
The move to pluralize the causes of faction and, therefore, the motives for oppression, 
then, built on a characteristic Federalist tactic – portraying Antifederalists as partisans of 
economic leveling, possibly closet Shaysites – to paint Antifederalists as advocates of 
majoritarian tyranny generally.273 Where advocates of local government and state sovereignty 
valued responsiveness to the community’s needs, Madison made this responsiveness seem 
threatening. Bringing religion into the frame, along with occupation and other sources of 
economic competition, pushed readers to consider the ways that they might find themselves in 
the minority, subject to others’ power, rather than the ways that the proposed constitution would 
move power away from them. Moreover, some readers might recall the very real connections 
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Antifederalism and factional oppression opposed the Federalist project of protecting minority 
rights. In each of these cases, the rhythm of alternating between religion and other opinions, on 
the one hand, and the economic disputes that Madison explicitly privileged, on the other, both 
reassured audience members who most shared Madison’s economic agenda and pushed other 
readers to see themselves protected by the same institutions that protected the wealthy. Madison 
reclaimed the ground of individual rights for the Federalist project by assimilating the concerns 
of elite property holders, which everyone agreed the proposed constitution would protect, into 
new concerns which more readers could recognize as their own. 
Move #2: Institutions over Virtue 
Madison’s first move lumped the Antifederalists that Saul Cornell has described as 
“middling” – Federal Farmer, Brutus, and others who worried about national power’s effects on 
the middling sort of farmers and business owners – in with the “plebeian” radical democrats, 
then implied that all were partisans of majoritarian oppression. In his second, he targeted 
Antifederalist elitists by marginalizing the role of personal and public virtue in preserving liberty 
and prosperity.274 This allowed Madison to emphasize the relationship between individuals and 
the state at the cost of other forms of political identity.  
In a parallel to the way that Hobbes’ Pericles instructed individuals to eschew orators in 
favor of their own calculations of self-interest, Madison, as Publius, consistently emphasized the 
fallibility and unreliability of enlightened political leadership. Indeed, such leadership recedes 
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10, “enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm”.275 We might think they sometimes 
will be, but references in the rest of the essay focus heavily on the negative: “men of factious 
tempers”, “unworthy candidates”, “factious leaders” all haunt popular government.276 In 
Federalist 37, Madison suggested that nobody was really up to the task of crafting a durable 
constitution, and that if the proposed constitution proved worthy, its success reflected divine 
intervention.277 And in Federalist 51, Madison conjured a decidedly Hobbesian state of nature to 
describe, in decidedly un-Hobbesian fashion, the reality of any society in which political leaders’ 
authority remains unchecked: “In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can 
readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, 
where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger…”278 In this 
sketch of human nature, grimmer and less forgiving than that of Federalist 10, the idea of 
enlightened or benevolent rulers appears nowhere in the essay. Instead, the only check on elected 
representatives’ selfishness and ambition depends on the countervailing ambitions of their rivals.  
With political minorities defined in numerical terms rather than by their substantive 
interests, wealth, or power, and with enlightenment or public-mindedness marginalized in favor 
of constrained self-interest among politicians, Madison did much to defend the proposed 
constitution from Antifederalist charges. He presented a government that would protect all 
groups that might otherwise find themselves unable to protect themselves at the state and local 
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aristocratic cabal not by appealing to the wisdom of the virtuous framers, but by arguing that the 
new government would prove more robust to the machinations of any such cabal. But these were 
not the last, nor the most lasting, of Madison’s rhetorical moves in the Federalist.  
Move #3: Social Plurality and the Single-Person Faction 
By insisting both that even “the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions” suffice to ignite 
factional conflict and that, instead of naturally aligning, factional identities stem from “various 
and interfering interests”, Madison made the most important theoretical contribution of 
Federalist 10.279 If Madison had limited his rhetorical strategy to introducing religion as a source 
of political conflict, orthogonal to the “unequal distribution of property”, the second dimension 
might have split the Antifederalists, but might not have contributed much to long-term political 
stability. If he had stopped at defending institutional checks on overambitious politicians, the 
possibility of a durable majority or a coalition between angry disempowered minority groups 
remained. Instead, Federalist 10 presents social plurality as a barrier to mass mobilization and 
points to a new reality of hegemonic politics in which political power depends largely on 
soliciting consent from the governed. 
By relegating the source of faction to the ephemeral realm of opinion and treating 
interests as fundamentally changeable and contingent, Madison introduced a novel variety to 
factional politics. Instead of two factions contesting economic resources, or as many as four 
defined by their positions on economic distribution and religious freedom, the possible factions 
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slavery or westward expansion than conflict over the precise distribution of the settler republic’s 
acquisitions? Interests are the product of opinion formation, which could take many different 
forms. As a result, Madison’s treatment of plurality refigured the economic diversity that 
“middling Antifederalists” like Federal Farmer had seen as a source of stability: so many roles 
and opinions cut across the various economic orders that, instead of providing a source for 
politics-as-usual, these differing orders exploded the possibilities of factional contestation. 
Individuals who follow Madison’s rhetorical lead recognize that any faction that might represent 
one identity they hold dear would compromise others. With this recognition comes a distrust, not 
only of factional politics, but of invitations to join in such projects.  
Madison’s repeated references to the rule of the majority, as well as the fundamental 
difference between his “safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection” and Hamilton’s, 
point to the centrality of hegemonic politics. Hamilton’s Federalist 9 centered on a highly 
creative reading of Montesquieu in which a “confederate republic” – strangely interpreted to 
describe the new national government – has a greater capacity for coercive force against 
insurrections of the sort that (Hamilton and Madison agreed) had taken place in western 
Massachusetts; Madison’s Federalist 10 not only addressed the possibility of peacefully 
preventing such insurrections, but actively attempted to constitute subjects who would consent to 
the new order. A few years later, Hamilton would provoke, then urge Washington to crush, 
another populist “regulation” in rural Pennsylvania; here, Madison was trying to stop fights 
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before they got going.280  
Madison’s rhetorical strategy, and its implications for the relationship between public 
opinion, consent, and government, would become especially clear as his immediate political 
agenda suddenly reversed. In 1791, as Madison became the leader of the Jeffersonian faction in 
Congress, in open opposition to Alexander Hamilton and Hamilton’s allies in the executive 
branch, his tune in the National Gazette changed from extending the sphere of government to 
theorizing that the circulation of opinion is “equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits, and is 
favorable to liberty, where these may be too extensive.”281 In other words, now that the wrong 
faction – finance capital and Northern speculators, instead of the planter aristocracy, now that 
these interests had diverged – was benefiting from federal power, Madison was more interested 
in coordinating opposition to the executive branch than in breaking up majoritarian movements. 
Madison’s commitment to the tactic of rhetorically altering public opinion nonetheless remained 
firm. Indeed, his confidence in this tactic became grounds for opposing any new federal control 
over political expression:  
“As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the government; so there 
are cases, where not being fixed, it may be influenced by the government. This distinction, if 
kept in view, would prevent or decide many debates on the respect due from the government to 
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In other words, if Hamilton and others wanted to manufacture consent for their policies, 
they needed to put in the work, as Madison had done back when he and Hamilton were political 
allies. More generally, Madison claimed that the capacity of rulers both to fragment opposition to 
and to build support for their policies was sufficient that any durable opposition to those policies 
evidenced a serious and unjustifiable mistake of political judgment. Absent such a gross error, 
however, the web of various and interfering interests would attach to individuals even more 
thoroughly than to groups. Where a particular group can exist to mobilize around a specific 
interest, and limit itself to that purpose, people experience cross-cutting concerns whether they 
would like to or not. And the Madisonian logic has proliferated in ways that Madison almost 
certainly never considered. The interests and identities that are politically relevant in the United 
States have expanded with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Nineteenth, and 
the Twenty-Sixth, and the laws that gave those amendments political force, and with every social 
movement that brings to political presence an aspect of humanity that had been subordinated or 
excluded. With this expansion of the people who count as politically relevant, and of the issues 
that matter to those people, the range of possible divisions among any given movement has 
similarly expanded. To the extent that we are shaped by Madison’s political logic, then, the 
possibility of uniting around a set of demands becomes ever more elusive. Instead, the state 
becomes the guarantor of the unique set of various and interfering interests in any one person’s 
lived experience, while the logic of Madisonian pluralism erodes and neutralizes other forms of 
collective identity and effort.  
4. The Democratic Problem of Madison’s Pluralism 
Madison’s legacy, a rhetoric that obscures wealth and power as targets of political dissent 
and divides movements that seek to change how wealth and power are distributed, continues to 
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loom over democratic theory and practice. As such, “Madisonian pluralism” depends for much of 
its present force on its reception among scholars, from the 1950s onward, who read Madison’s 
rhetorical moves as straightforward expressions of his political thought and treated that reading 
as a jumping-off point for a pluralist approach to democratic theory. These scholars – the most 
notable was Robert Dahl, with Martin Diamond also influential for some political theorists – 
reacted against portrayals of the United States’ constitution as a reactionary or “Thermidorian” 
text, arguing that Madison instead genuinely sought to prevent tyranny and that the new system 
impartially protected minority groups.283 Minority factions grow organically from people’s 
interests and compete within relatively benign bounds to advance those interests; as a result, 
provided that institutions prevent the dominance of a majority faction, the competition between 
minority factions is compatible with a free and stable republic.284 This scholarly uptake of 
Madison’s rhetoric helped cement Madisonian pluralism in American political discourse both by 
naturalizing Madisonian factions – treating as a political fact the concepts that Madison 
attempted to rhetorically construct – and by introducing generations of political scientists and 
students to Madisonian faction as a central concept in political thought. In both cases, 
Madisonian pluralism undermines contemporary democratic politics by misleading those who 
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normative commitments) and contributing to the intuition that plurality divides movements. 
Democratic Theory and the “Democratic” Madison 
The interest pluralism of Dahl, Charles Lindblom, and their various interlocutors has been 
particularly significant in transmitting Madisonian logics to contemporary democratic theory. 
Some time ago, Kirstie McClure worried that the status of pluralism as “a central element of the 
dominant political culture” of the United States would obscure “the potentially radical 
implications” of radical democratic pluralism.285 For McClure, two waves of pluralist thought 
had already shaped this status – Anglo-Americans of the 1920s and American interest pluralists 
from the 1950s and 1960s onward – and with “a third generation of pluralist debate” already in 
progress, the familiarity of assuming that social groups are irreducibly plural threatened to 
overwhelm the novel aspects of the radical democratic project.286 Richard M. Merelman has 
characterized what he calls “Yale pluralism” as a contribution to a hegemonic legitimating 
discourse which, even in its relatively reform-minded versions, tends to represent the state as a 
neutral party mediating between competing minority groups.287 Mark Wenman, like Merelman, 
emphasizes an early mutual hostility between interest pluralists and political radicals, but has 
claimed that after “a remarkable renaissance”, “pluralism has become the common sense in 
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pluralists now’.”288  
Of these, only Wenman has identified a Madisonian influence on recent pluralisms in the 
United States, tracing a lineage of pluralist political thought from the agonist pluralism of 
William Connolly, through Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, to William James and James 
Madison.289 For Wenman, Madison’s concern with the tyranny of an overbearing and interested 
majority, largely solved in the institutions of the extended republic, informed Dahl’s concern 
with preventing “the tyranny of a well-organised and motivated minority”, which in turn has 
informed Connolly’s “account of the danger of intense minorities”.290 We might struggle to find 
a more strongly motivated tyrannical minority than the owning class, and both Dahl and 
Lindblom wrote book-length treatments of the relationship between economic systems and 
democracy that balanced liberal anticommunism and moderate support for workplace 
democracy.291 This may explain how some contemporary agonist pluralists might see that body 
of work more as a resource than as a legitimating discourse or text of American political 
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Recent uses of Madison as a resource for democratic deliberation have similarly adopted 
the logic of Madisonian pluralism, often without close attention to his more troubling normative 
commitments.292 Jason Stanley has taken Madison’s distrust of factions as an important resource 
for understanding the problem of group-based identities, “flawed ideologies”, and propaganda.293 
Stanley, for whom the terms “propaganda” and “political rhetoric” are coextensive, presents 
Madisonian faction as a standard for the kinds of appeals that “public political speech” should 
avoid in favor of appeals offered from the standpoint of the impartial observer.294 Given 
Stanley’s commitments, expressed in that text and elsewhere, to anti-fascist, anti-racist, anti-
sexist, and pro-worker politics, it appears that Stanley is committed to two claims about 
Madison’s position: that Madison’s treatment of faction reflects a standard of impartiality, and 
that Madison’s own normative commitments were either irrelevant to his treatment of faction or 
consistent with contemporary left-liberal opposition to oppressive institutions and behaviors.295 
Stanley’s turn to Habermas, Rawls, and the early Du Bois as similar resources for norms 
governing public reason reinforce this understanding of his reading of Madison.296 Bryan 
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Madison’s commitment to majoritarian norms: “the people”, as Madison says, “are, and must be, 
themselves the judges”, and Garsten takes this to be a call to take the people’s judgment 
seriously, and to embrace rhetoric as a mode of persuading audiences to move from demanding 
their own interests to deliberating over collective interests.297 This would allow for “sustained 
dispute” that would move “toward less demagogic and more deliberative forms of 
controversy”.298 While Garsten’s reading of Madison perhaps asks less of Madison than 
Stanley’s does, it nonetheless implies a deference to the beliefs and desires of the people that is 
more than merely procedural, and a hope for the people’s good judgment more optimistic than 
Madison’s sustained treatment of “human nature”. Appealing to the American founding as a 
resource for projects opposed to the actual purposes of someone like Madison probably offers 
rhetorical advantages for some audiences – ones simultaneously inclined to see the principles of 
the constitutional framers as authoritative and unfamiliar with the content of those principles – 
and disadvantages for others. Aside from the immediate tactical concerns for speakers trying to 
convince audiences to join in anti-oppressive efforts, however, Madisonian pluralism undermines 
projects that attempt to use it.  
First, reading Madisonian pluralism as “value-neutral” is not sufficient to empower the 
oppressed minorities that Madison and his heirs have striven to keep oppressed. As I argued in 
Chapter 4, an appeal to value-neutral or impartial principles to justify ending specific instances 
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such a shared discursive framework would require successfully struggling for and winning 
hegemony, insofar as such an appeal can only mobilize collective social power to the extent that 
a broad range of audience members would recognize the hypothetical impartial principles as 
authoritative.299 We can probably find, and certainly must build, audiences that take opposition to 
a broad range of oppressions as an authoritative principle of deliberation and action. I discuss 
how to do that in the following chapter. But we do not have such audiences, beyond local or 
otherwise limited contexts, and appealing to the obvious in front of audience members who do 
not share the speaker’s conception of the obvious is more likely to drive them away than to bring 
them together. Indeed, assuming that liberal conceptions of racial equality and feminism are and 
have been hegemonic grants cover to right-wing groups’ claims of grievance while 
simultaneously demobilizing those who are satisfied with those liberal values. Even a relatively 
tame version of liberation, then, in which everyone simply receives de facto equal rights as 
liberal citizens, therefore requires resources that the current hegemonic articulation does not 
grant. For those of us who take these liberal achievements as insufficient, the need for a new and 
stronger counter-hegemonic politics is even more pressing.  
Second, someone might read Madison’s conception of faction as value-neutral – or even 




299 For those who haven’t yet or haven’t recently read Chapter , this is Laclau and Mouffe’s argument that relations 
of subordination only take shape as relations of domination or oppression within a given discursive framework; it 
follows that a discursive framework makes relations of oppression broadly obvious to the extent that that framework 
is hegemonic. Cf. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 137-138; Anna Marie Smith, Laclau and 
Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary (New York: Routledge, 1998, 2003), 8; Lisa Disch, “Radical 
Democracy: The Silent Partner in Political Representation’s Constructivist Turn”, in Dario Castiglione and Johannes 
Pollak, eds., Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2019), 170-171.  
 205 
should be free equals in a society and aren’t – and attempt to graft a different conception of 
rights or rule for deliberation onto Madisonian minorities. A version of this happens in Dahl’s 
engagement of Madison, insofar as Dahl avoids assigning any content to the concept of “natural 
rights” in favor of avoiding seriously infringing on any group’s preferences, While Stanley does 
not explicitly say this, his references to Habermas, Rawls, and Du Bois might draw on a different 
conception of human wellbeing to inform what counts as factious behavior. But Madison treats 
either side of any particular pair of factional identities, given sufficient power, as prone to abuse 
the other. Here, again, we have a resource for those who describe intentional attempts to redress 
genuine injustices as “reverse” racism or sexism. One also needs to determine what will be 
accomplished by identifying Madison as a resource that one would not accomplish otherwise. If 
the idea is, knowing Madison’s actual commitments, to borrow his perceived cultural and 
historical authority, then the objections from above apply. On the other hand, if one hopes to treat 
value-neutral factions as a basis for adopting new ways of resolving conflicts between various 
minority groups, one will have to face not only the ghost of Madison’s own commitments, but 
the tensions implicit in any attempt to fuse value-neutral conceptions of political relationships 
with specific and substantive conceptions of political or social values.  
Third, theorizing oppression in terms of separate, discrete relations that affect disparate 
minorities contributes to the divisiveness of Madisonian pluralism. The interests of each 
minority, at a minimum, exist and must be protected separately from each other; on the most 
natural reading of Madisonian factions, various factional identities have more or less obvious 
opponents (creditors and debtors, agrarian and mercantile interests, coreligionists and 
nonbelievers, and so on). Since these identities will intersect in somewhat unpredictable ways, 
and since either side will oppress the other if given the opportunity, Madisonian pluralism 
 206 
artificially obscures the possibility that any particular people would consistently end up on the 
winning or losing side of factional contestation. With the causes and solutions to factional 
oppression both varying across different minorities, the political action to address any particular 
instance of oppression has opportunity costs for other instances of oppression.  
The Intuition of Divisiveness 
The intuition of divisiveness may be Madison’s most successful rhetorical move. Here, 
his move to the state as the only mediator of factional conflict and therefore the proper repository 
of individuals’ trust and the push for individuals to consider the various and interfering factional 
identities that they themselves embody do most of the work. By setting up a dichotomy between 
“the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”, which can only be maintained by the 
state’s power and the people’s consent, and the rigid, toxic self-interest of the factious minority, 
Madisonian pluralism explicitly opposes collective unity to particular factional demands, and 
implicitly sets a burden on individuals or groups demanding change – even to establish bare legal 
equality – to demonstrate how their project benefits all of society. 
The explicit opposition between what is good for society and what is good (only) for a 
particular faction alters the rhetorical terrain in two ways. First, because material relations of 
capitalism, patriarchy, and white supremacy shape a common sense of what counts, in Asad 
Haider’s terms, as “neutral, general, and universal”, demands to redress the harms of these 
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normative commitments in through the back door. His lifelong commitment to constituting the 
political class in terms of white men, much like his attachment to property rights in general and 
to the rights of the planter aristocracy in particular, appear as the default point of unity for 
political discourse. Second, because that which benefits one group at the cost of another appears 
both inherently factious and potentially damaging to the entire society, rhetorical appeals that 
define a political project in terms of struggle appear threatening at best and outright subversive at 
worst. For a group to define itself in terms of opposition to another group within society, it has to 
signal to others that its intent and reason for existence are factious. The distinction between 
agonistic rhetorics – those that acknowledge the possibility of sharing a society with those that 
the speaker identifies as adversaries – and antagonistic ones, which suggest that the enemy 
cannot ultimately remain part of the speaker’s society, shades towards irrelevance when simply 
identifying a social adversary suffices to identify a movement as factious and dangerous.  
Consider the strange consensus between elements of the liberal center and the remnants 
of an essentialist left on the usually misinterpreted target of “identity politics”.301 Mark Lilla has 
summarized the liberal side of this consensus as follows: “identity-based social movements”, by 
emphasizing demands that are specific to the experiences and concerns of people within isolated 
social groups, undermine or compromise “a broad political vision” that could more effectively 
support a coherent egalitarian project.302 In Adolph Reed Jr.’s Marxist version, “race-
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and therefore constitute “the left wing of neoliberalism and nothing more”.303 Their agreement 
centers on the claim that we can either transform politics in the name of a privileged form of 
social unity or watch someone else’s politics transform us as isolated, powerless individuals. 
This apparently powerful claim accepts without comment or protest the Madisonian logic in 
which only single-person factions and the entire society count as privileged political actors. 
Based on this logic, and the very anti-Madisonian desire for broad political change, these writers 
and others like them conclude that contesting politics at the factional level pushes us towards 
disempowered individualism. They propose instead taking an allegedly more universal group – 
liberal democratic citizens or proletarians, respectively – as a basis for mobilizing a maximally 
broad part of society in favor of a progressive political agenda.  
This universal progressive movement, however, has to come from somewhere. People 
have to organize it. Lilla’s open disdain for political mobilization and action outside the narrow 
frame of electoral politics – “the only way to meaningfully defend [minorities] – and not just 
make empty gestures of recognition and ‘celebration’ – is to win elections and exercise power in 
the long run, at every level of government”; instead of turning Republican control of government 
“around at the local level”, “identity liberals” are merely “organizing yet another march in 
Washington or preparing yet another federal court brief” – demonstrates not only the Madison-
inspired tendency to center politics in the relationship between state and individuals, but a 
profound inattention to the process and techniques of actually organizing a political 
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as a new political “catechism” that united “nearly everyone (though African-Americans were 
effectively disenfranchised in many programs due to Dixiecrat resistance)”.305 Reed is more 
attentive to “the daunting prospect of building a movement … to center the interests and 
concerns of working people – of all races, genders, sexual orientations, and whatever 
immigration status”, and unlike the liberal wing of the anti-identitarian consensus, the class-
essentialist wing has a history of radical bottom-up organizing on which to rhetorically draw.306 
Nonetheless, the prospect of building a mass liberatory movement is daunting partly because 
Reed reproduces once again the all-or-nothing Madisonian logic in which electoral politics – 
pages, for example, of discussion in the cited essay of how identity politics contaminated the 
2016 Democratic Party presidential primary – and a purposeless mass of self-interested 
individuals appear as the dominant forms of political (or depoliticized) existence.  
We can find a more promising starting point for a response, both to Madisonian pluralism 
and to the racial dogwhistling central to the right-wing neoliberal articulation in the United 
States, in the “race-class narrative” developed by Ian Haney-López, Anat Shenker-Osorio, and a 
group of researchers at think tanks and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU).307 
The race-class narrative starts by recognizing two facts about the political reality that 
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them “economic populism”) run into decades of a racialized narrative about who deserves basic 
economic goods; second, many voters of all colors express a feeling that “racial justice” 
narratives are divisive. The designers of the race-class narrative found, however, that fusing these 
appeals – explicitly advocating for collective provision for everybody’s material needs, across all 
colors, and phrasing social opposition in terms of the need to fight back against the greedy few – 
proved persuasive across a broad range of conversations with focus groups. In the vocabulary of 
this dissertation, the race-class narrative adopts a populist appeal in which the material needs of 
people from all races are articulated against in relation to the oligarchs who deny these needs to 
enrich themselves. As presented, the race-class narrative has limitations. Unsurprisingly, for a 
project targeted at helping Democratic Party candidates get elected, it emphasizes responding to 
existing conditions, while relegating more radical demands and transformative projects to “think 
tanks, grassroots groups, and unions”.308 The role of rhetoric in building communities in which 
radical demands enter the common sense will have to wait for the following chapter. 
Nonetheless, constructing an articulation across identities offers more of a path forward than 
continuing to allow Madison’s terms to define our common sense.  
5. Conclusion 
Madison’s legacy continues to distort contemporary politics and to protect the United 
States’ oldest hierarchies and oppressions. It’s worth considering, however, how tenuous that 
legacy is. As we’ve seen, the brilliant and rhetorical moves of Federalist 10 were mostly not the 
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American political and economic situation since 1785, would have contributed to angry 
Antifederalists’ condemnations of an aristocratic conspiracy rather than deflating, distorting, and 
flattening those condemnations. Instead, a political thinker whose new ideas pervaded his 
correspondence and private notes never expressed doubts about his contemporaries’ binary 
political sociology and may not have seriously considered the issue at all, prior to writing 
Federalist 10 on a week’s notice. The later essays that built out Madison’s rhetorical intervention 
still only had a development period under three months. The reception of this rhetorical 
intervention, in which several generations of political theorists and political scientists overcame 
Madison’s class position, privately-expressed views, and frequent returns to the importance of 
economic hierarchy to instead read Federalist 10 in a flatly literal fashion that reinforced the 
politics of the Cold War, similarly demonstrates the contingency of Madison’s rhetorical devices. 
Like all rhetoric, Madison’s required an audience to see something in it that made sense. In this 
case, Madison’s mid-20th-century audience saw the argument of one of the most sophisticated 
thinkers of the American founding generation and recognized a resource for simultaneously 
attacking the insufferably materialist Charles Beard and defending the enlightenment and 
foresight of the American constitutional system. And finally, like all interventions in the world of 
hegemonic politics that Madison saw approaching, the effects of Madison’s rhetoric rode partly 
on existing material conditions and on favorable intellectual and rhetorical resources, such as the 
neoliberal articulation assembled at nearly the same time that Dahl, Diamond, and others found 
Madison’s Federalist such a congenial jumping-off point. Each of these factors should 
underscore the contingency of Madisonian pluralism’s success.  
At the same time, the material conditions of late capitalism and the discursive conditions 
of the neoliberal articulation have given Madisonian pluralism tremendous staying power. The 
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apparent divisiveness of appeals to identity, not to mention the apparent untrustworthiness of 
mass political mobilization, show up in the experience not only of people engaged in the 
academic contestation of contemporary political and social theory, but also of members of mass 
political audiences who may not know much about Madison, or care. It follows that the people 
who must join in a liberatory movement in order for it to succeed recognize a common sense in 
which liberation falls somewhere between impractical and undesirable. Rhetoric that divides us 
against each other enjoys an advantage over rhetoric that builds movements not only because 
Madisonian pluralism explicitly portrays rhetoric as inherently divisive, but because the distrust 
of faction and political mobilization that is so important to Madisonian pluralism implicitly 
encourages the cynicism at the core of dogwhistling, ethnonationalism, and similar invocations 
of racism in order to protect the interests of the few. It follows that attempting to articulate a 
broad movement towards freedom will require not only top-down representative moves of the 
kind that politicians’ advisers can summon, but long-term, bottom-up alterations of the common 
sense within specific local communities. In the following chapter, I turn to how rhetoric 
contributes to articulating a new sense of solidarity within such a community. 
 213 
 
Chapter 7 “A Moderate and Reasonable Position”: Articulating “Union Issues” in the 
Graduate Labor Movement 
 
1. Introduction 
By analyzing rhetoric as a practice of articulation and situating this analysis in a broader 
political logic of hegemony, I’ve shown in the two previous chapters how rhetoric draws on a set 
of material, social, and political resources to construct solidarities within an audience. I’ve also 
shown that these resources are distributed unevenly based on hegemonic political conditions, so 
that it is much easier to appeal to existing disparities and subordinations in order to maintain 
them than it is to construct new solidarities in a counterhegemonic project. For the purposes of 
articulation in the United States, the existing neoliberal hegemonic articulation finds important 
support in two other political conditions: the long history of racist institutions and discourses in 
the American settler empire, which provides a stable basis for reactionary rhetorical appeals, and 
the Madisonian intuition that difference is divisive, which undercuts centrist and center-left 
liberals’ ability to effectively craft oppositional populist rhetorical appeals. Taken together, these 
conditions show that leftist and left-liberal political efforts require a new counter-hegemonic 
articulation, and that this articulation will likely need to start outside electoral contexts.  
This chapter analyzes efforts to form a local version of such a counter-hegemonic 
articulation, centering on the organizing efforts of the Graduate Employees Organization at the 
University of Michigan (AFT/AFL-CIO, Local 3550). Like most labor unions, GEO’s members 
have fought for a wide range of changes to their compensation, working conditions, and broader 
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living conditions; also like most labor unions, GEO has only made progress in these areas due to 
decades of struggles carried out through – and sometimes outside – the collective bargaining 
process. These struggles depend on substantial member participation, which demonstrates the 
union’s credibility when it carries out various forms of collective action, and on the support of 
broader communities, including undergraduate students, faculty workers, and support staff at the 
University of Michigan, other labor unions in southeastern Michigan, and other community 
organizations in and around the Ann Arbor area. To build this support, the union has relied on a 
rhetorical strategy of articulating their demands as “union issues” – i.e. topics over which the 
union’s right to bargain, demonstrate, and threaten and carry out job actions should be 
unquestioned – even, and especially, when these demands are near or beyond the limits (wages, 
benefits, and working conditions) traditionally established in labor law. This strategy was 
especially apparent during the struggles that culminated in each of GEO’s two strikes, a 28-day 
strike in 1975 that secured the union’s first contract and a 10-day strike in 2020 over working 
conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic. On both occasions, GEO members overwhelmingly 
supported, and went on strike for, platforms including demands at the radical edge of 
contemporary labor activism: in 1975, a robust union and management co-planned affirmative 
action system and contractual guarantees against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
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preference, and in 2020, union and management co-planning of the university’s pandemic 
response and the disarmament and demilitarization of University of Michigan campus police.309  
At stake in these struggles were the extension of workplace democracy to include 
workers’ influence – as an equal seat at the table, or even with veto power – in areas of hiring 
non-discrimination, racial justice, and safe working conditions, and the union’s capacity to 
represent not only its members, but broader communities with whom the union claimed to act in 
solidarity. The union’s strategy of articulation, implicit in its rhetoric during the 1975 contract 
campaign, became explicit in its public statements during the 2020 strike. While the university 
claimed demands on policing had nothing to do with demands for a safe response to the 
pandemic, making the former an inappropriate subject for bargaining or for strike action, 
activists insisted that the demands were inseparable under union members’ right to safe 
workplace conditions. In both the 1975 and the 2020 cases, union activists’ articulation of 
broader social justice demands as union issues, worthy of union members’ and broader 
communities’ collective support, succeeded in building support within the union’s membership 
for the strike platform. GEO largely failed, however, to secure enough community support 
during the 2020 campaign to impose its demands on the university administration, or indeed, to 
continue the strike against increasingly severe legal retaliation from the administration. Instead, 




309 Today, the language of “sexual preference” is most often a right-wing dogwhistle that portrays sexual attraction 
as an individual choice that can be subjected to surveillance and control by employers and potentially the state. At 
the time, activists in the local gay liberation movement understood sexual preference to cover not only the existence 
of LGBT people, but their freedom to express themselves and refuse to be assimilated into liberal, individualist, and 
heteronormative logics. When referring to the GEO demand in the 1974-75 contract campaign, I use the term that 
the union and activists at the time used. 
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and nondiscrimination demands, in fact, were settled only a few days into the month-long strike 
– and the union winning its first contract, the 2020 strike ended with the administration making 
symbolic concessions and continuing to “discuss” the union’s concerns.  
What enabled GEO’s success in its internal organizing? Why did this success translate to 
broader community mobilization during the 1975 strike, but much less so in the 2020 strike? 
How could GEO, or unions like it, more effectively build community support? The theory of 
rhetoric developed in the previous chapters can help answer each of these questions. In the 
chapter’s first substantive section, I argue that GEO’s record of internal solidarity and its 
consistent ability to articulate social justice-based demands as “union issues” deserving of GEO 
members’ support owe much to participatory decision-making mechanisms and member-to-
member organizing practices. The union understands itself to be a social movement union 
operating on an “organizing model”, and union officers rely on decisions at mass meetings to 
determine the union’s goals and strategy.310 These institutions and practices create space for 
members to persuade each other to commit to common goals and, indeed, to persuade reluctant 
or overworked union officers to continue to fight for member-approved demands. GEO’s past 
and present articulatory practices have created and maintained a common sense among the 
organization’s members, in which racial justice, LGBT rights, and a safe and just workplace 




310 A “social movement union”, in the lexicon of contemporary union organizers, is one that orients itself to broader 
social struggles rather than to narrowly-construed categories of member interests. An “organizing model” is 
distinguished from a “service model” in that unions adopting the latter model tend to emphasize providing specific 
and concrete services to members in exchange for their dues, while unions that choose the former commit 
themselves to turning new employees into active members, and turning active members into shop stewards or even 
elected leadership. Given the high turnover inherent in graduate labor unions, the organizing model has proved 
extremely popular among graduate labor unions and contingent academic labor more broadly. 
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Second, however, this articulatory rhetoric primarily reaches GEO members – those who 
experience the union’s participatory democratic practices, member-to-member organizing, and 
so on – and is of limited efficacy when offered to audiences without the organizing and 
institutional support that make it effective within the union. GEO’s attempts to call on support 
from broader communities and organizations, therefore, typically (with one important exception, 
the union’s requests for solidarity from other labor unions) have the function of coalitional or 
populist rhetoric; that is, these appeals attempt to summon allies based on a contingent common 
interest, or by uniting audience members with reference to a common source – usually the 
university administration – for their various discontents. Understood in this way, the union’s 
appeals for community support depend on conditions largely outside the union’s control – for 
coalitional appeals, the existence of strong and effective organizations with which the union can 
ally; for populist appeals, the existence of a systemic crisis from which the union can construct a 
negative equivalence – which the union must respond to, rather than control, in decisive 
moments. In terms of coalitional politics, the union had far stronger potential allies in the 1975 
strike than in 2020; in terms of populist strategies, the union had some opportunities to 
coordinate discontent with the university administration in 2020, but did not build enough power 
through these opportunities to impose its demands on the administration.   
Third, then, I turn to examining how an organization like GEO could employ a politics of 
articulation more successfully. I argue that both articulatory strategies, centering on more 
developed engagement with relevant communities, and coalitional strategies based on improved 
cooperation with partner organizations are valuable; indeed, combining the two is most likely to 
produce favorable organizing conditions.  
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2. Internal Rhetoric and GEO’s Common Sense 
This section describes the internal institutions that characterize GEO as an organization, 
as well as a history of articulatory practices inside the organization before and during the union’s 
two strikes. By consistently making space for member participation in the union’s decision-
making processes, GEO has generally been quite successful in articulating “union issues” so as 
to include a broad social justice vision within its member base. The bulk of this section 
documents the continuity in this articulation across the union’s history, particularly in the cases 
of the union’s affirmative action and sexual preference demands before and during the 1975 
strike, and the case of the “safety articulation” during the 2020 strike.  
Participatory Practices 
GEO’s most important structural support for its articulatory practices, its emphasis on 
mass participation across organizing contexts, is a legacy of the New Left and 1960s freedom 
struggles at and near the University of Michigan. Most active organizations in this area depended 
on mass meetings, featuring substantive discussion and voting on the organizations’ policy and 
tactics, as their primary decision-making mechanism. Every major collective action on the 
University of Michigan campus during the 1970s, including the building occupations carried out 
by the first two iterations of the Black Action Movement, the GEO strike, and various 
demonstrations and confrontations leading up to these, involved collective deliberation in large, 
relatively open meetings to determine platforms, overall strategy, and the tactics for specific 
collective actions. Students and faculty in Michigan’s Residential College collectively decided 
whether and how to support these actions, as did the members of other organizations in the area. 
For GEO specifically, the practice of direct democracy at general membership meetings (GMMs) 
became a central part of the union’s organizing and deliberative practices, and the union holds 
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five or six such meetings per year in typical years. During bargaining and job actions (a generic 
term for strikes, walkouts, and similar direct action involving the members’ labor), the union 
holds these meetings at a much higher rate, allowing members to determine the union’s current 
bargaining terms, whether and how to continue job actions, and other urgent issues.311 During 
these especially urgent meetings, hundreds of union members – ranging from perhaps one in four 
members to, during the union’s second strike, eight or nine out of every ten members – attend 
and participate. Similar deliberative practices have appeared in other unions of academic 
workers, at the University of Michigan and elsewhere, with several consequences for unions’ 
internal organization and deliberation.  
First, direct democratic procedures in mass member meetings tend overall to strengthen 
members’ resolve for risky or confrontational courses of action. This tendency matches the one 
that Francesca Polletta observed in participatory democracy in the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the New Left, and post-New Left radical feminist 
organizing.312 Aside from alleged idealistic reasons for adopting deliberative and participatory 
internal processes, Polletta identifies eminently practical reasons for basing collective action on 
such processes: when such organizations solicited wide participation in the decision to begin, 
continue, and end direct action campaigns, and relatively wide participation in tactical decisions 
during those campaigns, they provided a framework for participants to gain trust in the strategy 




311 In 2017 and 2020, the union held bargaining GMMs twice a month; during the 2020 strike, the union held GMMs 
twice a week.  
312 Polletta, Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002).  
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collective solidarity.  
Further, building collective action on members’ collective deliberation grants an 
alternative source of authority to the organization’s rhetoric. The terms in which the organization 
justifies its actions tend to apply with greater force to future actions. Reminding wavering 
present members that they or past members had committed to some platform demand or principle 
of solidarity tends to calm worries of overly radical leadership and instead center frustrations on 
authorities and management, who have failed to respond to a consistent collective demand. This 
kind of appeal mobilizes members’ trust in themselves against habits of deferring to management 
and other official sources of authority. It also tends to solidify rank-and-file radicalism. For one 
thing, people considering the myriad ways in which collective action could hypothetically 
improve their lived experience usually choose goals with more ambition and excitement than 
they feel after weeks or months of effort. Even when the member-approved demand reaches 
beyond what a newly-organized member might otherwise support, the fact that other members 
voted to approve the demand often suffices to gain support and maintain solidarity. This owes 
partly to trust built by collective participation and strengthened by struggles with management.  
Most importantly for this chapter’s argument, in democratic unions committed to member 
participation, the use of mass meetings and empowerment of rank-and-file members broadens 
and flattens the rhetorical field. While the elected officials at a mass meeting are privileged 
speakers, in the sense that they shape the meeting agenda and generally have the bulk of 
whatever speaking time has been planned in advance, other speakers have considerable 
opportunities to introduce their own perspectives and to persuade their fellow members. 
Moreover, members can organize – spontaneously or in advance – a substantial speaking and 
voting presence at mass meetings, which often shapes the union’s final direction on any 
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particular issue. Whether organized spontaneously or otherwise, these kinds of self-organized 
member groups often become formalized as union caucuses responsible for designing future 
demands that affect them. For example, in late 2016, members voted to reexamine the bargaining 
committee’s proposed contract language on work hours protections after a group of international 
graduate workers pointed out that this language would not protect them from being ordered to 
work more than 20 hours a week, a violation of their entry visas that was especially worrisome 
shortly after the election of Donald Trump. The bargaining committee members responsible for 
the original proposal, largely unaware of this aspect of U.S. immigration law, withdrew the 
proposal in favor of the decision of the new union caucus, and the reworked hours protections 
became one of the centerpieces of the 2017 contract campaign.  
Members’ appeals before and during mass meetings also shape the union’s collective 
willingness to insist on certain demands, and plan collective action to enforce those demands, in 
the face of management intransigence. In most struggles, the union’s elected officials, especially 
those responsible for bargaining with the university administration and for soliciting support 
from affiliated labor organizations, reach a point where they no longer expect progress from 
continued negotiations. Only widespread member support for collective action will generally 
make further progress. Because of the fatigue involved in long negotiations with obstinate 
administrators, and all too often in dealing with higher-up union officials who urge the local to 
settle for an easier but worse contract, elected representatives sometimes ask members to 
authorize concessions on sticking points rather than asking for more concerted and aggressive 
collective action. It has often, therefore, fallen on rank-and-file members to insist on escalation 
instead of surrender. As I will show in the following section, rank-and-file member activists 
crafted much of the rhetoric that successfully connected workplace rights for LGBT people and 
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affirmative action against racial hiring discrimination as “union issues” in GEO’s first campaign 
to respond to exactly such a problem.  
In each of these cases, then, the participatory model that GEO and other contemporary 
organizations inherited from racial justice and New Left movements has created an internal space 
for rhetoric that articulates a wide range of member and community concerns to create a 
common sense of the union’s purpose and goals. Such rhetoric channels the concept of union 
solidarity in a concrete, specific direction, shaping the union’s strategy and intent for a specific 
struggle. At the same time, articulating issues within the central organizing principle of union 
solidarity works most effectively within the labor movement. To build movements that extend 
beyond the union to other potentially-relevant organizations and communities, the union depends 
either on well-organized groups that are willing to respond to its internal rhetoric, or on separate 
rhetorical strategies that reach beyond the discourses associated with the labor movement.  
Articulation in the Early Union: Racial Justice 
GEO’s commitment to an end to hiring discrimination dates to within a few weeks of the 
union’s formation in September 1973. A “Demand for racial and sexual equality” was adopted at 
the October 18, 1973 meeting of the Organization of Teaching Fellows (OTF)d, which would 




313 “Notes from T.F. Meeting Thurs. Oct 18, 1973” (Bentley Historical Archive, GEO Box 1, Organization of 
Teaching Fellows Meetings Sep 1973-Dec 1973). Efforts to form a graduate union at the University of Michigan 
date at least to 1969, and the university administration deflected two attempts at a union election between 1969 and 




this demand was adopted at a mass meeting in February 1974: 
“There will be an end to discrimination against graduate academic employees and 
applicants for graduate academic appointments due to sex, race, creed, national origin, union 
affiliation, political beliefs, or sexual preference of those employees and of those applicants; 
GEO will set quotas for affirmative action to end such discrimination.”314  
These standards might seem familiar today. Indeed, the University of Michigan adopted 
phrasing for its official non-discrimination policies wholesale from GEO contract language. At 
the time, however, administrators found this language highly objectionable, and deployed a 
strategy now familiar to labor organizers everywhere: simultaneous claims that the university did 
not presently discriminate on most of these grounds or intend to do so, and that asking the 
administration to make a contractual commitment not to discriminate infringed on management 
rights. Administrators rejected the sexual preference language entirely, resorting to reprehensible 
homophobic claims including lamentations that they might somehow lose their management 
right to punish sexual predators.315 After forceful pushback on this point, administrators’ official 
response emphasized the disingenuous but common claim that while they did not discriminate, 
they did not want to be contractually prohibited from doing so; while homophobic attacks on 




and agree to bargain in the 1974-75 year, provided that the union accepted the administration’s proposed bargaining 
unit (including graduate instructors, research assistants, and staff assistants) – with the new bargaining unit and the 
university’s renaming of “teaching fellows” to “teaching assistants”, the OTF changed its name to the Graduate 
Employees Organization. The reasons why this organizing effort succeeded, its implications for GEO’s history and 
institutions, and the lessons for other organizing efforts in academic labor are of value to labor historians and 
organizers, but beyond the scope of this chapter. 
314 “CONTRACT DEMANDS PACKAGE AS APPROVED BY THE MASS MEETING FEB. 7, 1974” (Bentley 
Historical Archive, GEO Box 1).  
315 John Ellis, “Homophobia: Paranoia or prejudice?”, Michigan Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), February 11, 1975.  
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reactionary bargaining committee members to make those attacks for them.  
On the question of ending racial discrimination in hiring, and establishing a contractual 
mandate for an affirmative action program, the union’s rhetoric initially aimed at activating 
existing support in the membership for these demands. The union circulated an anonymous flyer, 
“An Injury to One is an Injury to All”, fairly early in negotiations for the first contract.316 The 
flyer referenced the university’s past failures to honor racial justice commitments, such as those 
it had made in 1970 to the first iteration of the Black Action Movement after a lengthy student 
strike and building occupation, and argued that a union-negotiated contract would invoke a 
controlling legal framework and force the university to make good on its pledges.317 By 
emphasizing the contract’s unique potential to force real change at the university, the authors 
suggested that racial justice demands naturally fit within the category of union issues.  
The chosen title of this flyer, “An Injury to One is an Injury to All”, as well as other 
rhetorical choices throughout the text, also reinforce the framing of affirmative action and non-
discrimination as “union issues”. The title, of course, comes from a motto adopted at the 




316 “An Injury to One is an Injury to All.”, handwritten “Oct. 74” date on the page (Bentley Historical Library, GEO 
Box 2, “Outreach”). While the flyer is anonymous, it is reasonable to assume that this, like practically all union 
publications, was written by a small committee.  
317 On these and many other broken promises, and university administrators’ broader choice to emphasize 
“diversity” rather than racial justice in half-hearted efforts to recruit more Black students and faculty, see Matthew 
Johnson’s groundbreaking study of the University of Michigan’s resistance to racial justice in higher education. 
Johnson has practically nothing to say about the role of labor in anti-racist direct action, as he focuses on 
administrators’ strategies for creating layered institutional defenses against long-term commitments to racial justice. 
Nonetheless, Johnson’s archival research and discussion of UM administrators is a tremendous contribution, not 
only to studies of racial injustice in the academy, but to the history of the University of Michigan. Johnson, 
Undermining Racial Justice: How One University Embraced Inclusion and Inequality (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2020), 88-103. 
 225 
the history of American industrial unionism.318 The use of a union slogan demanding radical 
solidarity among members simultaneously advances the “union issue” framing and invokes the 
best elements of labor history in support of the specific affirmative action demands. The 
beginning of the flyer emphasizes the union’s purpose “to unite all graduate employees” and 
assesses the university as unwilling to make concessions on any questions – economic or “non-
economic” – unless “forced to do so”.319 Here we have an enemy – a powerful institution defined 
by “long-standing institutionalized racism and male supremacy” – and a strategy, and the sole 
path to victory requires unified solidaristic action. The same framing recurs in a double flyer, 
printed front and back and circulated in November 1974, explaining GEO’s proposals on non-
discrimination and affirmative action on the two sides of the page. “The union”, the flyer’s 
authors insist, “has to be sensitive to the interests of all of its members if the interests of any are 
to be safeguarded.”320 The front of the flyer concludes with a striking appeal to members for 
empathy and solidarity:  
“GSA’s [graduate student assistants, the term applied to graduate workers by the 
University from 1974] are often isolated from each other and remain unaware of the pain many 
other GSA’s feel, and the problems of survival they confront, as a result of discrimination. The 
‘U’ structure encourages us to feel competitively about each other, and our isolation too often 




318 While the IWW was active in the Ann Arbor/Ypsilanti area of Southeast Michigan from the late 1970s onward, I 
haven’t found any evidence of direct contact with IWW organizers at this time, and the earliest dates of public IWW 
organizing seem to be in 1978.  
319 “An Injury to One is an Injury to All.”, handwritten “Oct. 74” date on the page (Bentley Historical Library, GEO 
Box 2, “Outreach”). 
320 “GEO Proposals: Non-Discrimination/Affirmative Action”, dated November 1974 per the GEO timeline (Bentley 
Historical Library, GEO Box 2, “Outreach”). 
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break down these barriers, we can’t hope that our future reality will be any different than our 
present one. Supporting the GEO demand for non-discrimination with enough strength to ensure 
its acceptance is one essential move towards that difference.”321 
This appeal reinterprets the populist logic, in which university administrators deny the 
needs of separate and potentially allied communities and each of those communities therefore 
benefits from weakening the administration through any given struggle, into a framework in 
which the university’s structure actively produces the perceived differences between these 
communities. This works particularly well because it takes seriously the experiences of readers 
who don’t initially see the value of the non-discrimination language and offers a new way for 
those readers to understand their experiences. The appeal avoids moralizing language in favor of 
the hope that graduate workers can create a better world for themselves, and because of this, it 
also recontextualizes previous paragraphs that speak to the importance of standing unified behind 
each and every union demand. Where a reader might initially think of the previous paragraphs of 
warning of the dangers of disunity, on the basis that a union that fails to support the needs of all 
of its members will fail to advance the interests of any of them, the turn from warning to 
aspiration encourages creativity and transformation instead of self-criticism and conformity to 
the leadership’s official line.  
On the question of affirmative action to end hiring discrimination against Black and 
“Third World” graduate workers (a term that racial justice organizers on the Michigan campus 




321 “GEO Proposals: Non-Discrimination/Affirmative Action”, dated November 1974 per the GEO timeline (Bentley 
Historical Library, GEO Box 2, “Outreach”). 
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II”), these flyers and the accompanying conversations with membership convincingly portrayed 
racial justice as a union issue. While the struggle to impose an affirmative action system on the 
university, and the administration’s intransigence in bargaining, led to “affirmative action” or the 
“Fair Practices Committee” (the relevant union committee) receiving significant agenda time for 
nearly every meeting of GEO’s Stewards Council in the 1974-1975 academic year, union 
activists apparently saw no need to prepare further organizing or messaging materials on this 
subject after the wave of flyers on practically every contract demand in the fall of 1974. This 
uneven pattern – extensive time in leadership meetings to strategize around winning demands, 
but practically no member-facing messaging on the importance of the demands – almost always 
indicates that the union’s stewards and officers believe that rank-and-file members are united and 
no further organizing on the relevant demands is urgently needed.  
Articulation in the Early Union: Sexual Preference 
The demand to include sexual preference in the non-discrimination language faced more 
serious challenges. While the university’s intransigence on this point and on the affirmative 
action program reached similar levels, and crumbled at exactly the same time during the 1975 
strike, the union’s capacity to maintain the sexual preference demand in bargaining and the strike 
platform was unclear. A call to action in the November 1974 GEO newsletter demonstrates the 
relative weakness of the mobilization and organizing behind the sexual preference demand. The 
authors made little effort to change anybody’s mind; instead, with unclear levels of membership 
support behind the demand, they concluded by asking people already committed to the demand 
to show up: “…GEO cannot fight effectively for groups who do not make their presence felt, 
both within the union and to the university. If you feel that those demands which would improve 
the position of women and gays are important, come to the mass meeting on Nov. 13 and show 
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your support. And lobby within your departments for these issues…”322 That is, if more than a 
handful of activists supported the contract demands, the authors – probably members of this 
handful – needed the heretofore-silent supporters to speak up. The framing of these demands is 
also a bit ethereal. A “demands package” that would “improve the position of women and gays” 
did exist, but only in the sense that the university administration opposed affirmative action to 
end discrimination against women and students of color, as well as a childcare program, and also 
refused to include sexual preference in the now-agreed-upon language prohibiting discrimination 
on the base of race or sex, while the union wanted contract language on each of these points. The 
piece provides no additional framework for understanding the interests of women and LGBT 
people as materially or ideologically articulated, and overall, the rhetoric of this appeal evidences 
little ambition, and not much more optimism, for persuading union members to newly support 
contract protections for their LGBT colleagues.  
For other rank-and-file members (and possibly bargaining team members, although this is 
unclear) in late 1974 and early 1975, the apparent lack of support for the sexual preference 
demand led them to consider dropping it entirely. If the university was giving up nothing on the 
contract demand at the bargaining table, how was the union to know that it would win any 
progress on the demand after going on strike? Surely it would be worse to include a demand on 
the strike platform and then lose that demand than to drop the demand prior to the strike. Finally, 
if activists believed that community solidarity would win this demand, where was the gay and 




322 “women, gays, and GEO”, GEO Newsletter No. 2 (November 1974), 7.  
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out in front of the community they claimed to represent?323  
It’s important to recognize that while some of the people voicing this position doubtless 
did so because they didn’t support the demand to begin with, others understood themselves to be 
in solidarity with the principle behind the demand and worried over the proper strategy to 
advance that demand in the long term. Maintaining such a clear distinction between principle and 
strategy often provides intellectual and rhetorical cover for retreats on principle without 
meaningful strategic gains, and GEO activists Gayle Rubin and Anne Bobroff would write a 
brilliant retrospective, while the strike successfully concluded, on why avoiding these retreats 
was correct.324 In the immediate moment, however, a moralizing response that condemned or 
criticized overly worried members would only have alienated them and, in a way, proved them 
right by further fracturing union solidarity around the sexual preference demand. Rubin, Daniel 
Tsang, and other GEO members who were active in local struggles for gay liberation identified 
the only way forward: by mobilizing sufficient external support for the sexual preference 
demand, activists would prove the advocates of strategic retreat wrong on their own terms. This 
began with arranging a letter from Ann Arbor’s Gay Liberation Front to the GEO Stewards’ 




323 Much later, after the University of Michigan’s administrators’ decades-long struggle to undermine racial justice 
and replace it with the language of diversity and inclusion, as well as broader state and national reaction against 
affirmative action and the resulting collapse of Black student enrollment, these kinds of moderate critiques would 
trouble racial justice demands in the 2016-2017 and 2019-2020 contract campaigns, as well as during the organizing 
for GEO’s fall 2020 strike. In 1974, of course, the high-profile student activism for racial justice at the university 
made this kind of attack on racial justice demands completely inaccessible to centrist critics.  
324 Rubin and Bobroff, “On the Fetishism of Bargaining”, The File, September 20, 2019 http://thefilemag.org/on-
the-fetishism-of-bargaining-2/. 
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the university’s homophobia in the Michigan Daily.325 This op-ed, when published, carried over 
two hundred signatures of faculty and graduate workers, including the chair of the political 
science department, Samuel Eldersveld.326 With community support now clearly in evidence, 
Rubin and Tsang circulated a flyer calling on their fellow GEO members to fight for the sexual 
preference demand up to and throughout the upcoming strike: “Don’t settle for a contract which 
perpetuates discrimination against gays. Join with others who have already spoken out in defense 
of this simple and basic demand for civil rights for an oppressed minority.”327 Now that 
organizing and solidarity made the demand winnable, the appeal called on members simply to 
keep fighting, and it worked. The fact that outside groups treated the union contract as the 
specific locus of struggle for this moment of liberation solidified the treatment of the sexual 
preference demand as a union issue, allowing its advocates to persuade union members to 
include it on the strike platform and eventually to win it as a part of the contract.  
Internal Articulation and the 2020 Strike 
In recent contract campaigns and in its 2020 strike for “a safe and just campus for all”, 
the union attempted to use its traditional “union issues” articulatory strategy to ground two very 
different approaches to these problems in its organizing and rhetoric. After an initial attempt to 




325 “STEWARDS’ AGENDA JANUARY 16, 1975” (Bentley Historical Library, GEO Box 1, “GEO Admin – 
Stewards’ Council Meetings, 1974”).  
326 Gayle Rubin and Dan Tsang, “Letters to The Daily: homophobia”, Michigan Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), January 23, 
1975. While the letter was submitted anonymously, see Guerin Wilkinson, “UM GEO demands set for strike”, 
Michigan Free Press, January 27, 1975.  
327 Rubin and Tsang, “Non-discrimination: A Matter of Rights” (Bentley Historical Library, Dan Tsang Box 1, 
“GEO Topical Files: Gay Rights (1)”).  
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solve particularly well, the union turned to a maximalist version of “union issues”, provoked by a 
novel mode of administrative obstruction, in which practically anything that would improve the 
lives of graduate workers at the University of Michigan could be a contractual demand. 
The first highly targeted approach attempted to define a recent university initiative to 
advance “diversity, equity, and inclusion” in terms of union issues. After the administration had 
announced this initiative in response to Black students’ protests of racial injustice, systematic and 
personal exclusion, and a sustained decrease in Black enrollment, the union argued that any such 
initiative required material support for marginalized graduate students, who after all are early-
career scholars who often provide uncompensated labor to advance the goals the university 
claimed to support. The union wanted this support in several forms: paid, unionized positions for 
graduate students doing diversity work, overall wage increases, unified hours protections for all 
graduate workers that would safeguard international graduate workers from visa violations while 
removing incentives to discriminate against them, expanded coverage for gender-affirming 
health care, and improved funding for childcare. The administration’s response to these demands 
involved the standard stonewalling, gaslighting, and condescension that graduate labor unions 
had long since learned to expect, but also a newly emphatic insistence on an arcane legal 
distinction between mandatory subjects of bargaining, topics on which the parties to collective 
bargaining are legally obligated to discuss, and permissive subjects of bargaining, on which 
discussion is optional. Repeatedly demanding that a party to collective bargaining discuss a 
permissive subject carries potential legal penalties, and the administration threatened to file a 
legal action against the union if the bargaining team continued to discuss permissive subjects, 
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especially the DEI staff assistant positions.328 
At this point, the bargaining team and some of the committee members working on the 
DEI proposal succumbed to the logic that had nearly undercut the sexual preference demand in 
1975.329 While members initially voted to authorize the bargaining team to abandon the demand 
for DEI staff positions, after a significant mobilizing effort and some tense meetings, the 
membership reversed that decision and ordered the bargaining team not to give ground on that 
demand at all, as well as overwhelmingly authorizing a two-day walkout. Several hundred 
graduate workers and community members occupied the university administration building 
while, a few blocks away, the bargaining team accepted a “strike prevention package” that 
involved substantial administration concessions on every remaining issue, including a promise to 
hire six DEI staff assistants.330 The connection between GEO’s rhetoric around the 2017 strike 
platform, which continued to demand that the university deliver on its alleged commitment to 
diversity, equity, and inclusion, and the union’s actual demands could hold firm only because the 
union stood behind the demand for DEI staff positions. This demand was a central material link 




328 I was the notetaker for these negotiations. During the 2017 contract campaign, instead of having one or two lead 
negotiators across the entire contract, the GEO bargaining team appointed separate primary negotiators for each 
contract demand, based on the team members’ experiences and subject matter expertise. While I took notes on all of 
the formal negotiations, I specialized in and was present in sidebars for negotiations on other, mostly mandatory, 
subjects.  
329 For another eyewitness perspective on these events that closely matches my recollections, see Nick Caverly, 
“Reflecting On The Fetishism of Bargaining”, The File, September 21, 2019 https://thefilemag.org/reflecting-on-
the-fetishism-of-bargaining/. 
330 Ultimately, the number was somewhat higher than the contractual minimum of six, after graduate workers and 
activists lobbied schools and departments to hire additional staff assistants.  
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of the union’s position and the sincerity of its rhetoric.331  
When the University of Michigan announced a premature in-person campus reopening 
for the fall of 2020, GEO and many community members accurately predicted that this plan 
would expose large numbers of students, university employees, and residents in Washtenaw 
County to serious risks from the ongoing pandemic.332 The administration refused to 
meaningfully negotiate on its reopening plans, and announced a new “Michigan Ambassadors 
Program” under which students – in the initial announcement, to be escorted and reinforced by 
armed campus security officers – would police other students in order to mitigate infection risks. 
Both the intention to increase an armed police presence on campus and the broader idea that the 
university’s only meaningful pandemic safety plan relied on policing and blaming misbehaving 
students outraged GEO members generally, as well as organizations representing students and 
communities of color on campus, and GEO included a demand to demilitarize campus police and 
redirect funding to community support in its platform for a “safe and just pandemic response”.  
Several factors led union activists to center “safety” when justifying the union’s actions. 




331 I have omitted discussion of the union’s 2020 contract campaign, which was prematurely ended due to the Covid-
19 pandemic. I briefly discuss GEO’s description of its contract demands as “bargaining for the common good” later 
in the chapter; other aspects of the campaign are beyond the scope of the chapter.  
332 The administration’s motives in reopening in-person are both uncertain and beyond the scope of this chapter. An 
anonymous University of Michigan employee attributed the reopening to pressure from billionaire donor and UM’s 
lone Republican member of the Board of Regents Ron Weiser, whose status as one of the Ann Arbor area’s largest 
landlords meant he stood directly to profit from bringing students back in-person. Anonymous, “Op-Ed: The 
University’s summer of lies”, Michigan Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), August 27, 2020. In a personal conversation in July 
2020, Regent Paul Brown, one of the more union-friendly regents, told me that the administration feared losing 
students to peer institutions if it went remote in the 2020-21 academic year. However, since Harvard had already 
announced a remote-only fall term and Michigan’s public peer institutions overwhelmingly cancelled in-person 
reopening plans or never had them in the first place, this explanation does not seem entirely consistent with my 
understanding of the facts at the time or since.   
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the university president over a possible campus appearance, the union’s officers and staff 
realized that contractual guarantees of safe working conditions offered a useful lever for 
demanding accommodations around any potential incursion of neo-Nazis and white 
supremacists.333 Union members had also used this language to argue that the university’s 
climate plan and militarized police counted as making working conditions unsafe for present and 
future GEO members. The most important factor in the union’s rhetoric around safety, however, 
came from the national union with which GEO is affiliated, the American Federation of 
Teachers. AFT president Randi Weingarten, normally an avatar of respectable, centrist unionism, 
announced at the national federation’s biannual conference in late July 2020 that local unions 
could authorize “safety strikes” against unsafe in-person reopening plans with the full backing of 
AFT.334 While it was unlikely that AFT Michigan or the national federation would ever endorse 
broad anti-policing demands specifically, and the Huron Valley Area Labor Federation had long 
been divided on how to respond to ongoing police violence, GEO now had an opportunity to 
articulate a set of strike demands that the national federation would be obligated to support. 
Because of the union’s previous advocacy for a broad reading of workplace safety, the 
administration’s thoroughgoing disregard for student and community safety, the rising opposition 
to police violence in the summer of 2020, and AFT’s new commitment to support “safety 




333 In the end, antifascist activists’ counterdemonstration at Michigan State University, which had been forced by a 
court decision to allow him to rent a meeting space at the fringes of campus, drove off so many of Spencer’s 
supporters that he cancelled the remainder of his college tour because such appearances “aren’t fun”. Martin Slagter, 
“Richard Spencer rethinking plans to visit UM after violence at MSU”, MLive, March 12, 2018.  
334 Brakkton Booker, “Teachers Union Oks Strikes If Schools Reopen Without Safety Measures in Place”, National 
Public Radio, July 28, 2020.  
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members realized that only large-scale direct action had a chance of changing the university 
administration’s direction.  
As GEO carried out its eight-day strike, the second full strike in its history, a group of 
union members situated the strike within a broader vision of radical solidarity. Alejo Stark, 
Jasmine Ehrhardt, and Amir Fleischmann argued that GEO’s articulation of safety from the 
pandemic and safety from policing offered a valuable new vision of labor solidarity:  
“…by articulating two seemingly different set[s] of demands, GEO is insisting that 
‘safety’ and ‘security’ aren’t two separate subjects. Take, for example, the university’s police 
force’s name: the Division of Public Safety and Security. GEO is insisting that such security 
forces do not make us safe. And the COVID demands speak to a different vision of safety, where 
the health of the community is not subordinated to the university’s bottom line.  
This is a strike with an abolitionist strategy. Its demands are squarely contractual, 
inseparable from our working conditions, while also beyond a single contract. Such demands are 
exactly the kind the labor movement needs to make to address the wide range of miseries all of 
us, union and non-union workers, face.”335  
By connecting a set of radical and controversial demands, this articulation enabled the 
union ultimately to put another crack in the university administration’s firewall between 
mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects. The university administration promised to talk to 
the Students of Color Liberation Front and to GEO about reviewing the ambassadors program, as 




335 Stark, Ehrhardt, and Fleischmann, “University of Michigan Graduate Workers Are on Strike”, Jacobin, 
September 11, 2020.  
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settlement.336 Two days later, the administration unceremoniously announced the cancellation of 
the ambassadors program.337 This was the first reduction in campus policing as a response to 
student or union activism in the history of the University of Michigan, and contradicted repeated 
administration statements before and during the strike that the university would never negotiate 
on policing with the union. This policy change, like the others in the strike settlement, fell far 
short of a truly safe and just pandemic response, and as predicted, the university became a center 
of the pandemic’s resurgence in Washtenaw County.338 Indeed, the union’s acceptance of the 
strike settlement spoke to years of financial damage inflicted by state and federal “right to work” 
laws, leaving the union unable to absorb the financial costs of continuing to strike in the face of a 
legal injunction that would be waived if the strike settlement was accepted. The university’s 
injunction not only “requested relief against GEO in excess of $25,000”, but also named any 
union members and anybody else cooperating in a continued strike as targets, meaning that 
anybody continuing the strike would be personally vulnerable to arrest and to fines of $250 per 
day of continued action.339 Nonetheless, the strike made historic progress in forcing the 
university to negotiate on issues it never would have negotiated otherwise, and the union 




336 The Students of Color Liberation Front is a coalition of the Black Student Union, United Asian American 
Organizations Executive Board, La Casa, the Arab Student Association Executive Board, and Students Allied for 
Freedom and Education, formed during the GEO strike after the administration ignored the first four organizations 
in designing and implementing the Michigan Ambassadors program. See BSU, UAAO, La Casa, and ASA, “Op-Ed: 
A call to end the Michigan Ambassadors program”, Michigan Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), September 7, 2020.  
337 Emma Stein and Allex Harring, “University to end controversial Michigan Ambassador program”, Michigan 
Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), Friday, September 18, 2020.  
338 David Jesse and Kristen Jordan Shamus, “Washtenaw County issues two-week stay home order for U-M 
students”, Detroit Free Press, October 20, 2020.  
339 Emma Ruberg, “Facing legal pressure, graduate students accept University’s proposal to end strike”, Michigan 
Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), September 16, 2020.  
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other union employees who acted in solidarity, and non-unionized undergraduate and staff allies.  
Probably the strongest evidence that GEO’s “safety strike” rhetoric successfully 
articulated safety from the Covid-19 pandemic and safety from police violence came two days 
into the strike, when the university offered a standard carrot-and-stick offer for an end to the 
strike. The carrot, minor movement on workplace safety measures with no mention whatever of 
policing – an issue, the administration reminded the union, entirely outside the collective 
bargaining system – left nobody in the union satisfied. The stick, however, frightened many 
members and a majority of the union’s elected leadership: an “unfair labor practice” claim filed 
with the state government, along with other threats against the union and its members. In a long 
and contentious mass meeting, members eventually chose to reject the elected officers’ majority 
recommendation (accepting the administration’s offer) in favor of continuing the strike. This 
decision reversed a straw poll, taken early in the meeting, in support of accepting the 
administration’s offer. While it is impossible to know exactly what was in the minds of hundreds 
of union members who changed their minds, those who spoke in opposition after that straw poll 
heavily emphasized the safety articulation: for the union to give up one aspect of safety in favor 
of progress on another would demonstrate its lack of solidarity, and the union either supported a 
safe campus for everybody or it didn’t. The reversal of members’ positions, from a substantial 
majority leaning toward accepting the administration’s offer to an overwhelming majority 
rejecting it, suggests that the safety articulation, and the rhetoric appealing to solidarity over fear 
of management reprisals that set up and reinforced that articulation, did important work in 
members’ deliberation.  
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3. Community Support and the Limits of Coalition 
While GEO made significant efforts to mobilize community support behind both strikes, 
and many people donated time and energy to the picket lines, money to strike funds, and food to 
strikers during both strikes, organized allied groups were overall much stronger and more 
effective in their support in 1975 than in 2020. In 1975, many allied organizations had either 
developed from New Left and civil rights organizing in the previous decade, or traced their 
origins to efforts to build on and extend the previous decade’s struggles. These organizations, 
recognizing opportunities in GEO’s struggle, chose to echo, affirm, and endorse the union’s 
rhetoric and therefore motivated their members to join in the shared struggle. In 2020, the overall 
organizing climate was not as impressive, but some organizations – especially the broader labor 
movement, and exploited undergraduate workers hoping to unionize – did offer important 
solidarity during and after the strike. GEO, however, had mixed success in rhetorically 
summoning community support; while the union’s safety articulation was highly successful in 
mobilizing latent support for the union’s goals, it was less effective in persuading those who did 
not already support the full strike platform.  
Mirrored Rhetoric in the 1975 Strike 
As the 1975 strike approached and then proceeded, allied organizations came to regularly 
adopt GEO’s rhetoric when announcing their support for graduate workers. The Undergraduate 
Support Committee – undergraduates working to bring students to the picket lines – perhaps 
hewed most closely to the union line in a flyer simply titled “GEO on Strike – WHICH SIDE 
ARE YOU ON?”:  
“Undergraduates, graduate students, the faculty, and even department heads supported 
going into binding arbitration. Yet the administration refused. They refused because they wanted 
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to drive a wedge between these groups, making it appear like their interests are opposed. 
Realizing that our interests are the same, we must work together for the strike.”340  
The authors referenced compensation, anti-discrimination demands, and class size limits 
as particularly closely linked to student interests: graduate employee compensation affected their 
teachers’ ability to focus on their academic work; anti-discrimination would advance the interests 
of minority undergraduates; class size limits would both immediately serve undergraduates and 
create more jobs for students hoping for an academic future. Various New Left successor 
organizations similarly endorsed GEO’s claim to represent a broad front of campus movements. 
During the Third World Coalition’s occupation of the administration building, which was 
protected from police interference by a large group of GEO-led students ringing the building, the 
Revolutionary Student Brigade argued that  
“What the University would like to see is Third World Students and whites divided and 
GEO isolated from the rest of us students. But what we’ve got to see is that our struggles are 
linked and that a victory for one will make us better able to strike blows against the University. 
…Winning these struggles will strengthen the overall movement on this campus.”341 
The Spartacus Youth League, New American Movement, and Young Workers Liberation 
League similarly supported the strike, albeit often critically and while highlighting each other’s 
real and perceived transgressions. In each of these cases, the support emphasized the ways in 




340 “GEO on Strike: WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?” (Bentley Historical Library, Sandy Silberstein Box 1, “1974-
75 (including strike)”).  
341 “UNITE TO WIN!” (Bentley Historical Library, Dan Tsang Box 1, “GEO Topical Files Printed and press release 
material”). Emphasis in the original.  
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matching a GEO spokesperson’s statement that GEO’s strike “is in the interest of every other 
union on the campus, in the interest of progressive education, and all the students as well.”342  
By representing a broad range of demands within the rubric of “union issues”, GEO’s 
most important achievement may have been organizing labor support behind demands that much 
of the labor movement might otherwise not have supported. While organized labor in southeast 
Michigan had begun to recognize the value of affirmative action programs by 1975, most labor 
unions were less thoroughly persuaded to oppose homophobia. Nonetheless, as the strike built 
momentum, the United Auto Workers, AFSCME, Michigan Education Association, and 
Michigan Federation of Teachers all sent speakers to a meeting of the university’s board of 
regents. Regent Deane Baker adopted a particularly homophobic line when asking a UAW 
spokesman whether GEO, “by supporting non-discrimination on the basis of sexual preference, 
advocated homosexuality and lesbianism”, and the UAW spokesman dismissed the question as 
an obvious distortion that “[did] not deserve a reply”.343 The Huron Valley Central Labor 
Council donated to the strike fund, and among a broad range of labor organizations that endorsed 
the strike, the Washtenaw County Coalition of Labor Union Women explicitly endorsed GEO’s 
affirmative action demands. The next year, with GEO’s active engagement, the Michigan 
Federation of Teachers also passed a resolution urging locals “to bargain for affirmative action 




342 Lisa Katz, “GEO readies strike vote”, Michigan Free Press, February 3, 1975.  
343 The anecdote is recorded in GEO’s strike news bulletin, The Picket Line, Vol. I No. 8 (February 21, 1975). See 
also Jim Tobin, “Fleming, GEO clash; exchange ‘bad-faith’ bargaining charges”, Michigan Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), 
February 21, 1975.  
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point forward.344   
Finally, with the union having adopted and even radicalized positions previously taken by their 
allies, allied groups also found an opportunity for further mobilization. Statements issued early in 
the GEO strike by MECHA, the organization representing Chicano students at the time, and by 
the Black United Front document this opportunity. MECHA’s statement described GEO’s 
demands as “a moderate and reasonable position on affirmative action which deserves the 
support of all groups systematically excluded from the resources of this University”; the Black 
United Front’s statement echoed this assessment, and called for “a serious consideration of the 
present proposal as a mere beginning of a strong and effective affirmative action program.”345 
Activists on campus had long moderated their own demands for a genuine commitment to fair 
hiring practices, in favor of building larger coalitions in support of their high-profile student 
strike and similar direct actions. When the union made these earlier demands its own, 
organizations demanding racial justice believed that they had room to move to the left, and did so 
with some success. When MECHA, the Black United Front, and a few smaller organizations 
formed the Third World Coalition Council and announced revised, more radical demands, they 
were able to secure new recognition and programs for Chicano, Asian-American, and Native 
American students, and the university briefly increased Black student enrollment. The 
TWCC/BAM II actions very probably would have escalated further had the university not 




344 Early drafts of this resolution can be found in the Bentley Historical Library, Dan Tsang Box 1, “GEO Topical 
Files: Michigan Federation of Teachers”.  
345 MECHA, “Chicanos Unite with GEO”, Bentley Historical Library, GEO Box 9; Black United Front, “Blacks & 
GEO”, Bentley Historical Library, GEO Box 2. Emphases in the originals.  
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occupation of the administration building approached. Unconscionable infringements on 
management rights, which the university had refused to negotiate on for eight months, had 
suddenly become a lesser evil that management was happy to accept. 
Safety, Abolition, and Coalitional Limits 
While the union’s rhetoric in 1975 gained legitimacy and support from allied 
organizations, the union’s safety articulation in 2020 was less successful. On the one hand, 
justifying the strike in terms of safety helped ensure that officials in the American Federation of 
Teachers’ Michigan and national ranks publicly supported the strike. Efforts to persuade 
members of local unions not to cross picket lines, on the other hand, relied far more on appeals to 
maintain traditional solidarity across the labor movement – and to strategic targeting of different 
job sites on most days of the strike, so that no one job site had its workers too heavily burdened 
by missing work – than on the union’s official political positions. Indeed, GEO’s own record of 
solidarity was probably the most important factor in local building trades unions’ honoring of the 
GEO strike. GEO members had not only honored picket lines in Washtenaw County, but 
repeatedly showed up in significant numbers to informational pickets and strike pickets of the 
United Auto Workers, the Bricklayers, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and 
the Michigan Nurses’ Association, among others.346 Whether conservative, progressive, or 




346 In early October 2020, a month after the strike, at least seventeen GEO members attended the line of Sprinkler 
Fitters Local 704 for two days, continuing this history of solidarity and forcing a quick resolution of the Sprinkler 
Fitters’ concerns.  
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and honored the GEO line. Where the 2020 strike received support from the labor movement, 
then, this support depended on considerations other than the union’s public-facing rhetoric.  
Other communities, on whose support GEO also depended, seemed similarly 
unpersuaded by the safety articulation. To put it bluntly, for organizers, activists, and individuals 
who already felt that police make people less safe, GEO’s articulation of safety from the 
pandemic and from police violence was highly persuasive; for those who did not already share 
that perspective, the strikers’ rhetoric often succeeded in persuading them against the university 
administration’s reopening plan, but much less against campus policing. Overall support for the 
strike was quite high; hundreds of faculty members signed a solidarity letter endorsing the strike, 
while many students joined picket lines, spoke out in support of the strike, or – in the case of 
residential staff, whose safety the university had jeopardized in its reopening plans – went out on 
strike themselves.  
Much of this support, however, emphasized the medical aspect of safety, sometimes at the 
detriment of the union’s policing demands. In some cases, faculty, union leaders, and community 
members who union activists knew sympathized with at least some of the policing demands 
nonetheless expressed concern that the union’s contract was not the right place to secure such 
demands, as the conversation around the demands necessarily excluded entities other than the 
union and the university administration. In principle, many union activists would have preferred 
a broader and more public process for developing demands around safety from police violence 
and coercive administration policies, but felt that the union had compelling reasons to press a 
radical agenda forward and draw community support for that agenda. The problem with the 
safety articulation, then, was strictly practical: it was more effective at activating latent support 
than persuading new people to adopt the union’s position.  
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Late in the first week of the strike, the union and some of its allies supplemented the 
safety articulation with the claim that GEO and its allies were engaged in an “abolitionist strike”. 
While initially coined in radical media coverage, many strikers and allies on the picket lines 
adopted the term as capturing the urgency and significance of the common struggle. At times, 
this and similar phrases supplemented the safety articulation, as when Stark, Ehrhardt, and 
Fleischmann explained that a “strike with an abolitionist strategy” meant advancing demands 
that both advanced the union’s contractual rights and continue struggles that reach far beyond 
any one contract. However, this rhetorical framing is best understood as a populist appeal that 
attempted to characterize the university administration as complicit in (and in some ways 
embodying) structures of institutional racism, classism, and extractive capitalism, thus justifying 
increasingly confrontational strike tactics. In this role, the phrase “abolitionist strike” functioned 
as an empty signifier, uniting the various opponents to the university administration with respect 
to the depth of their opposition, asserting that only deep and radical change would remedy the 
harm done by the university, and specifically referencing the university administration’s 
complicity in ongoing racial injustice. The turn to this rhetorical frame therefore de-emphasized 
the specific content of different groups’ grievances, concerns, and demands in favor of the 
negative equivalence of opposition to a highly unpopular university administration.  
It’s possible that the turn to abolition as a rhetorical frame will, along with GEO’s 2020 
policing and racial justice demands and the union’s broader history at the university, contribute 
to cultivating broader movements in cooperation with anti-racist organizations on and near the 
University of Michigan campus. As argued in Chapter 5 and as observed in the 1975 strike, 
radical appeals and demands can alter public discourse and open space for further organizing; I 
will discuss this possibility further in the following section. Similarly, abolitionist slogans had 
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appeared on the picket lines before the “abolitionist strike” label appeared in media coverage or 
in union leaders’ speeches, and seeing this label in media coverage and hearing it in the union’s 
new rhetoric energized many strikers. At the same time, much like the previous articulatory 
strategies, this one worked much better within the union’s membership and among already-
dedicated strikers than it did among those who were on the fence, or who were generally 
sympathetic but not present in the many collective actions in and around the strike. The turn to 
an abolitionist framing was especially ineffective in reaching those whose frustrations with the 
university administration were most limited to the pandemic response. Those who had 
experienced conflict with the university president, conservative members of the board of regents, 
and high-level administrators for the previous several years – and activists in labor unions 
representing University of Michigan employees and racial justice organizations demanding 
change on the Michigan campus were at the top of this list – were often disposed to think the 
worst of these administrators and officials; those who simply wanted a safer reopening plan had 
not necessarily developed such an oppositional relationship.  
At a more fundamental level, the “abolitionist strike” language pointed past the horizon 
of presently achievable demands in a way that demonstrated the inadequacy of those demands. 
This is not a new problem; it has always loomed over workers’ attempts to use a contract with 
their employers to codify demands that call into question the relationship between labor and 
capital. However, the attempt to rally substantial community support, in the name of demands 
and concerns that unavoidably reached beyond and outside the experience of union members as 
union members, posed the problem in a new way. An organization that exists to democratize the 
workplace could, in principle, build history and institutions for a democratized workplace that 
would remain relevant beyond the need to bargain with private or hostile “public” management. 
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Demands that greatly expand the power and autonomy of a workers’ organization, then, may 
compromise the authority and legitimacy of the employer (no wonder employers react so harshly 
when protecting “the rights of management”!) but do not similarly challenge the union. When 
fighting for demands that exist outside and beyond the wage labor relationship, however, GEO’s 
rhetoric pointed to its own insufficiency as an agent for enacting those demands, as well as to the 
incapacity of management for granting them. It follows that while activists could use the 
organization’s history and achievements to demonstrate their intentions and sincerity, the 
organization itself did not comprise an adequate representative body for the shared struggle.  
4. The “Common Good” and Paths Forward 
Each of these appeals depended on the perception that the union’s struggle was an 
effective one for advancing shared demands. Union members and sufficiently pragmatic 
members of potentially-allied communities may share this perception, but for different reasons: 
union members, because the union stands as an obviously effective agency for advancing the 
interests they identify with; potential allies, to the extent that they see the union as a presently 
effective agency for advancing their interests. It follows that to mobilize broader communities in 
the union’s support, the “union issues” articulation in all its forms depends on some connection 
to those broader communities. Perhaps the union can directly reach out to concerned 
communities, via a sustained dialogue in which the union’s activists and community members 
co-create platform demands or via a compelling and persuasive representative claim, or the union 
can rely on other organizations to mirror its rhetoric and thereby symbolically reinforce its value 
to community members, as when the Third World Coalition/BAM II member organizations 
endorsed the 1975 GEO strike and portrayed it as a shared struggle for racial justice on campus. 
In considering possible improvements in the union’s recent strategies, I examine a sustained 
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practice of outreach and organizing under the concept of “bargaining for the common good”, and 
also consider the possibility of a broader abolitionist or anti-racist movement with campus and 
community organizations. In either case, the union’s outward-facing rhetoric would require 
consideration and refinement based on extensive community contacts, so as to develop a 
convincing articulation of the union’s platform as reflecting a collectively-developed “common 
good” or a sustained and developed engagement with anti-racist partner organizations. 
“Common Good” Organizing 
What could the union have done to persuade more people during the 2020 safety strike? 
To some extent, this question asks how rhetoric crafted to persuade people within a particular 
community – a local union in which solidarity based on the safety articulation would reach a 
wide variety of members and help them find strength to begin and continue a strike – could have 
become rhetoric that more effectually reached people with less or no experience in such a 
community. Some activists during the strike turned to an attack on the university’s overall 
austerity policy – laying off instructors and nurses, for example, in the middle of a pandemic, and 
providing ill-prepared housing with poor or sometimes no food to students who reported Covid-
19 symptoms – as an example of the administration’s lack of care for the broader community, 
and of better uses for the university’s substantial real-dollar increase in police funding during the 
pandemic. When the union donated food to hungry quarantined students, this appeal and the 
union’s commitment to students’ wellbeing probably did gain some good will. Others in the 
union suggested that people didn’t need to feel particular affinity with all of the union’s demands 
to join in achieving those demands that they did identify with. This appeal, however, would have 
proved more persuasive if there were a broader variety of demands that the union could articulate 
through its ongoing struggle with the administration. As it was, the safety articulation – effective 
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as it was in uniting union members around the strike – made it a little more difficult to include 
demands that otherwise fit with a formula such as “a safe and just pandemic response”: for 
example, ending and reversing layoffs among lecturers and employees of the UM hospital 
system. Ultimately, in the context of a “common good”-oriented contract campaign (during 
which the union would typically approach job actions and mass mobilization with five to seven 
key demands), these problems would be less serious because the union’s rhetoric could more 
easily reach a wider variety of subject positions.  
A project of “bargaining for the common good”, to effectively construct a common good, 
would need to do two things that the union did not effectively accomplish in its 2020 campaigns. 
First, the success of teachers’ unions in similar campaigns in Chicago and Los Angeles drew 
substantially on mobilizing existing community organizations in support of those unions, and 
this involved a longer and more sustained conversation between union members and community 
organizations than the union has yet accomplished. It is too soon to tell if the union is taking that 
path forward, but two developments suggest that it may do so: post-strike attempts to build 
relationships with community organizations in Washtenaw County, and the increasing growth 
and strength of racial justice organizations on campus in the wake of the strike. A larger number 
of partner organizations, co-creating the demands advanced in a collective bargaining campaign 
and offering marginalized voices in support of demands that the union claims to create a more 
just knowledge community, would offer important validation to the union’s rhetorical claims that 
its agenda, not that of university administrators, best reflects an achievable common good.  
Second, the union would need to identify worries among the thus-far less active or union-
friendly sectors of students and graduate workers (historically, concentrated in the College of 
Engineering and in STEM programs more broadly) and offer persuasive solutions for those 
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worries. These efforts are not new – notably, efforts to organize students in the sciences and in 
engineering played a significant role in GEO’s attempt to unionize research assistants in 2012, 
and similar efforts from 2018-2020 contributed to GEO’s recent interest in affordable housing – 
but these efforts require more effort and concentration. By more consistently identifying concrete 
problems that underorganized graduate workers experience and moving to address those 
problems, the union can draw these individuals into a practice of improving working conditions 
through collective effort and thereby ground appeals to a common good that effectually includes 
and advances a range of otherwise disparate and incommensurable individual goods. Put simply, 
the experience of collective effort that helps achieve one’s own goals translates readily to the 
belief that collective effort to achieve another member’s goals is worthwhile, and rhetoric that 
reminds people of past and present successes will empower them to achieve future successes.  
Anti-Racism, Abolition, and Developing Partner Organizations 
One might defend the union’s strategy on the basis that by activating latent community 
support – representing a set of otherwise-quieter voices in such a way that those voices grew 
louder – the union’s demands contributed to a broader conversation about ending police violence. 
Many of the faculty in Michigan’s Department of Afroamerican & African Studies signed an 
open letter in which they “applaud[ed] GEO for linking their employment demands to calls for 
justice, the protection of the health and safety of our community and the absolutely relevant de-




347 DAAS faculty, “Op-Ed: Statement in support of GEO strike & associated student activism”, The Michigan Daily 
(Ann Arbor, MI), September 15, 2020.  
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who had condemned the Ambassadors Program (and, during the strike, merged into the 
“Students of Color Liberation Front”) all strongly supported both aspects of safety that the 
strikers tried to advance; the following winter (February 2021), the SOC LF released a 
comprehensive list of demands to advance racial justice on campus, again setting up GEO’s 
strike platform as a relatively moderate position on which to expand.348 Strike endorsements and 
material support from the campus and Huron Valley chapters of the Democratic Socialists of 
America, as well as from racial justice organizations and activists throughout Southeast 
Michigan and nationwide, demonstrated the union’s success in activating radical anti-capitalist 
and anti-racist organizations and activists.  
Understood this way, the union’s efforts to present and justify radical demands were not a 
failure; nonetheless, these efforts also have not proven successful. A strategy of activating and 
supporting partner organizations requires those organizations to grow, develop, and exert 
political influence. Where BAM, Third World groups, the Gay Liberation Front, and other 
organizations had independently developed and functioned as successful partners in the 1970s, 
the campus and community organizations that might form a new emancipatory force have yet to 
build and wield independent power in a sustainable way. While this broader organizing effort 
continues, then, GEO members will need to engage in further community outreach, either 





348 Paige Hodder, “Students of Color Liberation Front releases anti-racist demands for UM administration”, The 
Michigan Daily (Ann Arbor, MI), February 8, 2021.  
 251 
5. Conclusion 
The Graduate Employees Organization at the University of Michigan owes both its 
historical and present successes and, in the final analysis, its existence to an ability to persuade 
individuals to fight for each other as well as for themselves. This persuasive capacity offers two 
sources of collective power. It means that the union, through organizing and rhetorical practices, 
produces members who are willing to show up for collective action – mass gatherings, sit-ins, 
job actions, strikes – in order to achieve the goals that they set for themselves; at the same time, 
by uniting members with a variety of concerns in struggle to advance each of those concerns, the 
union makes it more difficult for management to buy the membership off with minor concessions 
in any one area and therefore makes it more likely that management will eventually make 
sufficient concessions on each of the major demands.  
When a political contest expands beyond the solitary organization, however, a new set of 
rhetorical problems arise. This expansion, and these problems, are inevitable in any organization 
that seeks to advance more than the simplest of singular interests. Even strictly oppositional, 
negative projects, such as “NIMBY” movements that exist purely to prevent some development 
or infrastructure project from happening, often find themselves in a situation where they must 
rhetorically justify their existence with reference to separate vocabularies, interests, and 
experiences that their members and potential members work within. In the case of an 
organization like GEO, success in many struggles can only be achieved if the organization 
persuades broader communities and organizations to join in those struggles.  
This persuasion, however, typically cannot depend upon the accountability and 
experimentation that the process of deliberation within mass meetings provides for the 
organization itself. Instead, the organization has to somehow demonstrate its commitment to the 
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needs and goals of its potential partners. It can do this through sustained dialogue and 
collaboration with another established organization, in which case activists are relying on that 
other organization’s credibility in order to gain the additional support they require. On the other 
hand, an organization can attempt to directly gain supporters through accurately evaluating 
individuals’ latent concerns and designing an agenda that successfully represents those concerns. 
In each of these possibilities, however, the use of rhetoric to create solidarity is fundamentally 
asymmetrical. That is, where the practices of a democratic, organizing-based organization can 
build solidarity through processes of mutual accountability, when that organization attempts to 
build broader support, it must attempt to represent others’ interests either indirectly, based on 
dialogue with other organizations who hope to direct their members toward a mutually useful 
goal, or directly, by appealing to individuals on the basis of an imperfectly informed assessment 
of their goals and needs. In either case, the formation of deeper affective and discursive ties 
depends on getting new people “in the door”, so that the rhetoric and behaviors that build more 
durable solidarities have time to work. And in either case, the organization’s ability to invite new 
members or new partners depends heavily on other people’s efforts and success, whether 
drawing on existing powerful efforts, as the GEO of 1975 did in its struggles for affirmative 
action and non-discrimination, or when drawing on existing but disorganized frustrations and 
suffering, as the GEO of 2020 tried to do in building support for a campus safe from both 
pestilence and policing. 
 253 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
I began my reading of Aristotle by claiming that the self-contained political production of 
the Aristotelian regime offered reassurance against the alleged dangers of rhetoric, but within 
constraints – a narrow, tightly defined conception of who counted as citizens, with the large 
majority of a political community unquestioningly excluded from political life – that we rightly 
reject today. The final chapter in the dissertation suggests an important addendum to this claim: 
deliberation within well-organized, solidaristic participatory spaces can also be robust, with no 
need for the kind of categorical exclusion characteristic of the Aristotelian polis. These spaces 
may not comprise an entire society – it would be strange to find the shared principles and 
common purpose necessary for such deliberation across an entire society – but they are enough 
to enable collective reflection, persuasion, and action.  
The collective aspect of persuasion was evident, in a minimal form, in the earliest parts of 
the dissertation. For ancient theorists of rhetoric, to be sure, the individual nature of the speaker – 
a person using the techniques of eloquence to craft appeals to an audience – was obvious and 
inescapable. Nonetheless, in the archetypal case of rhetoric for Aristotle and Plato, the assembly, 
the audience was both a large collective and the product of the regime’s production. Even in less 
typical cases, such as the far smaller cast of characters in Plato’s Gorgias, the choice even to 
engage in conversation required a kind of collective consent. It was not until Hobbes that the 
collective production of the audience was replaced with a sweeping array of individuals: a single 
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sovereign educator in the figure of Pericles, used by Hobbes to warn against individual 
rhetoricians and their controversy-stirring appeals, and portrayed as encouraging audience 
members to calculate their self-interest and listen to their fears as individuals. Madison’s single-
person factions, equally fearful and self-interested as Hobbes’ hoped-for readers if not inclined to 
the same solutions, similarly learned to distrust individual bad actors and appeals to form 
collective attachments outside of the national order.  
Even in Hobbes’ and Madison’s times, individual speakers, as represented by figures as 
different as Pericles, a hypothetical sovereign, parliamentary or factious demagogues, or even 
Madison himself, were rhetorical constructs, abstracted from community and context in order to 
exaggerate their political significant. For their influence, such speakers depended on broader 
material and political supports, from printing presses, to friendly churchmen, to the social 
resources required for training in eloquence. Today, speakers’ greater reach comes almost 
entirely from the far greater material and social resources that they enjoy, and from the audiences 
whose interests have been produced on an unprecedented scale. As a result, the apparent 
influence that today’s most prominent politicians possess is less their own than, perhaps, at any 
previous historical moment. The possibility, and indeed the responsibility, of producing 
audiences that will reject appeals we consider harmful or contemptible therefore cannot be 
avoided. In every way that matters, it is up to us to build the spaces in which we attempt to 
persuade each other.  
With that in mind, it is worth considering the connection between principle, in the general 
sense of seeking liberation and wellbeing, and strategy, in mobilizing political movements via 
counterhegemonic articulation. In theorizing rhetorical appeals that reinforce reactionary politics, 
I have repeatedly returned to the claim that material conditions of racial capitalism and 
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longstanding racialized conceptions of individual and national self-interest tend to produce 
audience members who understand reactionary politics as advancing their own interests, and 
therefore that such audience members serve as willing accomplices to such projects rather than 
the manipulated dupes of far-right politicians. In rejecting worries about rhetoric as a practice of 
manipulation, then, I have cultivated far more serious worries about the nature and origins of the 
political and social institutions of the United States. Nonetheless, I maintain that the theory of 
rhetoric that I have advanced in this dissertation is, on balance, good news for those of us who 
seek emancipatory and egalitarian political change. A pessimistic assessment of rhetoric as a 
political practice undermines the very possibility of political intervention, while a similarly 
critical assessment of present political conditions motivates such intervention. Moreover, just as 
rhetoric that produces fear, hatred, and a commitment to hierarchy and inequality will tend to 
produce subjectivities that resist emancipatory appeals, rhetoric that produces a concern for 
liberation, dignity, and wellbeing and an opposition to relations of subordination will tend to 
open possibilities for more egalitarian and creative collective deliberation. A counter-hegemonic 
struggle therefore offers the possibility, not only of ending specific harmful institutions and 
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